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The purpose of this thesis is the examination of the suitability
of the construction management approach for use by the U.S. Navy in their
military construction program. A systems analysis approach was used in
developing the topic because the system of facility production within
the Navy is a complex one and the application of a technique like
construction management to this system could create significant impacts
on the entire process. In this paper the goals and objectives of the
Navy's military construction program are presented as well as the existing
system that implements the program. The performance of the existing
system is also discussed. Then construction management alternatives are
explored and the performance of these alternatives as now used by
governmental agencies is presented. Hypothetical application of con-
struction management to the Navy's construction program is demonstrated
through the use of model systems and the effects on the system as a
whole are discussed. The thesis concludes with recommendations concerning
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The term "construction management" (CM) is a "buzzword" V7ithin
construction circles which is being used more and more frequently.
Readers of the construction industry trade journals cannot help noting
the published claims of success of projects performed through the use of
CM
(1) A $12 million, eleven building classroom and laboratory health
sciences complex completed in 1970 at the Stony Brook Campus of
New York State University in less than nine months after signing
of the architectural contract.
(2) A $21 million, seven story graduate laboratory
at Stony Brook occupied 21 months after the architect was
commissioned
.
(3) The $22 million expansion to the Greater Cincinnati Airport to be
completed in 33 months claims to be delivered 55 percent cheaper
and three years faster than similar facilities provided in a
conventional manner.
(4) A $40 million, 1.2 million sq. ft. office building built in Dallas,
Texas in 24 months - a time saving of 12 months.
These quotes are likely to be viewed with great enthusiasm by those
frustrated by the traditional methods of converting a facility requirement
into concrete and steel. Those who have become seasoned veterans in the
construction business and who are less idealistic will naturally look upon
such published claims with a degree of skepticism. Since many of these
construction "vets" occupy vital roles in the industry, their skepticism
is understandable, for adoption of any of the CM techniques could have
significant impacts on their own organizations as well as the whole
construction business. Thus, CM deserves close scrutiny as to what it is,

v?hat it can accomplish and what its potentialities are if decision-makers
are going to effectively evaluate this alternative system of procuring
construction.
1.2 Construction Management - The Term
What is construction management? This is a very difficult question
to answer since the word "construction" and the word "management" are both
sources of considerable confusion in themselves. Webster defines the word
"construction" as "the act of putting parts together to form a complete
integrated object." In industry practice "construction" is used in a
variety of ways and scopes. "Construction" can be restricted solely to the
building phase of a project - the implementation of the plans and specifica-
tions. "Construction" many times is used to describe the process of design-
ing and building a project, since design is a prerequisite of putting work-
in-place. "Construction" is even stretched to include the early planning
stages of a project as far back as identification of the requirement for a
facility. The end product of the process is a facility. The facility was
produced by the act of building which followed the designer's intent. The
designer's product was based upon satisfying a need. "Construction" is
frequently applied to all these segments of the facility production process.
Thus, the word "construction" can be the source of some confusion in itself.
Webster defines the word "management" as "the conducting or super-
vising of something especially the executive functions of planning, orga-
nizing, coordinating, controlling and supervising an industrial or business
project or activity with responsibility for results," and "the judicious use
of means to accomplish an end." This definition coupled with one's experi-
ence validates that the term "management" can be a confusing term as well.
When the two words are combined to form the term "construction
management" the confusion which surrounds the term is also multiplied. The
foreman who supervises a crew of carpenters could consider himself a con-
struction manager. After all, he directly supervises labor in applying
material resources to construct an end product. The subcontractors who on

many projects physically do 70-80 percent of the work can consider
themselves construction managers. In addition to being the organization
responsible for putting the bulk of the work in place, the subcontractor
is closest to the actual work itself . The subcontractor must plan his portion
of the work, order and receive the material, ensure that his workforce is on
site when required, and ensure that the work is in accordance with the
plans and specifications . No one can deny that the subcontractor is a
construction manager. The general contractor will be the first to say
that he is a construction manager and that he always has been. The general
contractor has the ultimate contractural responsibility to provide the
facility in accordance with the plans and specifications. He manages the
portions of work done by his own forces in the same manner as the sub-
contractor. He also coordinates, schedules, and directs the subcontractors.
Management of the construction process is important to him, since he has
usually agreed to build the facility for a fixed amount of money. Waste
and mismanagement can produce significant losses to the general contractor.
However, there are other organizations outside the ones that physically
construct the facility that frequently lay claim to the term "construction
management .
"
Architects and engineers (A-E) may claim that they perform construc-
tion management. Drawing the plans and writing the specifications determines
the work which a contractor will have to perform, controls the materials
which he will use, and many times even specifies the method in which they
will be applied. The A-E also inspects the work and approves shop drawings
and material submittals to ensure compliance with design intent.
The owners, particularly large, industrial corporations or some
federal government agencies have sophisticated facilities engineering divi-
sions which plan and program construction requirements for their parent
organization. Although most design and construction is actually performed
through contracts with A-E's and contractors, the in-house expertise of
these organizations allows them to exercise tight control over the process
of facility production. For example, the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFAC) performs this function for the U.S. Navy and in some cases
for other services and agencies. In addition to maintaining and operating

world wide Navy shore facilities, NAVFAC also identifies and plans for
facility requirements, develops projects to satisfy these requirements,
assists decision-makers in determining the priority of projects, obtains
funds to accomplish the projects, and designs and constructs the projects.
Most projects of significant size are designed by private A-E and
constructed by contractors, but NAVFAC closely monitors the design and
construction. In some cases NAVFAC may perform design and/or construction
In-House. In any case, there is little question as to why NAVFAC and
other similar organizations perceive themselves as construction managers.
There are other organizations who exercise influence in the
management of construction. Banks and lending institutions exercise control
by perhaps limiting the size, scope and nature of projects the owner can
undertake, and they often influence whether or not a contractor can even bid
on a project. Bonding companies are keenly interested in the efficient
management of a project to ensure their contractors remain solvent.
Safety organizations such as the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) control the construction to the extent that certain
safety features are provided for in the new facility and that safe con-
struction practices are used. Insurance companies likewise are interested
in the safe management of construction and they use inspection, investiga-
tion, and their rate structure to exert some control over the process.
Testing firms and laboratories exercise control over construction by cer-
tifying that material specifications have been achieved. Even professional
and industrial associations have a role in construction management.
The American Institute of Architects (AIA) , American Society of
Civil Engineers (ASCE) , Consulting Engineers Council, National Society of
Professional Engineers (NSPE) , Associated General Contractors of America
(AGC) and like organizations set standards of performance that their members
are to abide by in the process of designing and constructing. Other organi-
zations set the standards for materials. The American Society of Testing
Materials (ASTM) , American Concrete Institute (ACI) , American Institute of
Steel Construction (AISC) , and other similar organizations influence the

construction process in this way. Therefore, depending on one's role(s)
in the multi- faceted construction industry the perceptions of what the
term "construction management" means can be very diverse. To maintain
understanding throughout the rest of this thesis, the need for defining




The term "Construction Management" on a given project shall mean:
(1) The application of construction expertise to the design phase in the
form of market analysis, estimating, cost alternative generation,
constructability control, and contract packaging decisions
(2) The supervision, coordination and inspection of the multiple con-
tractors and the provision of construction support items in the con-
struction phase
(3) The responsibility for the scheduling and control of cost and time
for the integrated process of design and construction, and
(4) The delivery of services in a professional manner
Further "construction management" as defined shall hereafter be referred
to as "CM" to reduce the possibility of confusion with other roles in the
construction process. This attempted definition of CM can now at least
provide a boundary in which the further discussions of the CM approach
can take place. A comprehensive discussion of CM is covered in Chapter 4.
1.4 CM - Its Origin
CM certainly did not evolve based on the brainstorm of some profit-
hungry entrepreneur. It was not developed specifically to slash construc-
tion time, or specifically to combat inflationary forces. Its origin is
rooted in a much deeper cause - that of owner dissatisfaction. Owners as
the users of newly constructed facilities have become increasingly dis-
satisfied with the ways buildings are designed and constructed. John H.
Newman of Tishman Realty and Construction Company, Inc., a large owner-
builder, gave a fair appraisal of the attitude of many owners when he said,
"Owners are tired of buildings that don't work as intended and don't get
built on time or within the budget." These owners as facility users may

be completely ignorant of the science of design and construction; however,
common sense tells them something is lacking in the design and delivery
of construction.
Generally speaking, it has been the lack of effective management
that has created the disdain for the design and construction process.
Years ago during the Industrial Revolution the manufacturing industry was
faced with the problems of planning, designing, implementing, operating,
controlling, and coordinating production processes. Then these production
processes had to be integrated with the processes of marketing, selling
and servicing the product. Without the coordination and control that the
management process provides, the large industrial firms of today simply
could not exist. The twentieth century has seen a rapid development in
the art and science of management, due to the critical needs of industry.
These critical needs are just as apparent in construction today as they
were in the manufacturing industries decades ago. Construction has
become a complex business - buildings and facilities are more complicated
to construct; a multitude of building materials are available on the
market; designs are more intricate; the construction product must be
suitable to its environment; the cost of construction has skyrocketed;
and the new construction worker is well paid, educated and quite
independent.
An official of the General Services Administration identified
the problems which prompted owners to switch to the CM method more
specifically as:
(1) increased cost of construction
(2) lower productivity of construction resources
(3) increased complexity of projects
(4) increased involvement of communities in environmental considerations
(5) rapidity of change
(6) general contractors high contingency cost included in his bid to
offset the above conditions

1.5 CM - The Functions
Contrary to the impression left by most periodical articles
that CM firms perform all the management functions required on a construc-
tion project and do them well, the CM ' s responsibilities are quite
specific, though they may vary from job to job. The CM system brings into
the design phase construction-oriented inputs which are usually not
included under the traditional system. Since construction contracts are
awarded to numerous contractors rather than a general contractor under
this system, the CM actually assumes most of his responsibilities during
the construction phase. The difference is the relationship of the builder
to the owner. While a general contractor's relationship is strictly "arms
length," the CM-owner arrangement is intended to be professional, which
should give the owner more control over his project. The CM works for a
fee and in many cases bears no financial risk in the project, which
should reduce the conflict of interests between the owner and CM. Some
prefer to say, "He's on the owner's team."
To illustrate the scope of a CM's typical responsibilities, the
following list of functions is provided. They will be discussed in detail
in Chapter 4.
PREDESIGN
Performs Construction Market Study
DESIGN PHASE
Provides Construction Economy Inputs
Performs All Estimating
Provides Bid Packaging Recommendations
Performs Design Reviev/s
Makes Long Lead Material Procurement Recommendations
BID PHASE
Assists in Potential Bidder Identification
Serves as Bidder Information Source
Advertises, Holds Bid Openings and Awards Contracts (optional)

CONSTRUCTION PHASE
Provides Temporary and Common Use Facilities
Directs, Schedules and Coordinates Contractors
Maintains Quality Control Program
Performs Initial Progress Payment Review
Initially Processes Change Order Requests
Provides Initial Shop Drawing Submittal Review
Maintains Project Safety Program
ALL PHASES
Produces and Updates Integrated Project Schedule
Maintains Project Management Information System
1.6 CM - The Benefits
The CM approach to construction procurement allows the overlap of
the design and construction phases
, which is sometimes called "fast- tracking.
"
This allows the construction phase to be started when the working drawings
and specifications are complete enough for a logical beginning, such as the
site preparation and excavation. Thus, phased construction allows for
timesaving. Since work is bid a short time before it is actually supposed
to start, the bidders can reduce their contingencies because the uncer-
tainty of labor and material cost fluctuations is reduced. Time and cost
savings should also accrue from the CM ' s efforts in the design phase to
make the project construction efficient. The quality of the project
should be ensured since the CM has no financial interest in "cutting
corners," and his professional reputation and his ability to get more
jobs depends on his ability to deliver quality projects on schedule and
within the budget. Although the previous description may sound like an
endorsement of CM, it must be recognized that CM is different in many
respects from a traditional technique of procuring construction where
design, bid, and construction are basically treated as three separate
sequential phases. Replacing a tried and true system, even though it may
not be the most efficient, with a new method must be approached with
careful and thoughtful analysis. This paper is intended to serve as a
beginning in such an analysis.

91.7 Why Study Of?
Some people may question the need for studying the CH approach.
Perhaps some have semantical difficulties with the words "construction
management" as discussed earlier in this chapter. Perhaps some see any
break from traditional modes as an indicator of subsequent organizational
upheaval. However, any system which has the potential of being more
responsive to an owner's or facility user's needs is worthy of examination
no matter what that system may be or may claim to be.
Peter Drucker says, "Managers must learn to build and manage an
innovative organization. They must learn to build and manage a human
group that is capable of anticipating the new, capable of converting its
vision into technology, products, processes and services - and willing
and able to accept the new."
Therefore, two reasons are offered as to why this topic should be
of specific interest to the Navy. The first is a defensive motive to
protect one's self and to remain flexible to a changing environment in
order to permit continued procurement of construction in an effective
manner. One authority has predicted that 50 percent of all building
construction will be done on a design-build concept within five years.
The second is an offensive motive designed to exploit potential gains
which could make the facilities production more effective for the Navy.
1.8 Management Analysis
If the CM method is to be adequately explored for use by the Navy,
then a systematic approach to management analysis must be used. It has
12been written that vje should "beware of technique advocates." One should
consider the entire system in which we function before committing an
organization to a new "idea." One aspect of a system may be optimized to
the detriment of the other parts and even the system as a whole. Thus,




The systems approach initially gives the "big picture" from
which specifics of the overall system can be focused on as required. In
a complex setting such as the Navy and its facilities arm, NAVFAC , new
techniques such as CM must be evaluated in a systems context in order to
be properly assessed. Systems approaches are becoming more and more
accepted as an evaluation tool, and this is evident with the increasing
concern about things such as life cycle costs, environmental impacts, and
energy efficiency. De Neufville and Stafford provide one of the simplest
descriptions of a systematic analysis by identifying the five basic steps
as: (1) definition of objectives, (2) formulation of measures of
effectiveness, (3) generation of alternatives, (4) evaluation of the
alternatives and (5) selection. The reader will note that these steps
emerge in the model used to outline the logic of this thesis presented
later m this chapter.
Management analysis, in addition to being systems oriented, should
also evaluate alternative operating systems and subsystems with respect to
an organization's ultimate purpose and the resources that are available to
implement the system. Gerald Nadler developed the model shown in Fig. 1.1
to illustrate this notion. He states that the first requirement of an
organization is a purpose and the second is resources required to achieve
the purpose (Step 1) . The presence of certain resources or the non-
availability of others can affect the stated purpose or generate additional
ones. Thus, there is an interaction between purposes and resources (Step 2).
In order for resources to be employed to satisfy the purposes, systems
must be developed (Step 3). Systems also have a feedback effect on pur-
poses and resources. A change in a management system can require
use of different resources and can even eliminate organizational purposes
14(Step 4). The key concept here is that purposes, resources and systems
all interrelate with each other, and this interaction is extremely impor-
tant when considering the application of a system like CM for use in the





PURPOSE < 5^ RESOURCES
Step 2
PURPOSES < > RESOURCES
SYSTEMS'
Step 3
PURPOSES < > RESOURCES
CVCTT?-MC tSYSTEMS'
Step 4
Source: Nadler G. , VJork
Fig. 1.1. Nadler's PRS Model.
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Another perceptive notion that can be very useful and complimentary
to a systems analysis is one promulgated by Russell Ackoff. He
distinguishes between solutions which are of an optimizing character and
those which are of an "adaptivizing" character. The quantitative world
of operations research has introduced the widespread notion of optimization,
Ackoff maintains that too often the goal of planning is optimization - how
can the existing system be made more efficient? He maintains that the
focus of planning should be "adaptlvization." This is a broader approach
that seeks to consider the total system and develop alternatives which will
make the system more effective rather than just more efficient. Where
optimization may try to develop a more efficient stacking arrangement for
pallets in a warehouse, adaptlvization may determine that the warehouse is
not needed at all by making some other changes in a plant's operation.
The foregoing notions can be viewed as purely theoretical; however, this
writer believes that analyses of problem areas, existing systems, and
alternative proposals can be much more comprehensive when evaluated in
adaptive systematic contexts, even if only used in a quantitative sense.
None of these "academic" notions suggest the exclusion of "real world"
problems that could impact on a proposed alternative. In fact, the way
they are postulated seems to encourage consideration of all possible
impacts. When a decision-maker adopts an adaptive-systematic frame of
mind and momentarily removes himself from the arena of the day's business
to stand back and view his organization and proposed alternatives as they
affect the "big picture," he becomes more perceptive and more effective
as well.
1.9 Purpose and Scope of Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is the examination of the suitability
and potential benefits of using CM for the procurement of NAVFAC contract
construction. Can CM be of some use to the Navy? Can it help the Navy to
accomplish its missions, goals and objectives more effectively? Can CM
achieve more productivity out of each tax dollar NAVFAC has allocated for
construction? The scope of the study shall be of an exploratory nature,
for this thesis is not designed to present a comprehensive action plan for
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implementation of CM within NAVFAC. But hopefully, it will serve to
answer general questions in the readers' minds about the CM method,
the NAVFAC construction system, and the possible impact of the use of CM
by NAVFAC. The exploratory character of the study may also open up topics
for future study.
1, 10 Methodology of Thesis
A model of the methodology used in this thesis has been adapted
from a management systems model developed by Dr. Eugene Konecci of the
Graduate School of Business of The University of Texas at Austin. The
model is depicted in Fig. 1.2 and the elements of the model are numbered
to correspond with the following explanation:
(1) First the goals and objectives of the system must be stated. In
the case of the Nav>' the beginning point would be the mission of the
Navy, followed by more specific goals, particularly relating to
shore facility requirements and construction of new facilities.
Certain assumptions may have to be added to begin the process of
translation of these goals into a program.
(2) The translation of goals into a program must first be "strained
through the constraint sieves." The various sieves could represent
different levels of constraints placed upon the development of a
program. For example, sieve A could represent congressional con-
straints; sieve B, Department of Defense constraints; and on down
through NAVFAC policy constraints. The sieve notion does not neces-
sarily have to follow organizational lines. For example, one sieve
could be used to indicate behavioral or public opinion constraints.
The sieve idea can be viewed in the context that sieves to the left
are more fixed than sieves to the right. To illustrate this point,
it is logical to assume that changing a law, a Congressional con-
straint, would be significantly more difficult than changing NAVFAC
policy.
(3) The next input to the system is the available resources. Resources
could include talents, organizational structures, funds.
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information systems or any item which allows goals to be translated
into a program.
(4) The next logical step is the statement of the program, which is the
plan to be implemented to bring about realization of the stated
goals and objectives. This will be the statement of NAVFAC's
existing program for the planning, programming and acquisition of
facilities
.
(5) Following the statement of the existing program, alternatives will
be introduced and discussed. These include the forms and features
of CM that could conceivably be applied to the Navy's construction
procurement system.
(6) The next step in the model is the performance measurement phase.
This phase measures the effectiveness of the various techniques
of construction procurement, which include the existing system
as well as the alternatives. The evaluation will attempt to
stress functional strengths and weaknesses of systems and
techniques. This will be augmented by results from actual projects
to the maximum extent possible.
(7) The subsequent setp will be a synthesis of the evaluated
alternatives into hypothetical models for use in procurement
of contract construction by the Navy. Trade-offs that must be
made to arrive at these various models will be discussed. The
impacts, consequences, and required changes which will occur as a
result of implementation of these models will be predicted. The
feedback loop represents the effect of using a model or the various
components of the system. For example, the use of a particular
model system could require changes in various constraints to
allow it to be used or to -be effective. It could even impact on
the resource structure and on the way the existing program is
stated. Although this thesis will make one cycle within this
system, the initial feedback will be predicted.
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(8) The final step is the output statement, which will present the
conclusions and recommendations resulting from this study. The
recommendations will provide follow-up actions which can be
taken.
To apply the model to the actual presentation of material in this
thesis, the following should serve as a guide. The discussion of goals
and objectives, constraints and resources is contained in Chapter 2
while the existing program statement is presented in Chapter 3. The
discussion of the alternate CM systems and techniques is discussed in
Chapter 4. The evaluation phase is covered in Chapters 5 and 6.
Chapter 5 is an evaluation of the existing Navy system and Chapter 6
evaluates the alternative CM systems. Chapter 7 is the presentation of
hypothetical construction procurement systems for use by the Navy and a
discussion of what feedback these system.s might return to the earlier
stages of the model. Finally, Chapter 8 will be the output or the con-
clusions and recommendations for further study and action.
It should be noted that this thesis represents only one pass
through the model. To properly treat a topic such as CM, numerous
cycles must be made through the model with each pass analyzing more
specific elements of the system and more quantitatively oriented data.
This paper should help in determining whether subsequent passes through
the model are necessary at all.
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THE OBJECTIVES AND ENVIRONMENT OF NAVY CONSTRUCTION PROCUREMENT
2.1 General
This chapter will seek to establish (1) the objectives for which
Navy contract construction is performed, and (2) the environment
which constrains and provides resources to the planning, designing, and
building of new facilities.
2.
2
Fundamental Objectives of the System
To begin any systematic analysis one must have a clear idea of v/hat
the basic goals and objectives are of the organization in which the study
is being made. The fundamental objectives of the entire organization need
to be considered, even though on the surface this may even seem extremely
elementary. At best, it can serve to eliminate choosing alternatives which
actually impede an organization from realizing its goals.
In the context of construction procurement by the U.S. Navy, there
are three levels where basic purposes are defined. Hopefully, the Navy
construction program is seeking to support these objectives. The three key
levels where the purposes of the defense structure and facilities support
emerge are
:
(1) the Department of Defense (DOD)
(2) the U.S. Navy
(3) the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC)
A presentation of the defense hierarchy structure and how NAVFAC '
s
construction program fits into accomplishing the goals of national
security is included for those unfamiliar with the subject. Assuming




construction function within the Navy to the intimate knowledge of it as
possessed by the Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) officers and NAVFAC employees,
meaningful conclusions could not be drawn from a presentation of alterna-
tives without knowing the goals of the defense structure and how the
Navy's construction system seeks to fulfill these goals.
The Department of Defense maintains and employs armed forces to
(1) Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic;
(2) Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the
United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest;
(3) Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United
States; and
(4) Safeguard the internal security of the United States.
The fundamental objectives of the Department of the Navy, within the
Department of Defense, are
(a) To organize, train, equip, prepare, and maintain the readiness of
Navy and Marine Corps forces for the performance of military missions
as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, and
(b) To support Navy and Marine Corps forces, including the support of
such forces and or forces of other military departments, as directed
by the Secretary of Defense, which are assigned to unified or
specified commands. Support, as here used, includes administrative,
personnel, material and fiscal support, and technological support
2
through research and development.
The purpose of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command is to pro-
vide support to the operating forces of the Navy, the Marine Corps, other
components of the Naval Material Command and other offices and organiza-





Though these missions do not give any information on how things
operate, they do give a statement of purpose - a statement of what the con-
struction program is trying to assist. The next step then is to examine the
environment in which the construction program must operate.
2.3 Environment
The environment for Navy military construction includes many segments
such as
:
(1) the military environment
(2) the public environment
(3) NAVFAC's organizational structure
(4) the construction industry
2.3.1 Department of Def ense/U.S. Navy Environment
2.3.1.1 Organization
The military environment here means the Department of Defense and the
Department of the Navy. Figure 2.1 shows the organization of DOD and how
the Navy fits into the national defense structure. The Department of the
Navy is located on the readiness and support side of the organization and
the arrows flowing to the operational side indicate to what element of DOD .
the support is directed. Figure 2.2 shows the basic organization of the
Navy, with NAVFAC located under the Chief of Naval Material as one of
the principle systems commands. NAVFAC, through its headquarters and
field activities, provides facilities support to the operating forces
of the Navy and Marine Corps.
NAVFAC functions much as the facilities arm of a large company
would. The big difference, of course, Ls in the nature of the require-
ments. l-Jhile a company's investment in construction is in expectation of
eventual financial returns, the Navy's investment in facilities is for
different reasons. The Navy expects a return, but is expects it to be in
the form of enhancing of the naval service's ability to accomplish its
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been attempted. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, wrote in
1963 that a strict quantitative analysis of the submarine based Polaris
IRBM system to the land based Minuteman system, would show the Minuteman
as much more cost efficient than the Polaris. The procurement costs of the
Polaris missiles are higher; a submarine is an expensive launching platform
requiring two large crews, port facilities, two months a year overhaul time,
and time to move on and off station. The Polaris is reportedly less destruc-
tive and less accurate than Minuteman. But what about the invulnerability
of the Polaris, and the resultant diversion of Soviet military resources into
antisubmarine warfare investments? Emphasis on easily quantifiable figures
can distort the picture. "Simple dedication to efficiency in the spirit of
4
operations research might easily lead to the wrong decision." Thus, the
simple quantitative oriented present value models of the enlightened busi-
ness executive are insufficient. Major military decisions must then be
more qualitative in nature. Theoretically, the Navy is more interested in
what a new weapons system, or a new drydock,or a new training facility will
do for them in terms of better accomplishing their mission without regard to
cost. However, there is much concern about cost in military decision-making
for this is due to the influence of the public environment. It is impera-
tive, though, that decision makers view alternatives first in terms of their
impact on mission accomplishment. Over quantification can lead to systems
which appear to be cost effective, but which, in fact, may be mission
ineffective.
2.3.1.2 Requirements
The nature of the requirements of the military are such that great
premiums are placed on responsiveness and flexibility. This responsive
stance extends into areas of construction support as well. The Navy
Seabees
' primary function is to provide advanced base construction for
military operations at any point on the globe. However, military reactions
to events in the Western Pacific could very likely cause a significant
increase in activity at a Navy ammunition depot in Oklahoma. That event
could also cause the transfer of several fighter squadrons from the East
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Coast to the West Coast. Such sudden shifts or changes in activity could
strongly affect facility needs in a short time frame. If new construction
is required to fill these stateside needs, then these requirements will
most likely be satisfied through contract construction. The quick readjust-
ment of the posture of the armed forces can impose a very short planning
horizon on the delivery of construction, creating a challenge for a process
which is normally quite deliberate.
The rapidly changing events in the military environment may not
only be in response to worldwide military and political actions, but they
could also be the result of technology breakthroughs such as the introduc-
tion of a new type of aircraft, a new missile ora new waterborne surface
craft for which existing support facilities may not be adequate. Other
events such as an energy crisis, new environmental standards, and highly
political decisions (i.e., base closures and realignments), can affect
facility requirements in a sudden fashion. As a result, defense construc-
tion agents, like NAVFAC, are expected to react in an expeditious manner to
see that the newly created requirements are satisfied.
2.3.2 Public Environment
Unlimited resources, however, are not available to dedicate to a
"super responsive, mission-oriented Utopia." The public environment acts
as a continuing constraint on the military establishment through civilian
control as guaranteed by the Constitution and Congress. The Congress,
through its powers, controls the activities of the armed services. Not
only are specific actions and practices of the military controlled to soine
extent by the Congress, but also the allocation of financial resources by
the legislative branch is a strong constraint on defense programs and
activities. The Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for the annual
military construction programs designating which projects the services can
build within the fiscal year. The most significant document in control-
ling the procurement methods of contract construction is the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation (ASPR) . This manual, published and continually
updated by DOD, is the written intent of governmental policy with respect




The manner in which the Congress conducts its business has a
profound effect on military construction (MILCON) programs. The annual
budget approval process that Congress utilizes has a significant effect on
the manner and speed in which construction can be procured.
2.3.2.1.1 Government Accounting and the Congress
The accounting system of the government affects decisions for
military construction. The federal system is based on a cash budget rather
than an accrual system which is the primary system of business. Expenses
are not shown until cash payments are actually made. Award of a construc-
tion contract may obligate funds for use on a particular project, but no
costs are expensed until a payment for the work is made. Large projects
which may service the government for 50 years are not allowed to be expensed
over the life of the facility, but rather are completely expensed by the end
of the project. This type of system does not give an accurate picture of
the assets held by the U.S. government, but it may be congruent with the
goals of many Congressmen as they view government spending. Many of these
statesmen view government spending programs, of which construction is a
primary one, as a means to bolster (1) the economy of their regional con-
stituencies and (2) the national economy as a whole. Thus, the effect of
government spending is not felt by the economy until payments are made for
services rendered. Finally, the nature of the government accounting system
may seem inefficient from the manager's point of view, but it suits the
requirements of the Congress.
2.3.2.1.2 Budget Control and the Congress
The MILCON budget is one of the most closely scrutinized budgets
the Congress reviews before approval. The goals of the Congressmen who
review the MILCON program may be very diverse, but there does seem to be
some common concerns and areas of emphasis that have significant influence
on the way funds are authorized and appropriated. The questions contained
in Appendix A were posed in a letter to Senator John Tower (R- Texas), and
his letter reply is shown as Appendix B. Gil H. Woerner of NAVFAC , who is
directly involved in the preparation for and in the proceedings of
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Congressional subcommittee hearings on the MILCON budget requests, was
interviewed by the writer regarding the areas of concern to the Congress-
men. The interview and the letter both indicated that (1) validity of
construction requirements, and (2) cost are the prime concerns of the law
makers. The manner in which projects are implemented, their responsive-
ness in meeting the need, and the progress of construction are of little
concern to the legislators, other than in the case of severe cost problems
or highly unusual circumstances. The government overhead cost in connec-
tion with construction has also been the topic of some concern to the
various subcommittees. This is understandable since it is actually part
of the total construction cost.
In deciding at what magnitude to finance the proposed MILCON
program, the Congress does view the success with which the preceding
year's program has been obligated. Obligation here means that the
construction contract for a project has been awarded. This has no bearing
on the physical progress of the job or the amount of payments made, but it
is some measure that the project is at least in the construction phase.
As Mr. Woerner explained. Congress tends to underfund the proposed
MILCON budget in proportion to the size of unobligated portions of last
year's appropriation. Therefore, there seems to be some correlation
between success in obligating one year's budget with the success in
getting a higher percentage of next year's budget appropriated.
2.3.2.2 Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR)
The ASPR is the document that implemented the Armed Services Pro-
curement Act of 1948. A letter from the President to the Secretary of
Defense on 16 February 1948, stated that this act was the basic policy
of the Government with respect to military procurement and even though the
services were granted some latitude in their procurement methods under the
Act, the basic need remained to assure favorable price and adequate service
to the Government. This was to be primarily achieved through formal
advertising with a fair share of all procurement to be awarded to small
o
business concerns. The ASPR clearly reflects this intent. In the General
Provision section of the document three objectives are stated very clearly:
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(1) All procurements, whether by formal advertising or by negotiation,
shall be made on a competitive basis to the maximum practical
extent.
(2) Purchases and contracts for supplies and services shall be made
by formal advertising in all cases in which the use of such method
is practical and feasible under the existing conditions and circum-
stances.
(3) It is the policy of DOD to place a fair proportion of its total
purchases and contracts for supplies, research and development,
and service (including, but not limited to contracts for mainte-
nance, repair and construction) with small business concerns.
2.3.2.2.1 Formal Advertising
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation outlines the requirements
for the entire bidding process-solicitation, submission and award. The
award must be made to the lowest responsible bidder whose bid is
responsive to the Invitation for Bids.
2.3.2.2.2 Negotiation
ASPR is very clear in defining when negotiation is permitted and who
has the authority to authorize it. In regard to construction negotiation,
this is only permitted for:
(1) National Emergency declared by the President or Congress
(2) Public Exigency such as fire, flood, explosion, other disasters, of
a structure and/or its contents which are in immediate danger.
(3) Small purchases less than $2,000 for construction.
(4) Personal or professional services
(5) Purchases outside the U.S.
(6) Supplies or services for which it is impractical to secure competi-
tion through formal advertising
(7) Experimental, developmental or research work
(8) Classified purchases
13
(9) Negotiation after advertising fails.

28
Contracting officers are further constrained in that
determinations and findings must be made to justify entering into negoti-
ated contracts and to justify the type of contract being used. The
hierarchical level at v/hich determinations to negotiate can be made are in
some cases very high. For example, only at the Secretary of Defense level
can reasons (7), (8), and (9) above be used to justify negotiations.
2.3.2.2.3 Small Business
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation requires that all
proposed procurements for construction between $2,500 and $500,000 be
automatically set aside for small business concerns to bid. In general
construction, a small business contractor is defined as one whose average
annual receipts for the last three years do not exceed $7.5 million. For
subcontractors, different amounts are specified depending on the type




The ASPR seeks to maximize competition throughout all the levels of
contractual relationships that may result from the basic procurement
contract
.
Plans, drawings and specifications or purchase descriptions shall
state only the actual minimum needs of the Government and describe
the supplies and services in a manner which will encourage maximum
competition and eliminate insofar as possible, any features
which might limit acceptable offers to one supplier's product,
or to the products of relatively few suppliers. -^
Proprietary specifications are not allowed, either directly or indirectly.
Thus, the public environment imposes the reality of cost and the
mechanisms necessary to protect public funds as constraints on the
military's plans for mission accomplishment.
2.3.3 Naval Faci lities Engineering Command Organizational Environment
The organizational structure and operating procedures of NAVFAC
can also be considered an environmental factor in the procurement of
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construction by the Navy. Although NAVFAC provides construction services
for the U.S. Navy, this is only one of its functions. Since the facilities
planning and contract procurement process will later be discussed in
detail, this section will give an overview of the functions that NAVFAC
performs
.
NAVFAC is charged with:
(1) Support and training of the Naval Construction Force (SEABEES)
(2) Designing and Constructing all shore facilities and deep ocean
structures for the Department of the Navy and other agencies when
assigned
(3) Planning for all shore facilities requirements
(A) Maintenance and operation of the Navy's shore establishment
(5) Management of the Navy's real property
(6) Research and development work on problems related to NAVFAC 's
functional areas
(7) Maintaining readiness for contingency actions, limited or general
war for mobilizations areas that involve ''lAVFAC functional areas.
(8) Assure the readiness and capability of Civil Engineer Corps
officers and Seabees in the Naval Reserve in the event of
mobilization.
The functions of NAVFAC involve more than just new
construction for the Navy. The organizational relationship that exists
with other parts of the Navy for accomplishing these functions adds even
more complexity to the situation. Examples of these organizational com-
plexities are :
(1) Even though NAVFAC is concerned with maintenance and operation of
Naval shore activities, the funds for this function are allocated
by the major command who is the primary user of the base. Thus,
NAVFAC must provide guidance for management of the Public Works
Department, technical assistance, and assistance to the major
command in determining the funding levels required to maintain and
operate the base.
(2) NAVFAC is primarily a Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) command, but it
does not have complete control over CEC officers. The Bureau of
Naval Personnel assigns them, the Navy Education and Training
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Comniand educates them, and the majority work in activities whose
chain of command does not include NAVFAC. However, the Commander
of NAVFAC is the Chief of Civil Engineers, so NAVFAC is looked to
for overall CEC manpower planning and CEC selection criteria. On
the other hand, all CEC officers feel that NAVFAC should look out
for Navy wide CEC interests.
NAVFAC is caught up in literally hundreds of these organizational relation-
ships and interdependencies , with some formally drawn and many which
are informal.
In summary, two points should be clear before looking at the formal
organization of NAVFAC and its subordinate commands.
(1) NAVFAC performs more functions than just design and construction
(2) NAVFAC does not exist in a vacuum, but in the complex organiza-
tional framework of the Navy within which many inter and intra-
relationships exist.
Figure 2.3 shows the organization of NAVFAC and its field activ-
ities. In addition to Engineering Field Divisions (EFD), which are
primarily of interest here, there are nine Public Works Centers which
provide common public works support to all commancs in large Naval com-
plexes and two Construction Battalion Centers which are home bases and
support sites for Naval Construction Forces (SEABEES).
The headquarters organization for NAVFAC is shown in Fig. 2.4. In
examining the organization, one can see that it is designed to cover the
functions previously mentioned in this section. The Deputy Commanders
for Facilities Acquisition (09A) and Planning (09P) are primarily concerned
with meeting facility needs by construction. The Commander of NAVFAC is
designated as the Contracting Officer for construction and other types of
contracts that affect shore facilities. NAVFAC realizes that efficient
implementation of the MILCON program and other construction programs cannot
be directly managed from Washington. Thus, NAVFAC operates largely on a
decentralized basis, with the Commander delegating most of his contractual
authority to the Commanders of the EFD's and EFD's being charged with the
responsibility for actually developing construction requirements and
executing the MILCON program. NAVFAC 's role becomes one of:
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(1) Basic policy formation
(2) Liason with major naval commands for which NAVFAC provides services,
as well as with other DOD and federal government activities.
(3) Management on an exception basis of problems experienced by field
activities
.
The Engineering Field Divisions are the regional arms of NAVFAC,
There are six EFD's and they work closely with all the Naval shore
activities in their geographic region on facilities matters. An
organization chart for a typical EFD is shown in Fig. 2.5. In fact,
their mission sounds much like the functions of NAVFAC that were listed
previously:
To accomplish the planning, design and construction of public
works, public utilities and special facilities including acquiring
and disposing of real estate of the Navy and other Federal agencies
and offices; to direct and administer the operation and maintenance
of family housing; to assist activities in the application of the
programs which are assigned to the NAVFAC for technical or manage-
ment direction; and to perform such other functions as may be ._
directly by the Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command.
In the realm of planning, design and construction, the EFD's are
the level in the hierarchy where:
(1) Detailed work is done in assisting shore activities in developing
planning
(2) Designs for major new construction are accomplished either in-house
or with private A-E, and
(3) Construction at shore activities is monitored.
These functions are handled primarily by the Facilities Acquisition
Department (09A) and the Facilities Planning Department (09P)
.
In order for EFD's to effectively operate on this decentralized
basis, the Commander of NAVFAC has delegated most of his contracting
authority to the Commanders of the EFD's. In using their contracting
authority to award and administer contracts, these Commanders are referred
to as Officers in Charge of Construction (OICC). The Commanders of the
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at Naval shore activities, so these officers become OICC's for limited
scope work. Two EFD ' s, Pacific Division and Atlantic Division, are so
large in geographic area and magnitude of workload is such that each one
has further delegated its design, construction and contracting functions
for certain locations to major OICC's. There are also two Officers in
Charge of Construction who report directly to NAVFAC. They were formed
to complete the specific tasks of building the support site for the
Trident Submarine in Washington State and the Uniformed Services Medical
University in Bethesda, Maryland. The organization of the OICC's is
similar to an EFD's 09A or Facilities Acquisition Department - its three
basic elements are design, contracts and construction divisions.
Each EFD and major OICC have numerous field organizations that are
headed by a Resident Officer in Charge of Construction (ROICC) to administer
contracts during the construction phase. These ROICC offices are
located at most major Naval facilities, and the size and extent of each ROICC
organization varies greatly with the volume and nature of the construction
being undertaken. An example organization chart is shown in Fig. 2.6. The
detailed functions of the ROICC will be explained later in this chapter.
NAVFAC 's multifunctional organization has an environmental effect
on the task of procuring contract construction. This multifunctional
purpose should not be ignored in determining the most effective system for
obtaining new facilities.
2. 3. A Construction Industn.
The final segment V7hich strongly influences the facility procure-
ment process is the construction industry itself. The strength of national
defense of the U.S. is largely a function of its industrial capabilities
and capacities. Construction for defense purposes is no exception. The
bulk of military construction is procured by contracts with the private
sector, so that the application of the resources of the construction
industry to defense projects has a significant impact on their outcome.
The industry is also extremely important to the economic condition
of our country, and likewise it is quite sensitive to the economic state of












Fig. 2.6. U.S. Navy Resident Officer in Charge of Construction.
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(1) 14 percent of the Gross National Product is accounted for by
construction
.
(2) 3,500,000 employees are directly involved in construction
(3) 16 percent of the nation's labor force is involved in construc-
tion related industries.
The construction industry has also been characterized as a back-
ward industry that is poorly managed.
Construction contractors, generally speaking, have been slow in
applying proven management methods to the conduct of their
businesses. Specialists have characterized management in the
construction industry as being 'weak,' 'inefficient,' 'nebulous,'
'backward,' and 'slow to react to changing condition.' This does
not mean to say that all construction companies are poorly
managed. On the contrary, some of America's best-managed
businesses are construction firms, and it may be noted with
satisfaction that the list of profitable construction companies
is a long one. Nevertheless, in the overall picture, the
construction industry is at or near the top in the annual rate
of business failures and resulting liabilities.
There are many reasons to dispute the claims of poor management by
contractors
.
(1) Construction projects are unique in character and do not lend
themselves to standardization.
(2) Construction operations involve many skills and are largely non-
repetitive in nature.
(3) Projects are constructed under environmental conditions of weather,
location, transportation and labor that are m.ore or less beyond
the contractor's control.
(A) The construction business is a volatile one, with many cyclical ups
and downs
.
These superficial reasons do not make the results any easier to
accept, however. Manufacturing productivity increased 25 times faster
than construction productivity in the period 1900 - 1952, and there is no
22
reason to believe that this trend has not continued. From 1969 to 1973
40 percent of all business failures were in construction. This is three
times the national average. Dun and Bradstreet indicated that 85 percent
f u 23or these construction failures were due to poor management.
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Experts in industry, government and education are trying to help
reverse the poor performance of the industry and in the process they are
exploding some of the myths that innovative management methods and techni-
ques originally used in manufacturing are not applicable to construction.
2,3.4.1 Contractors
For more insight into the construction industry one needs to know
the nature of the participants in the process and their relationships.
Contractors, for example, are mostly small firms. In 1970 there were
875,000 contractors in the U.S. Seventy-five percent of these employed
24
an average of eight employees or less. Seldom can one of even the very
largest construction firms garner over 1 percent of the nation's construc-
25
tion volume. There is no General Motors of the construction industry.
Contractors tend to specialize and organize themselves along functional
lines. It is not uncommon for a general contractor to perform only 15
percent to 20 percent of a job he has contracted for with his own directly
2 A
hired personnel. The rest of the work is subcontracted to specialty
contractors. Electrical, mechanical, sheet metal, steel erection, con-
crete, elevator, and masonry subcontractors are examples of specialty
contractors commonly found in most vertical construction projects, and
collectively they do the bulk of the actual work. The general contractor
has in effect, become a broker who contracts for the entire job under the
traditional lump-sum contract approach, and he then turns around and sub-
contracts with specialty contractors for most of the project. The general
contractor's function has become one of scheduling, coordinating, and
controling subcontractors in addition to supervising the work of his own
forces. Thus, the make-up of constructing organizations along functional
lines has helped to promote smallness. The divisibility of resources into
such small units could partially account for the slow pace of productivity
gains. The meager size and technical orientation of firms has prevented
them from investing in management improvements. National contractor
associations have also failed to fill effectively this void and they




The lack of managerial initiative by construction contractors is
substantiated by the presence of clauses in federal government contracts
which require builders to use management tools such as CPM (Critical Path
Method) schedules and to institute formal quality control programs.
2.3.4.2 Organized Labor
The nature of labor and particularly organized labor has a signifi-
cant impact on the industry, since construction is a labor intensive busi-
ness. The structure of organized labor with its 19 different construction
trade unions complements the specialty structure of the contractor previously
discussed. Contractors need flexibility to expand and contract their labor
supply rapidly, and to move great distances from job to job. The unions
provide a stabilizing function to the industry by
(1) Enforcing standards of work and compensation
(2) Conducting training programs
27
(3) Referring skilled specialists to work at the contractor's request.
Bargaining and the resulting agreements are primarily local func-
tions. The nation's 10,000 union locals do most of their own negotiating
with local contractors associations, since the unions tend to be better
organized than the contractors. Local agreements for a particular trade
are generally not coordinated with other agreements in the same geographic
area, and this results in a variety of expiration dates and work rules.
These staggered expiration dates may result in a succession of strikes that
28
"cripple" the progress of construction in a certain locality. National
unions and contractor associations play only limited roles in the bargain-
ing process. National unions do not become involved until they are
requested to approve a strike. National contractor associations have no
29power to intervene in local disputes and are too poorly staffed to do so.
In many cases national contractor associations and national union represen-
tatives reach agreements on issues menacing the "union" construction industry,
such as regressive work practices that promote gains by open shop contrac-
tors. However, these "far sighted" changes are very difficult to incorpor-






Labor's impact on construction is also a function of the nation's
economic condition. When the economy is booming, construction usually is
too; and labor is in short supply. In order to prevent successive work
stoppages, contractors consent to wage demands more readily. During a
strike union workers in one local's area can frequently work in a neighbor-
ing local's territory, so strikes frequently have less impact on the
workers than on the employers. Locals become quite militant and seek to
maximize wage gains and employment by sustaining regressive work practices.
Since the market price of labor is fixed and every "union" contractor
knows the unit cost of the other contractor's labor is the same, a con-
tractor can easily pass the cost of wage settlements onto owners in later
contracts without losing any competitive edge. Thus, the incentive is
31
not too great for contractors to staunchly resist wage demands.
When the economy is in a recession and construction activity is
low, the local unions seek help from the national hierarchy and they
tend to seek incorporation of national agreements into local contracts
to protect their share of the construction market from open shop encroach-
ment. Thus, the fragmentation of organized labo. has worked to exploit
the fragmentation of construction contractors by gaining phenomenal wage
increases. The inflated cost of construction has prompted the rise of
open shop contractors and the use of other techniques such as prefabrica-





Architects and engineers are another significant group involved in
the construction industry. They design the structures that are
to be built and they, too, tend to be a fragmented group of numerous firms
which usually specialize in various fields - architecture, structural,
mechanical, civil, electrical, foundation, environmental, etc. Architecture
and engineering firms are usually very small, employing an average of only
33
8 professional people. On a typical vertical project the architect is
the lead designer. He contracts with the ox<mer to produce the plans and
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specifications and oversee the construction. The architect then retains
firms involved in other disciplines to provide additional expertise. Thus,
the design is produced by a number of firms in the same way that construc-
tion is produced by a number of contractors.
Architects and engineers (A-E) have also tried to remove themselves
both physically and legally from the construction process. Frequent court
judgments against A-E's because of construction accidents and failures are
major factors in driving up the cost of professional liability insurance.
Many times the A-E's become targets of suits even though there is no apparent
contribution to an accident on their part. Since many contractors are
shielded from a suit by workman's compensation law, the A-E is the next
target. Thus, at a time when projects are becoming more complex and the
designer has much more of a need to gain knowledge from the field, he is
staying away from the job site for legal reasons.
A-E's have come under fire in recent years for elaborate designs,
lack of coordination among disciplines, poor estimating, and poor cost
control. One of the problems is that architectural and engineering
education programs give little emphasis to the subjects of estimating or
cost engineering. Peter Blake, an architect commenting on the state of
architecture said, "Expressing structure is driving builders mad, driving
34
clients into bankruptcy and driving architects into premature graves."
2.3.4.4 Integrating Forces
The fragmented construction industry and its participants are
showing some signs of integrating forces to bring the process back
together. In some cases, architects and engineers are combining to
provide a broad range of services within the firm. Out of the 1975
Engineering News Record's (ENR) top 500 design firms, 54 were listed
separately as design-constructors; with the top 16 doing a combined total
of $36 billion of construction work, with none of these 16 doing less than
$1 billion each. The $46.4 billion awarded to design-construction was up
46 percent from 1973. Of the straight design firms, 41 out of the top 50




the entire top 446 (46 percent) also provided these services.
Construction management will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4;
however, the trends indicate there are forces in the industry seeking to
integrate the design and construction processes. Many of the design-
constructors are also listed in the ENR's top 400 construction companies.
In fact, the top 14 construction companies in 1974 all provided design
services as well as construction. All but two of these firms provided
11 36CM services as well.
The construction industry is under great stress. As projects
become more complex, as environmental and energy factors concern
designers and even the operations of contractors, and as owners become
less patient because of inflationary forces, some segments of the
fragmented world of construction seek to become more integrated to over-
come these "hurdles." Considerable uncertainty must prevail concerning
the future state of construction. When economic recovery does become
complete and construction again nears full employment, will the industry
face outrageously inflated wage demands? What about the national labor
shortage that Drucker predicts to begin in the late seventies, due to a
37decline in the birthrate following the "baby-boom" years? What will this
do to a labor-intensive industry such as construction? Every owner who
procures contract construction must be sensitive to the changes in the
construction industry environment to determine how it will affect himself
and his organization.
2.4 Summary
This chapter attempted to provide the goals and objectives in
support of which Navy construction is performed. The environment in which
construction is pursued in support of the organizational objectives has a
significant effect on the responsiveness and effectiveness of new facility
production. This environment contains the constraints that must be over-
come and the resources that must be employed to provide new facilities for
the Navy. The next chapter will outline how facility requirements are
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The process of major facility procurement by the Navy is divided
into three phases: planning, programming and implementation. A thorough
understanding of the mechanics of turning requirements into completed con-
struction is necessary before alternative systems can be contemplated.
3.
2
Shore Installations and Facilities Planning and Programming System
The first two phases are encompassed by the Shore Installations and
Facilities Planning and Programming System (SIFPPS). This is perhaps one
of the most comprehensive planning systems developed by any organization.
The aim of the system is to ensure that resources allocated for shore
facilities are in balance with the requirements of Navy operating forces
and approved Navy programs
.
3.2.1 Facilities Planning
The system begins with assembling the support requirements of the
Navy and after numerous steps, it evolves into specific definitive
construction projects. The segments of the SIFPPS process are:
(1) Logistic Support Requirement
(2) Basic Facilities Requirements List
(3) Evaluations of Existing Shore Facility Assets
(A) Summary of Facility Excesses and Deficiencies





3.2.1.1 Logistic Support Requirement (LSR)
The LSR is the means by which all tasks, functions and workload of
a shore activity or command projected over an eight-year period, are identi-
fied and analyzed. This essential planning information for each activity
is delineated by:
(a) Mission, tasks and functions
(b) Activity organization and staffing requirements
(c) Interdependent relationships with other activities
(d) Loading plans (projection of personnel, ships, aircraft, etc.)
(e) Equipment inventories and allowances
2
(f) VJorkload analyses
The LSR is limited to peacetime planning, and is not intended to identify
3
support required for contingency or mobilization plans. The LSR prepared
by each shore activity must be approved by all superiors in that activity's
chain of command up to and including the Chief of Naval Operations, since
a shore installation's projected workload is normally a function of high-
level Navy and DOD planning. The LSR serves as the basis for determining,
developing and validating all facility requirements.
3.2.1.2 Basic Facilities Reauirements List (BFRL)
The BFRL enumerates the essential facilities required for the
activity to perform its missions, tasks, functions and workload as outlined
4in Its approved LSR. The BFRL denotes the facility requirements
(1) By type using standard Navy category codes and
(2) By quantities standard for each code
For example, U.S. Naval Station, Anyport, FL may require
(1) 10,000 FB (Feet of Ship Berthing) of General Purpose Berthing Pier
(2) 600 MN (Men) Bachelor Enlisted Quarters
(3) 25,000 SF (Square Feet) of Adminstrative Space
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These requirements are determined with the aid of published Navy planning
guidelines, and they are zero-base in nature; that is, they are listed
without regard to existing facilities. They are just what the name says -
basic requirements. The BFRL is prepared by each major shore-activity,
reviewed by the cognizant Engineering Field Division for technical adequacy,
and submitted through the activity's chain of command to NAVFAC for approval
.
3.2.1.3 Evaluations of Existing Shore Facility Assets
The purposes of this step in the planning process are as follows:
(1) To determine to what extent that existing facilities of an activity
satisfy the facility requirements established by the BFRL.
(2) To physically inspect the existing facilities to determine
structural conditions.
(3) To recommend changes in the current use of facilities in order to
achieve the optimum use of existing facilities to satisfy military,
operational and functional requirements.
(4) To determine if existing facilities, presently inadequate, can be
adapted to satisfy basic facility requirements.
(5) To recommend, when feasible, that a basic facility requirement be
modified to permit acceptance of something less than complete
satisfaction in order to make use of existing assets.
(6) To identify obsolete facilities that should be removed.
(7) To determine facilities excess to basic requirements that may be
reassigned or disposed of.
The cognizant EFD performs the on-site evaluations at shore activi-
ties at approximate frequencies of two years . The evaluation serves as the
step where the basic requirements are meshed with the existing facility
assets.
3.2.1.4 Summary of Facility Deficiencies and Excesses
The purpose of this summary is to provide all echelons of coBimand
with information relating to the extent to which basic facility require-
ments are not fulfilled by existing assets. It also provides initial infor-
mation as to the extent to which existing assets may exceed an individually
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categorized requirement. This report serves as a vehicle for development
of construction and/or demolition projects. It can also be used to trans-
fer functions from a "deficient" site to an "excess" site - a sort of
facility resource leveling.
3.2.1.5 Correction of Facilities Deficiencies
The purpose of this summary prepared by each activity with defi-
ciencies is to initiate incorporation of facility projects over $50,000
into the Military Construction Program. The summary of deficiencies dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph is used to determine the specific projects
required. The projects are listed (with other projects) in priority order
at each activity. The EFD assists in the preparation of this document to
ensure: (1) that projects are identified in an effective and logical manner
,
(2) that they correspond with the activities master plan, and (3) to give
a rough estimate of project cost. This report is submitted through each
activity's chain of command to its Superior-in-Command , which is usually
a major naval operational or support command (i.e., Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet; Naval Material Command,
etc.) In the planning realm of the Navy these commands are referred to as
major claimants, since they are the functional commanders and resource
allocators for large segments of the Navy. At this level the project
priorities within major command structures are determined. This report is
used to formulate the multi-year Military Construction Program prepared by
NAVFAC .
^
3.2.1.6 Military Construction Program Objectives (MILCON PO)
This is a report prepared by NAVFAC for all interested parties
which shows the proposed programming of military construction projects by
fiscal year. The MILCON PO can be used by an activity or command to
determine the general status of a project, to see if the project informa-
tion held by NAVFAC is valid, and to identify projects on which further
detailed development needs to be accomplished because of their inclusion in
an upcoming program. The Military Construction Program Objectives, the
final output of the Shore Installations and Facilities Planning and
Programming System, is the Construction Annex to the Secretary of the

A9
Navy's Program Objectives which projects Navy resource levels , procurements
,
Research and Development, and supporting programs for five years and the
9
force level objectives for three years.
SIFPPS then is a comprehensive and logical step by step system that
identifies the Navy's facilities deficiencies based on valid and substanti-
ated requirements. It is an economical system, in that extensive engineering
required for the preparation of detailed project write-ups and cost esti-
mates are applied only to those deficiencies which appear certain for
inclusion in next fiscal year's budget. By providing accurate knowledge
of the Navy's total facilities picture, it allows the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) and other major commanders to make meaningful mission and
workload assignments. Also, CNO and the Secretary of the Navy can make
decisions on the size of the Military Construction budget with a more
accurate knowledge of their implication.
3.2.2 Construction Programming
The distinction between where planning ends and programming begins
is not perfectly clear. Up to now, the SIFFPS has not been tied to a
specific time schedule because planning is a continuous effort. When
requirements change, the planning must also adjust. Ideally, then changes
in support requirement should be reflected immediately in the Logistic
Support Requirement, and subsequent planning documents adjusted in response.
Actually, each activity's LSR is updated annually and as a result changes,
if significant, may be reflected in the Basic Facilities Requirements
List and other planning documents. In general, the planning process is
continuous and responds mostly to changes in requirements. Programming
then is the process by which the products of planning are assembled into
a military construction proposal, and the proposal scheduled through the
various approval levels until it is ultimately approved by Congress. The
programming cycle for typical MILCON projects is shown in Fig. 3.1. This
chart also shows a common implementation or construction time to give the





3.2.2.1 MILCON Program Objectives and Construction Planning
The MILCON PO is the step where construction programming emerges.
The multi-year construction programming method used by NAVFAC is designed
to correct facilities deficiencies at a balanced rate within an established
time frame as permitted by budget constraints. The deficiencies are cate-
gorized into three areas:
(1) Investment categories which are facilities grouped into types such
as Training, Waterfront Operations, Personnel Support, etc.
(2) Investment programs to implement or improve an entire functional
system.
(3) Investment programs for accomplishment of master plans for specific
shore activities or complexes.
Items (2) and (3) are basically emphasis programs. After their share of
the budget has been determined, the remainder of the dollars available are
used in investment category groups.
3.2.2.2 Priority Determination
The allocations of resources for projects in investment categories
groups is a most difficult task since the deficiencies in this category far
exceed the annual budget. Thus, a priority rating system is used to deter-
mine the allocation of dollars to a major claimant within each investment
category. An Item Rating Value (IRV) is computed for each project by a
computerized, mathematical model which consists of the following five
independent factors;
(1) Mission of the activity where the project is to be located
(2) Degree of deficiency the project is to overcome
(3) Type of project expressed by category code
(A) Economic aspects of the investment
13
(5) Major claimant priority.
Those projects with the highest IRV's contribute to the total allocation for
an investment category. The dollar total of each major claimant's projects
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that have entered into this total allocation is the amount that the major
claimint has available in that investment category. The major claimant may
rearrange the order or priority of his projects for the upcoming budget
year, but he is constrained by his total allocation within each investment
category. Each of the major claimant's remaining projects over and above
his allocation are programmed for future years. This procedure is followed
14
for each of the investment categories for the five ensuing years.
3.2.2.3 Project Write-Up
When each major claimant knows his allocation for the program year,
he directs his activities to prepare project data sheet (DD1391) and a
facility study (DDl391c). A DD1391 is submitted on each project. This
form describes the size of the structure and the type of construction,
itemizes the cost estimate, provides quantitative data covering the total
requirement for and the availability of like facilities at the activity,
and gives a concise statement of the requirement for the proposed project
including the impact if the project is not provided. The DDl391c is used
to further explain the requirement. A DD1390 is also submitted which is a
summary of the MILCON program at each activity plus information on the
activity itself, including the mission of the base and present and pro-
jected personnel strengths. These documents are extremely important in
that they are the ones that are eventually reviewed by Congress. Each
activity submits its program year projects to its Major Claimant via its
EFD for technical approval. Each Major Claimant then submits its program
to NAVFAC for collation and preparation for the Military Construction
Review Board.
3.2.2.4 Navy Military Construction Review Board (NMCRB)
The NMCRB' s purpose is to recommend to CNO the total MILCON program
to best support naval operating forces and implement approved programs of
the Navy. The voting members of the board consist of representatives of
each of the Major Claimants. Functional, technical and other staff advi-
sors are also members of the board who assist with back-up information to
the voting members. The Navy Military Construction Review Board reviews
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the tentative program objectives by investment category, within which each
project is scrutinized. The Board develops an integrated priority list
for each investment category within the established budgeting levels,
and submits it to CNO for approval.
3.2.2.5 Commencement of Design
Once a project clears the NMCRB and is approved by CNO, design for
the project is usually authorized. Apparently, this is done for two pur-
poses. First, it allows the Navy to get a jump on the implementation of
its program, since the funds for construction probably will not be made
available for another year or year and a half when Congress acts on the
measure. Secondly, it allows the Navy to have a more firm cost estimate in
its presentation of the MILCON program to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
,
Office of Management and Budget, and President, and the Congress. By the
time the program gets to the Congressional hearing stage, the configuration
of the project should be defined well enough to have a much firmer estimate
of construction costs. A few projects in the program will not survive the
Congressional hearings, and the design will have to be stopped and shelved
or cancelled completely. The philosophy behind this seems to be that the
amount of time gained in getting into the construction phase for the bulk
of the projects that will be approved more than offsets the loss of money
spent for cancelled and unused design work.
3.2.2.6 Navy and Defense Departments Review
The MILCON program goes to the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT)
in August of each year prior to the MILCON program year which begins the
next 1 July. The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) makes final decisions on the
NAVCOMPT recommendations before submitting the program to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on or about 1 October. An intensive review
of each project is conducted at this level, with the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) participating. Formal hearings are held in which the
Navy must justify its requirements. The Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Installations and Logistics (OASD(I&L)) also conducts a technical
review of the proposed construction methods, types of structures and cost




to ensure that the engineering is sound. Upon completion of the reviews
OSD decides upon the firm budget for next fiscal year. This may reflect
some different projects than originally submitted since by this time the
Congress will have acted on the previous MILCON program, and projects which
did not survive this year may displace other projects in the upcoming
program, and since SECNAV submitted the budget other events may have
19
occurred that could introduce new projects and eliminate old ones.
After the Secretary of Defense approves the budget and it is
concurred with by the Office of Management and Budget and the President,
the military construction programs of the three services and other Defense
Agencies are consolidated in the Department of Defense Military Construc-
tion Authorization Bill and the DOD Military Construction Appropriation
20
Bill for submission to Congress.
3 ., 2 . 2 . 7 Congressional Review and Approval
For the MILCON Program to become a reality, both the authorization
and appropriation act must be passed. The Authorization Bill is presented
first, and is reviewed by the Armed Services Committees (ASC) of the House
of Representatives and the Senate. Each of these committees has a pro-
fessional staff which does an on-site investigation of proposed construc-
tion sites, and each ASC has a subcommittee on Military Construction that
21
holds formal hearings to review the MILCON program.
Title II of the Authorization Act reflects the projects which are
authorized and the total dollar volume authorized at each Navy installation.
The committee report which does not become law cites the authorized amount
for each project which is used by the Navy as a control figure since it is
the intent of the Congress. The differences in the House and Senate ver-
sions is hairanered out in a conference held before passage by each legisla-
tive body. The authorization is good for two years, after which if a
project is not started, reauthorization is requested. The Authorization
Act also contains continuing authorizations for such items as planning and
emergency construction. Over the past ten years the authorization has





The Appropriation Act provides the funds for the projects authorized.
The bill is reviewed by the Military Construction Subcommittees of the
House and Senate Appropriations Committees. The Appropriations Act cannot
be passed until the Authorization Act is law; however, in the interest of
time the hearings on appropriations do begin before the authorization is
passed. The House subcommittee meets first and usually conducts the most
23
detailed examination of the program. The House and Senate versions are
negotiated in a conference committee to become compatible before enactment
as law
.
The Appropriations Act grants a lump sum authorization to be spent
on projects and installations contained in the Authorization Act. However,
if the Report of the Conference Committee indicates that certain projects
will not be funded, this is just as binding as if it were law. The
amount appropriated has varied in the past ten years from 75 to 95 percent
24
of the amount requested with an average of 86 percent.
Through all of the hearings the Commander of NAVFAC serves as the Navy ' s
chief witness. He must respond on the spot to questions posed by the
committee members on individual projects. The Commander brings back-up
information and staff experts to the meetings, due to the broad character
of questions posed by the committees.
One feature of the existing system that presents some problems in
executing the program is the time of passage of the two acts. In the past
ten years the Authorization Act has been signed once in July, once in
August, twice in September, four times in October, once in November and
25
once in December. In the same time period the Appropriations Act has
been enacted three times in September, once in October, twice in November,
and four times in December. Since the fiscal year begins on the first
of July, nearly half of the MILCON program year is gone before the projects
are authorized and funds appropriated.
Some relief for this system may be in sight, however. FY77 V7ill
begin on 1 October 1976 vice 1 July 1976, due to the Budget Reform Act of
1974. Under the new system, authorizations and appropriations are due for
enactment prior to the start of the fiscal year in which the program is to
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be executed. Under consideration is a proposal to authorize the program
27
a year in advance of the program year. The change to the system has
kept the MILCON time cycle in a state of flux over the past few years,
but the total time from project submission to construction completion
remains about the same as shown in Fig. 3.2.
The continuing authorization and appropriation for planning
does allow the design of future projects not yet acted on, as mentioned
earlier. This gives the Navy a considerable head start in getting the
project into construction after approval of the program by Congress.
However, these design funds are limited to 6 percent of the total of
p Q
the facilities projects. As shown in Fig. 3.2 this authority is now
being used to commence designs up to two years in advance of the
appropriation.
Another feature of the Authorization Act is the limits it places
upon project escalation, above which Congressional approval must be
granted. The act usually permits escalation by 5 percent of the instal-
lation total in the U.S., and by 10 percent outside the U.S. However, the
total still may not exceed the total amount appropriated. Individual pro-
jects may be escalated up to 25 percent, but the installation totals must
remain within the 5 percent/10 percent requirements. The Authorization Act




3.2.2.8 Execution of Approved MILCON Program
Enactment of the Authorization and Appropriations Acts does not
make the funds instantly available for the award of construction
contracts. Contracts may be advertised upon enactment, but awards can-
not take place until the funds are apportioned by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. The apportionment is requested through the Comptroller
of the Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and eventually up
to OMB. The funds flow back down in a like manner. At each review level,
the projects proposed for funding are examined to ensure they fall within


































exist for overseas projects, that all special clearances have been
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obtained and that they are not affected by proposed base closures.
In the past ten years the time for receiving the first apportionment
document has ranged from 6 to 57 days with a 10 year average of 35
31
days. NAVFAC manages the apportionment requests to ensure they are
requested in a timely manner.
Operating in a decentralized manner NAVFAC assigns the projects and
the funds received to its EFD's for implementation. To assist the EFD in
effectively managing their assigned MILCON program, the EFD's are issued
what is called a compensating assignment. Since the Appropriations Act
usually underfunds the Authorization Act, careful management of the funds
provided must be exercised to maximize the number of projects which can be
accomplished. The total cost estimate as authorized includes:
(1) The estimated contract award price,
(2) A contingency for change orders of 5 to 10 percent,
(3) Government supervision, inspection and overhead costs (SIDH) of
6 percent, and
(A) A cost escalation factor of up to 10 percent per year to adjust
for the„time lag between the planning phase and the construction
phase.
Experience has shown that the total estimated cost is not always
required to complete a project, or at least it is not required at the
start of a project and may not be needed for some time thereafter. In
order to prevent needlessly tying up funds, program assignments are made
to each EFD on the basis of the current working estimate (CWE) which is
the estimated contract cost plus Government supervision, inspection
and overhead. The contingencies for all projects within each EFD's
area are grouped together and assigned to that EFD in a single lump sum
33
amount called a compensating assignment. Thus, the EFD has some
flexibility in allocating extra funds where needed, though the maximum
escalation on specific projects and at installations still is controlled
by the Authorization Act.
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3.3 MILCON Program Implementation
3.3.1 Design
As mentioned in the previous section, when the NMCRB finishes with
a Military Construction proposal NAVFAC usually authorizes final design for
those projects in the program.
3.3.1.1 A-E Selection
Design firms interested in doing Navy work keep qualification
statements and brochures on file at the EFD's. On each project a slate
committee composed of NAVFAC professional engineers and architects meets
to screen all available firms in terms of experience, performance, and
capabilities. The result is the selection of five to eight firms with
which to conduct interviews. A selection board then meets to interview
these firms. The interviews cover
(1) Explanation of the scope of project
(2) Determination of the A-E's ability to meet the time schedule
(3) The A-E's presentation of similar work he has performed
(A) The A-E's explanation of his organization and key personnel he has
available to work on the project
A secret ballot of the selection members is taken and the winning firm
is asked to submit a fee proposal. Up until this point no mention is made
of price. A government estimate of the fee is made, and a fee negotiation
board is convened to negotiate face to face with the A-E. The board
resolves differences in the scope of work, time schedule and A-E's fee.
If no agreement can be reached, the second firm that the selection board
34
recommended is negotiated with in a like manner.
3.3.1.2 A-E Contract
Upon agreement with a firm, a contract between the A-E and the
Government is signed. The Commander of the EFD is the contracting
officer on A-E contracts as he is for construction contracts.
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Some features of the Navy-A-E contract are:
(1) The A-E usually is required to check shop drawings and provide
as-built drawings as a part of his basic fee.
(2) Field consultation as necessary to ensure compliance with
designers' intent„may be required, and if so, it will be on a
reimbursed basis.
(3) If the bids for construction exceed the amount allowed, then the
A-E is obligated to redesign at no additional cost to the
Government
,
A member of the design division of the EFD is designated as
Engineer-in-Charge (ETC) to administer the A-E contract during the design
stage. He coordinates the design work of the A-E with the government
organizations concerned with the projects and assists the A-E in the
interface with government procedures. The A-E is required to use federal
and military specifications where applicable, and is required to follow
the format used for NAVFAC contracts, including assembling the contract
and adding the government "boilerplate."
The design usually will have three required submission and review
stages - at 30 percent, 100 percent, and the finalized package of plans
and specifications. At 30 percent, the A-E may be required to prepare
some supporting documentation for projects which are to go before Congress
In this system, which will interface with the new fiscal year and budget
review procedure installed by the Budget Reform Act of 1974, the design
contract will be a two part contract. The first part is for the first
30 percent including the preparation of supporting documentation, and
the second part is for completion of the plans and specifications. Under
this system, part one is negotiated with an option to negotiate part
two if NAVFAC considers the chances of surviving the Congressional review
^ 39good
.
The Navy's participation in the design is mostly by EFD design
personnel and some input from the using activity, especially with regard
to their requirements. The EFD Construction Division and ROICC Office
involved is given a set of plans to review at the 100 percent stage.
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The A-E is paid on a monthly percentage of the design work he has
completed. In general, NAVFAC construction projects are designed com-
pletely before commencing with construction.
3.3.2 Advertisement, Bid and Award
Upon completion of the design, the construction contract is
advertised by mailing Invitations to Bid (IFB) to contractors who would
bid on that particular type of work. On contracts under $500,000 the
bidding may be restricted to "small business" contractors. IFB's are also
posted in public places, and a synopsis of the potential project is listed
in the Commerce Business Daily published by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
The EFD contract division ensures that all contractors who have requested
plans and specifications receive any copies of addenda that are issued
prior to the bid opening, so that everyone is bidding on the same basis.
In some cases of very complex projects, a prebid conference is held with the
design division and A-E explaining some aspects to potential bidders. All
the bids are opened at a public meeting where they are read and recorded.
No determination is made as to who will be awarded the contract at that
time, although it is generally obvious who is the apparent low bidder.
Sometimes, though, the bid may contain a number of alternates that must
be bid in addition to the basic bid item. In this case, the successful
bidder will be the one who provides the base item plus the maximum number
of alternates for the lowest cost and within the allocated amount.
The basic requirement is that the award be made to the lowest
40
responsive, responsible bidder. "Responsive" means that the bid has
been submitted as instructed and the bid has not been qualified in any
manner. There can be no negotiations between the government and a
bidder prior to award of the contract, in order to provide a uniform
standard for all the contractors to bid on.
The other technique employed by NAVFAC to ensure that all bidders
are bidding from the same information, is to have bidders recognize the
41
addendum numbers they have received on the face of their bid. Failure
to do this can result in a nonresponsive bid that can be eliminated from
award consideration. Contractors are also required to submit a bid
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security with their bids, which usually amounts to 20 percent of the bid
42
price. Failure to do this also makes the bid nonrespons ive and
unacceptable.
On government contracts, if a low bid is significantly lower than
that of the rest of the bidders and the government's estimate, the bidder
is allowed to reconsider his bid. If he finds he has made a mistake he may
withdrav? his bid, but he is not allowed to modify the price. In this
instance he will not lose his bid bond.
A "responsible" bidder is one who has the capacity to perform the
work and the integrity to honor his obligations under the contract. When
the lowest responsive , responsible bidder is determined, the contract is
awarded. The successful contractor is presented with a notice of award;
however, he must complete certain requirements before construction can
begin.
3.3.3 Construct!on
3.3.3.1 Post Award Period
The two major documents needed are the contractor's performance
and payment bond, which amount to 100 percent and 50 percent of the con-
44tract price, respectively. The certificate of the contractor's insur-
ance policies must be submitted, showing he carries the minimum required
coverages. Upon receipt of these documents, the contractor is given
notice to proceed by the OICC who is the commander of an EFD or a separate
Dice as discussed earlier in the previous chapter.
At this stage of the contract the Resident Officer in Charge of
Construction (ROICC) becomes the key contact for the contractor. Before
construction begins, a conference between the contractor and the ROICC is
held. At this meeting, called the "preconstruction conference," the ROICC
has people from his office who will be concerned with this particular con-
tract - namely the Assistant ROICC assigned, the construction representa-
tives (inspectors), and the construction engineer. He may Invite other
base personnel to participate in order to familiarize the contractor with

63
safety, security and fire regulations aboard the respective Navy installa-
tion. The facilities management or public works personnel from the base
at which work is being done may also attend, since their activity will
become the user of the new facility. The contractor usually brings the
key participants in his organization who will be involved in this contract
such as the project engineer, the superintendent and key subcontractors.
This meeting is primarily to establish lines of communication and
settle administrative matters, rather than to discuss the technical aspects
of the job. The ROICC explains the roles of his AROICC, construction
representatives, and office personnel and also the appropriate channels
of communications to use. Basically, the contractor works through the
AROICC assigned to the project. The contractor introduces and explains the
roles of his job site representatives and subcontractors.
The ROICC stresses important features of the contract such as
(1) Completion dates,
(2) Pertinent general clauses,
(3) Liquidated damages,
(4) Roads and gates to be used,
(5) Hours in which contractor can work,
(6) Testing requirements,
(7) Shop drawing requirements,
(8) Physical condition of the site (cleanliness)
,
(9) Safety requirements,
(10) Required labor standards such as the Davis-Bacon wage rates,
(11) Arrangements for utilities,
(12) Procedures for change orders and
(13) Value engineering incentives.
The contractor is also requested to turn in his schedule of prices
as soon as possible to facilitate the monthly payment and change order
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process. A schedule of prices is a breakdown of the job into its major
components, with a percentage of the total project cost assigned to each
component. The overhead and profits are distributed into all these items.
This document is used to evaluate requests for progress payments, and to
assist in determining the equitable amount to adjust the contract for
change orders.
3.3.3.2 Resident Officer in Charge of Construction
The contractor's day-to-day relationship is with the ROICC who
performs the field administration of the contract for the Navy. The ROICC 's
job can be a demanding one, since all the problems embedded in the planning
and design of a job generally surface in the construction phase.
The ROICC 's organization and size can vary greatly, depending on
the amount and nature of work in an ROICC 's assigned geographical area and
the relative remoteness of the site. A typical organization chart is shown
in Fig. 2.6. The solid lines indicate the absolute minimum organization
while the dashed lines represent segments of an ROICC staff commonly found
in existence.
The Administrative Division handles the paperwork associated with
the contracts. A file is kept on each contract containing pertinent corres-
pondence concerning that job. On large contracts the file for one project
can be quite extensive. The Administrative Division also ensures that the
mass of reports the ROICC is required to make are submitted. These reports
are generally sent to the cognizant EFD, and mostly they concern the
progress of the projects under ROICC' s direction.
The other two components of the ROICC 's organization are concerned
with his project management functions. The technical division is usually
staffed with professional engineers who perform a wide variety of tasks,
which include:
(1) Reviewing the plans and specifications for construction problems
prior to advertisement,
(2) Preparing government estimates for changes,
(3) Coordinating design problems with the A-E,
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(4) Reviewing contractors' submissions (such as the schedules of
prices, shop drawings, material samples, value engineering
requests)
,
(5) Evaluating change order requests,
(6) Coordinating the delivery of government-furnished material (GFM)
(7) Evaluating the results of testing, and all items which require
a professional/technical treatment.
The other facet of the construction management functions is the
inspection responsibility. The inspection division traditionally has been
responsible for "riding herd" on the contractor to ensure compliance with
the plans and specifications. These traditional functions have included
(1) Understanding the performance requirements, then
(2) Judging quality,
(3) Identifying items for submittal,
(A) Inspecting for compliance,
(5) Observing the total effort and progress of the contractor,
(6) Making off-site inspections at material plants, prefabrication
sites, etc.
(7) Identifying unsafe work practices,
(8) Observing v;eather and climatic conditions,
(9) Reporting the size of the workforce and spot-checking to ensure
employees are being paid the appropriate Davis-Bacon wages.
These functions are usually performed by experienced construction people
who are civilian employees of the Navy. In a "typical" job one inspector
usually is assigned as "lead" inspector. This inspector is augmented from
time to time by inspectors or engineers with a specific qualification, such
as an electrical, mechanical, or boiler man, to ensure compliance in regard
to these particular areas.
3.3.3.3 New Inspection Strategies
A high premium has always been placed on getting the contract com-
pleted as smoothly and quickly as reasonably possible. Thus, the Navy has
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maintained a fairly high level of inspection to avert and solve problems
before they become big enough to delay moving into a long-awaited facility.
Contractors have taken advantage of this high degree of inspection by
reducing the level of supervision on the job, thus making the inspector
a "quasi-supervisor . " Another problem which relates to this "quasi-
supervision" is one of liabilities incurred. As students of contract
law know, the closer the "supervision" or "inspection" exercised over a
contractor, the less the contractor is held liable for defective perfor-
mance. The silence of inspectors can be equivalent to giving approval
to the workmanship witnessed.
In order to combat (1) the reduction of supervision by contractors
and (2) increased assumption of liability by the government, the Navy has
been taking a new approach to ensure contract compliance while forcing the
contractor to adequately supervise his project and holding him ultimately
responsible for his quality. This fairly new system is called Contractor
Quality Control (CQC) . Under this program, which applies to jobs in excess
of $1,000,000, the contractor is responsible for his own quality control.
This is accomplished by requiring the contractors on these jobs to submit
their own quality control plan before they are given notice to proceed.
The plan must provide the name of the contractor's CQC representative, his
technical experience and a copy of a letter giving him the authority to
control quality on that job. This CQC inspector is an employee of the
contractor, but he does not report to the superintendent. He must report
to an official of the construction company off the site. He serves the
same function as a Navy inspector by:
(1) Performing day-in, day-out inspections of the work to ensure
compliance with the plans and specifications,
(2) Arranging for labs to perform required testing,
(3) Arranging for consultants to approve submittals,
(4) Arranging for specialty inspection, and
(5) Approving shop drawings.
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The Navy's role then becomes one of surveillance of the CQC
representative. This is accomplished by spot checking to see that
(1) The CQC representative is at the project at critical times
(i.e., concrete pours, etc.)
(2) Materials are acceptable,
(3) Certified submittals are in fact acceptable,
46
(A) Test results are within the specifications required.
This system allows the Navy to hold the contractor more responsible for his
own performance, and it forces him to maintain adequate supervision. In
addition, it enables the Navy to spread its "inspectors" (who become con-
struction representatives under this system) over more jobs.
Under the traditional system the Navy inspector submits a daily
report on each of his contracts. This report provides information for his
superiors on the progress of each job, but more importantly, it provides
documentation for use in claims and/or disputes which may arise later . This
report indicates environmental conditions, trades working, type of work in
progress, material received on site, equipment on site, delays, accidents,
defective work to be corrected, and any special remarks concerning the
contract. Under the CQC system, the CQC representative is required to
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submit similar reports to the Navy construction representative.
3.3.3.4 Change Orders
Another problem which confronts the field administrator of construc-
tion contracts is that of changes. Nearly every contract of substantial
size is bound to contain numerous changes. For a change to qualify as a
valid change order on a government contract, it must fall within one of
the following categories:
(1) Design Change due to errors or improvements in design
(2) Changed Requirements of the government
(3) Differing Site Conditions from those found on the plans and from
what reasonably should be expected
(4) Ripple Effect of a change on unchanged work
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(5) Constructive Changes forced uporiothe contractor by overly strict
interpretation of the contract.
In evaluating a potential change order the ROICC must check to see
if the change is within the scope of the contract. If it is, then an
estimate must be made by the government. If the funds are available, the
contractor is asked to submit a proposal. If the change order must be
implemented immediately to prevent holding up the work, then the Navy may
authorize the contractor to proceed as soon as it has been determined that
there is enough money in the budget to do the job. Upon receipt of the
contractor's proposal, the ROICC evaluates the contractor's estimate by
comparing it to the government estimate. If the government estimate
exceeds the contractor's estimate, then a change order is immediately issued
and signed by both parties. Frequently the contractor's estimate is higher
than the government estimate, so the ROICC and the contractor meet, discuss
their differences, and try to negotiate a "fair and reasonable" price for
the change. The contractor, in addition to being allowed direct labor,
material and equipment for the change, is allowed his standard
(1) field overhead,
(2) home office overhead,
(3) engineering/drafting expenses,
(4) employee insurance expenses,
(5) additional bond expense (if any) , and
49
(6) six percent for profit.
3.3.3.5 Payments
Before any progress payment can be made the contractor must
(1) have signed the contract
(2) have performance and payment bonds submitted
(3) have submitted an approved schedule of prices, and
(4) have submitted an invoice which is reviewed, changed if necessary,
and endorsed by the ROICC and forwarded to the OICC for preparation
of the payment voucher.
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The payment voucher is sent to a Navy Finance Center for preparation
and mailing of the check to the contractor. The process usually takes
about three weeks.
3.3.3.6 Final Inspection
When construction is completed in the eyes of the contractor, a
final inspection is made. Deficiencies are noted which the contractor
must correct before he receives his final payment. This list of deficien-
cies is called a "punch list." Many times a project is 99 percent com-
plete, and the only delay may be a material item which has not been
received. As one may well imagine, the prospective occupants of the new
facility are anxious to move in. In this case a Beneficial Occupancy Date
(BOD) inspection is held and the remaining items of the contract to be
completed are noted, along with deficiencies which are to be corrected.
After this inspection, the occupants can move in, but the contractor must
still complete all items before final payment can be made. The effect of
the BOD is that it usually establishes the commencement of the contract
warranty period - a date which is of prime importance to the contractor.
The warranty period is usually for one year on most government
contracts, with up to five years for specific mechanical installations.
The ROICC is called upon frequently to determine whether a maintenance or
repair requirement to a facility during its warranty period is a contractor
obligation or due to damage by the occupants.
3.3.3.7 Phase Coordination
To ensure the coordination for the orderly progression of a
project through the design, bid and construction phases, the EFD's have a
group of individuals called project managers. Each project manager handles
all projects within an assigned region. Project managers are usually not
intimately involved with each assigned project, since they handle such a
large number of jobs. Since each of the phases - design, bid, construct -
are sequential, they are primarily managed by the design, contracts, and
construction divisions respectively as the project passes through each
stage. The project manager's function is highly oriented to the financial
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aspects of each project, to ensure the funds required - for design, for
construction award, for change orders - are available when needed. When
constructing under the traditional technique of these distinct and
sequential stages, the close coordination necessary when overlapping
design and construction is not really as critical.
3.4 Summary
Discussion of the existing system of procuring contract construc-
tion for the Navy is not a simple matter. The construction itself is to
contribute to the national defense and more specifically, to the mission
of the Navy. The procurement process must exist in an environment which
both constrains it and provides resources to accomplish its goals. The
mechanics of procuring facilities begins with the comprehensive SIFFPS
planning phase, then the projects are programm.ed and prepared for presen-
tation to Congress. The design, bid and construction are performed in
a sequential manner and culminate in the end products (new facilities)
of the long, but sophisticated process. This sequential form of design,
bid, construct shall hereafter be referred to as the "traditional method."
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In the previous chapters, the goals of Navy construction, its
environment, the resources and constraints that affect it have been
discussed. The existing system that the Navy typically uses to plan,
design and construct has also been introduced. This chapter will introduce
the CM concept and method as it exists today.
4.
2
Purpose of the CM Approach
It was noted in Chapter 1 that the emergence of CM was due to ovmer
dissatisfaction, but what were the results that these CM's achieved? The
primary objective of CM was to complete a project within the budget and in
the shortest possible time. Due to the nature of its operation, the CM
method in its different approach to designing and constructing, has also
produced by-products that will become evident throughout this chapter.
4.3 Reasons for CM's Emergence
The problems which generated project cost and time schedule overruns
were due to a number of factors. The first problem was a lack of competi-
tion among contractors bidding for construction contracts. This particu-
larly has affected owners who take competitive bids, especially the ones
in the public sector. Many of the most capable contractors have negotiated
work in the private sector, and because it reduced the risk they had to
take. Also, this type of work does not require the high quality contractor
to bid on an "initial price only" basis against a "cutthroat" contractor,
who will cut quality and make up for his initial low price in change orders
.
A second reason for the "surfacing" of CM has been the size of




imposed on the construction market which is made of primarily small
contractors as noted in Chapter 2,
(a) the number of contractors with the capacity to bid is severely
limited, and
(b) the risk to the firms that do bid is very high.
One large project can tie up a significant portion of a firm's capital and
bonding capacity, as well as its fixed assets and management talent. Even
the process of preparing a bid on a large project can be a costly matter
when there is a good chance that another contractor may get the job. Due to
the structure of the industry, a general contractor's bid strongly depends
on the subcontractor's bids he receives for the 75 percent - 80 percent of
the work they perform. Many times there is difficulty in getting the "subs"
to commit themselves to a figure at an early date, particularly when their
portion of the work may not even be required until a year to 18 months from,
the bidding date.
A third factor leading toward the development of CM has been the
increasing complexity of today's projects. In development of project
design, the architect and engineer need to know the impact of their
decisions on the physical construction of the project. In highly complex
structures, even minor design decisions can lead to suboptimal construction
economy. Understanding the methods of construction and the local construc-
tion marketplace are essential to integrating the design and construction
phase. The skills and knowledge that have been the stock and trade of the
general contractor are now needed to an increasing degree in the decision
and design phases of building generation.
A fourth factor which pressed for an alternative to the traditional
system was inflation itself. For sometime it has been vogue in business to
say "time is money," but the rampant inflation of the last few years of at
least 10 percent per year has made the message more valid than ever. The
longer a project took to advertise and bid, the higher the quotes as prices
continued to rise. The longer it took to construct the project, the more
likely the contractor was to claim changes to make up for his escalation
losses. As mentioned earlier, the general contractor has traditionally
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borne the risk by bidding a lump sum fixed price project for the entire
project. The longer the construction, the higher contingency the contractor
had to allow for the uncertainty in the economic conditions. Thus, even
the contractor's expectation of continued inflation was helping fuel more
inflation.
A fifth reason for the emergence of CM was that many owners who are
sophisticated professional managers in their own fields were becoming
impatient with the antiquated management methods of construction. To these
owners the construction process seemed unplanned, uncontrolled and unorga-
nized. However, the apparent mismanagement of construction has not been
because construction is full of inept managers. On the contrary, the
industry is filled with tremendous human resources; however, the structure
of the industry contributes more to management inefficiency than anything
else. Most construction companies are below the critical corporate size
where the development of managerial inputs and their applications are not
inefficient. As noted in Chapter 2, construction companies have one of the
highest rates of business failures in the country, and 85 percent of these
are due to poor management.
A. 4 VJays to Examine CM
The different approaches to examining the CM method to construction
are shown in Fig. 4.1. The remainder of this chapter will discuss CM from
each of these approaches.
4.5 The Concept of CM
A discussion of the CM concept is best initiated by delineating the
roles of the participants in the construction process.
4.5.1 The Owner
First there is the owner who has a requirement for the facility and
provides the funds to plan, design and construct it. He may or may not
have a facilities engineering staff to assist in the procuring of this new
facility. The less staff he has, the more he will need outside assistance























Fig. 4.1. Approaches to Examining CM.
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4.5.2 The Project Manager
The next participant shall be designated as the project manager.
This is the organization that is charged with the overall responsibility
for the creation of the new facility, beginning with the development of a
requirement through all stages to the completed product ready for use by the
owner. The project manager is concerned with
(1) Project need,
(2) Feasibility,
(3) Overall project planning and programming,
(A) Real estate decisions,
(5) Public relations,
(6) Coordination with the owner,
(7) Project financing,
(8) Contract administration of professional and construction contracts,
(9) Evaluation of changes to planned actions, and
(10) The insurance that the owner ' s wishes , needs, and requirements are
satisfied by the project.
The project manager is the spokesman for the owner, and many times
he has the authority for major decisions. This project management function
is usually performed by the facilities engineering staffs of large sophis-
ticated owners. However, an owner with no technical capability may retain
an architect or engineer to perform these functions.
One of the most common misconceptions about the CM system is that
the CM performs the project management function. As will be seen later in
this section and throughout this chapter, the CM's functions are usually
limited to the design and construction phases, and they are fairly well
defined when working with a large complex owner.
The project manager as a decision point when using the CM system is
a very critical aspect. Another misconception about the CM system is that
the owner sits back and lets the CM run the job for him, and that the owner
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has less involvement than ever in the facility production process. This
could not be farther from the truth. The CM system is highly sensitive to
close owner involvement and rapid decision making responses. If the benefits
4
of CM are to be maximized, the owner must play a full participating role.
This is why CM is adaptable to huge diverse owners with large facilities
staffs who can speak decisively for their owners in facilities matters.
Thus, the project management concept is critical to the operation of CM
for the large corporate or public client.
4.5.3 Design Professionals
The next participant is the architect and his associated engineers
who design the project. Their responsibilities are somewhat affected by the
CM systems because their normal operating procedures may be altered. The
CM will work closely with them in the design phase to ensure that the
technology, economics and marketability of the project are maximized. The
A-E will have to conform to a schedule which coordinates his efforts with
the actual construction. The A-E is usually relieved of estimating respon-
sibility by the CM and may have fewer on-site requirements. The A-E/CM
relationship is sometimes marked by conflict. The A-E may feel the CM is
imposing on his design perogative. However, the CM must be involved in the
design phase to ensure that construction considerations are not neglected,
as has been so common in the past. The A-E is still responsible for the
quality of the plans and specifications, and he is not subordinate or
superior to the CM during any phase of the project. Disputes between the
A-E and CM are resolved by the project manager. Most enlightened A-E's
are learning the value of the contributions made by competent CM's and a
cordial constructive working relationship becomes an important A-E and CM
selection criterion for project managers to consider.
4.5.4 The CM
A fourth participant in the CM system is the CM himself. CM was
defined in Chapter 1 and will be discussed in detail throughout the rest of
this chapter. Basically, the CM provides the integrating function in the
design and construction process. He brings construction skill to the design
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phase. He assumes the role of the general contractor in the construction
phase by directing, controlling and coordinating the work of multiple con-
tractors who were formerly subcontractors under the traditional system.
The CM performs another integrating role by maintaining the schedule and
project information system for the design and construction phases. When
design and construction take place at the same time, close coordination
between the design and construction phases is essential.
One of the basic conceptual features of the role of the CM and his
relationship with the other participants is that it is professional in
nature. The CM is not selected solely on price, but also on his qualifi-
cations and on his potential for producing a quality structure in an
economical and timely fashion. In the system's purest form, the CM has no
financial interest in the construction. His only contractual relationship
is with the owner or project manager, and this is for the professional
services rendered. Thus, the CM has nothing to gain and stands only to
lose in allowing less than top quality performance by the multiple con-
tractors who perform the actual construction. Like the traditional gen-
eral contractor the CM serves as the principle constructor. However, the
"arm's length" relationship that characterizes the owner/project manager-
general contractor dealing does not exist under the CM system.
The CM is an agent of the owner/project manager, and thus be
becomes a member of the professional team that consists of the owner,
project manager, A-E and now the CM. This professional relationship
is conceptualized in Fig. 4.2.
The professional status of the CM has another positive aspect in
that it should provide for more effective application of management tech-
niques and tools in managing the project, and in providing sound informa-
tion to the project manager. Management tools and techniques would include
network diagramming like Critical Path Method (CPM) and computerized
cost control and information systems. There are four reasons behind
this proposition:
(1) The CM, being on the owner's team, will structure the information
and control system with the owner's needs in mind. The general
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Source: W. B. Foxhall, Professional Construction Management and
Project Administration , Architectural Record and the
American Institute of Architects, 1972.
Fig. 4.2. Professional Team Concept

81
contractor's control systems are strictly for his internal
management and information,
(2) Since the CM's management capabilities are a prerequisite for
selection, the project manager will be able to pick one with an
expertise in this field,
(3) The management information and control systems, are primary
outputs expected of the CM rather than the secondary nature of
required CPM's and schedules from the general contractor. Therefore,
it is only logical that the general contractor will do only the
minimum amount of work to satisfy the project manager's informa-
tion requirements, and a submitted CPM or schedule may become
useless in a few days.
(4) General contractors historically have not shown interest in the
application of management techniques and tools, partly due to the
fragmented structure of the industry and partly due to pure
negativism concerning management improvements.
4.5.5 Construction Contractors
The final major participant in the CM system is the construction
contractors. The contractors are basically the subcontractors under the
traditional system; however, under the prevalent CM concept, the contracts
are directly between the owner/project manager and each contractor. Thus,
they are no longer subcontractors, but more appropriately "multiple
contractors." These contractors look to the CM as they would look to the
general contractor for general supervision, scheduling and coordination.
Since each of the multiple contractors is now a prime contractor, he may
feel his working relationship is more formalized than vjhen he worked as a
subcontractor, and this may be a disadvantage. On the other hand, he
would be assured that by bidding on a formalized basis, he would be
protected from "bid shopping" or from a general contractor's pressure
to reduce his bid further or lose the subcontract after the contract
was awarded.
4.5.6 CM Concept In Practice
The relationship between the participants in the CM concept is best
explained by the project organization diagram shown in Fig. 4.3. The
project manager, CM, and A-E form the professional team. The contractor's
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day-to-day direction, scheduling and coordinating comes from the CM.
Therefore, the crux of this concept is that when the CM acts in the best
interest of the owner, he is acting in his own best interest as well; in
short, it is the professional approach to design and construction.
4.6 The Functions of the CM
This section will provide a list of the functions a CM performs
and a discussion of each function. The reader must recognize that many of
the functions are mutually interdependent, and that the manner in which one
function is performed can affect the performance of other functions.
Figure 4.4 is a graphic portrayal of the CM functions by project stage.
4.6.1 Market Study
One of the first jobs of the CM on a new project is to perform a
market study. This study should report on the availability and cost of
labor, material, and equipment in the project area for the various types of
construction under consideration. The size, availability, type, skill and
activity level of potential bidders in the area should also be studied.
The study's purpose is to provide information on how the local construc-
tion market will affect the owner's project. This is one of the most
crucial inputs the CM makes, and is one of the most neglected aspects in the
traditional approach to design and construction.
4.6.2 Constructability
The CM begins from the very start of a project by providing the A-E
with construction economy inputs. Even when the architect is conceptual-
izing the basic form of the structure, the CM should be informing him of the
time, cost, and constructability consequences he is creating. From, concep-
tualizing to design development to final design, the CM should continually
be providing the A-E with comments on construction inefficiencies that are
latent in the designs. The CM not only identifies these problem areas, but
he also produces alternative recommendations on how to eliminate these
potential problems before they become a part of the final plans and later


























































1. Market Study /
2. Construction Econorry Inputs • v/
3. Estimating / /
U. Packaging Recommendations y
5. Scheduling and Management Information y y
y
y v^ •'
6. Prevention of Omissions and Suplication y
7. Long Lead Materials y y
8. Potential Bidder Identification y
9. Bidder Information Source y
y10. Advertise, Bid and Award (optional)
11. Cost Control J y y \y
12. Contractor Capability Survey y
13. Temporary and Common Use Facilities y
14, Direct Schedule and Coordinate Contractors y
15. Quality Control y
16. Progress Payment Review y
17. Change Order Requests y
18. Shop Drawing/Submittal Review y
19. Safety y
20. Final Inspection/Punch List y
21. Occupancy Plan *^
Fig. 4.4. CM's Duties/Project Phase.

85
why the CM is required at such an early stage in the design, since the
major design decisions are made early. Decisions regarding the form of the
structure, the structural design (steel vs. poured-in-place concrete vs.
precast concrete), the building' s "skin" material, the vertical transpor-
tation, etc. are all made early in the project, and their consequences in
terms of the construction market, ease of construction, time to construct,
and cost can be enormous. The timing of these inputs should be continuous
and not just at rigid intervals, such as 30 percent design, 60 percent
design, etc. On many projects the communication is so continuous that the
CM has a man in the A-E's office during the design phase.
A. 6. 3 Estimating
The CM usually performs all the estimating for the project. This
function must go hand in hand with the constructability input function,
since consequences of certain design decisions can only be measured in
terms of cost. The CM has assumed the estimating function from the A-E,
because the CM is closer to the actual cost by field experience. He knows
construction and the local market, which should give him a better idea
about current labor rates and productivity, prevailing material prices,
and equipment costs and productivity. The skills required range from
broad conceptual estimating abilities for application early in the project,
to detailed quantity take off skills for throughout the design.
A. 6. 4 Packaging Recommendations
The CM must recommend the manner of dividing the design into
separate contract packages to permit phasing construction with the design.
There are many considerations involved in the packaging decision. The
more important ones are:
(a) natural and practical lines of severability (i.e., electrical,
mechanical, etc.)
(b) sequencing effectiveness with design and other contract packages
(c) access and availability constraints
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(d) total time for completion
o
(e) construction market conditions.
The contents and timing of the package will have a significant
effect on (1) which contractors will bid on the that portion of the job,
and (2) the degree of competition among the contractors. Quality
packaging recommendations can thus have a tremendous impact on total
project cost.
4.6.5 Scheduling and Management Information
The CM is responsible for developing the schedule for the entire
design/construction process, usually by a computerized CPM program. Due
to the overlapping of design and construction and the formal contractural
relationships that exist between the owner and the multiple contractors,
close coordination is required. Thus, the CPM must be frequently updated
and used throughout the project. The computerized versions of CPM allow
use of this network scheduling techniques once considered too cumbersome for
9
practical use. The CM also maintains the project management information
system. This computerized system supplies information concerning the
schedule, costs and financing. The system is used by all the participants
in the design/construct process through a system of sorts which tailors the
outputs for the various hierarchies of the owner/project manager, A-E,
CM or contractor. Each one requires different types of information:
(1) The A-E may need design schedules and estimated costs,
(2) The project manager may need information on financing requirements
and schedule milestone dates,
(3) The multiple contractors may need information on their schedule , and
(4) The CM may need overall schedule data and cost information for
budget control.
The CM makes the schedules and maintains the management information system




4.6.6 Prevention of Omissions and Duplication
Another function of the CM is to prevent omissions in the design
and duplications between the contract packages through a thorough review of
the designer's products - contract documents, plans and specifications.
4.6.7 Long Lead Materials
It is inevitable that some items on the project will require a long
lead time for procurement. The CM must identify these items early in the
design stage, and recommend a strategy for procuring them so the project
will not be delayed. Procurement is usually accomplished by the owner
buying the material or equipment himself and supplying the contractor with
it when it is to be installed, or by awarding the contract for its instal-
lation at an early date so the contractor can be procuring the lead-time
item.
4.6.8 Potential Bidder Identification
Depending on the constraints involved, the CM may or may not par-
ticipate in the prequalif ication of bidders. On public jobs, prequalifi-
cation is prohibited. In any case, the CM should identify high quality
contractors to invite to bid on certain contract packages, instead of
solely leaving the function up to a clerk in the project manager's contract
office who may be using an out-of-date bidder's list.
4.6.9 Bidder Information Source
The CM acts as the information source for potential bidders on
each contract. He acts in this capacity by answering specific questions
posed by bidders, by showing bidders the job site, and by holding prebid
conferences for all interested bidders. The prebid conferences also
provide for a two-way flow of information. Not only does the bidder
receive information which reduces the uncertainty surrounding his bid, but
the CM gains further value engineering information from which changes to the
plans and specifications can be made. In many cases, the changes can be
made and addenda issued to all potential bidders prior to bid opening on that
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particular contract. Value engineering suggestions should be more numerous
prior to bidding under the CM system as opposed to the traditional system.
The prebid conferences are held for each functional portion of the work and
the contractors participating will actually be performing the work rather
than the general contractor, who is acting as a broker for the bulk of the
job.
4.6.10 Advertise, Bid and Award
Sometimes the CM actually advertises, takes bids or negotiates and
awards the contracts to the multiple contractors. It is more prevalent for
the CM to do this on privafe work, where the CM has guaranteed the owner a
project ceiling price and/or where the owner has little or no in-house
facilities staff. On most public work the governmental agencies, who are
the owners in this case, are not permitted to allow the CM to perform this
function. In some cases though, the CM still performs nearly all these
functions with the public client's governing body merely approving each
contract. This is usually the case where the owner has little or no
engineering capability. In a governmental bidding situation, the
requirements concerning bidding and contracts are quite numerous, detailed
and frequently changing. The knowledge required for this is quite extra-
neous to the main purpose that a CM is hired - construction knowhow. Thus,
in a governmental setting the contracting responsibility is best left to
the owner's project manager organization.
4.6.11 Cost Control
It has already been noted that the CM performs the estimating
function, but estimating in itself is not cost control. Estimating a
project is often just the first step of cost control. Cost control includes
measures to ensure the intended facility is constructed within the budgeted
amount for the project.
One approach a CM often employs is that at an early stage the
design is estimated for a high and low cost of each functional system or
potential contract (i.e., excavation, foundation, structure, mechanical,

89
electrical, etc.). A sum of the mean values for each category would equal
the most likely estimate, and the sum of the high values would equal the
maximum estimated cost; thus, the maximum estimated cost plus the contin-
gency allowance becomes a basis for the project budget. As design proceeds,
the high and low figures may be altered, but the summation of the high
estimates must not exceed the budget. As bids are taken on each contract,
the high estimate serves as a control amount. If the low bid on a contract
exceeds the high estimate, the bid can be:
(1) rejected, that segment redesigned and rebid;
(2) accepted, with the .overrun being spread over remaining margins from
other segments already bid that were below the high estimate;
(3) accepted, \j±th the overrun coming from the project contingency
allowance.
Figure 4.5 is an illustration of how this process works. The high
bids in Contracts C and E require different approaches. The problem in C
can be absorbed in the margin left by A and B quite easily. But the con-
tract E bid endangers the project budget, so it must be redesigned and
rebid. Thus, the function of cost control permits the undertaking of a
project without having a firm bid on the entire job. Each segments'
allocation is kept in perspective, thus minim.izing the risk of overrunning
the budget before all the contracts are awarded.
A. 6. 12 Contractor Capability Survey
Most construction contracts require a contractor to have the assets
and capability to perform the work on which he is bidding. Most project
managers reserve the right to inspect a contractor's facilities and make
this determination. The CM working as a professional has the construction
expertise to make this survey of a low bidder's assets and assist the
project manager in determining his capabilities.
4.6.13 Temporary and Common Use Facilities
The permanent construction as defined by the plans and specifica-







Low High Bid Gap Percent
of Job
A 1.00 1.25 1.05 -0.20 5
B 1.50 1.75 • 1.50 -0.25 -0.45 12
C 2.00 2.50 2.60 +0.10 -0.35 20
D 3.25 A. 00 3.80 -0.20 -0.55 38
E 2.25 2.75 4.00 +1.25 +0.70 50
10.00 12.25 12.95
Source: Foxhall, W. B. , Professional Construction Management and Project
Administration, Architectural Record and American Institute of
Architects, 1972, p. 14.
Fig. 4.5. CM Cost Control Example.
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into separate contracts. However, the provision of temporary and common
use facilities at the job site has customarily been the responsibility of
general contractors. Under this system, the CM is logically given the
responsibility of providing these facilities, which include such items
as the construction perimeter fence, the toilet facilities, and field
offices, the temporary power and water, etc. The CM provides these facil-
ities with his own forces or ensures they are procured by contract.
4.6. lA Direct, Schedule and Coordinate Contractors
At the job site, the CM maintains a field organization that is
actively involved in the work to ensure the smooth and timely operation of
the multiple contractors. The CM maintains communication with each con-
tractor concerning the start and completion times of his various tasks. He
coordinates and oversees the work of different contractors when their
respective tasks are closely interrelated. The more contracts there are on
a project, the more critical this coordination becomes. Under the tradi-
tional approach these functions are the province of the general contractor,
and in his absence under this system, the CM assumes the role. Some
people assert that the CM does not provide project direction in a fashion
similar to the general contractor, but in practice the CM is looked to
actively supervise at the job site. The multiple contractors are products
of a subcontractor heritage, and as such, tend to lean heavily on the
12
headman of the site for direction. Since the CM is filling this role,
he is looked to for direction, and if the project is to be successful he
had better be able to provide it.
4.6.15 Quality Control
As the CM system has emerged, the CM is generally being given the
responsibility for quality control. However, many existing CM configura-
tions still leave quality control to the architect or owner/project manager,
or even a combination of the two. Also, in some cases quality control is
shared by architect, owner, and CM. This joint responsibility situation
usually exists where there is no organized approach to quality control.
Nevertheless, the CM is the logical choice for quality control, because he
knows construction practices. He is working for the owner as a professional
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who has no financial interest in the project, and thus stands to lose his
"hard-earned" reputation if contractors "cut corners" on quality. Due to
his professional relationship with the owner, it is conceivable that
quality control could be provided by the same personnel who direct and
coordinate the multiple contractors.
4.6.16 Progress Payments
The CM checks the payment requests from the various contractors to
ensure that they have completed the work they have claimed for monthly
reimbursement. The CM may use the multiple contractor's CPM schedule or
his schedule of work quantities and corresponding prices to determine the
validity of his payment request. The CM passes his recommendations to the
owner's representative for authorization and payment, or for resolution if
the CM and contractor cannot reach agreement.
4.6.17 Change Orders
Regardless of where a valid change order may originate, the CM
prepares an estimate for the change since he has provided all the project
estimating. The CM also may negotiate with a multiple contractor to reach
a fair and reasonable price. However, when the contracts exist directly
between owner and contractor, the final approval of any change order rests
with the owner/project manager.
4.6.18 Shop Drawing and Submittal Reviews
The CM serves as the first stage in the review of shop drawings and
submittals. As a general contractor relays the shop drawings and submittals
from the subcontractors to the project manager with some eventually passing
to the A-E, the CM performs this same function. However, as a professional
working for the owner/project manager, he can screen the obviously unac-
ceptable ones and return them for resubmission. Since he has worked on the
design he may understand the designer's intent more clearly and this
knowledge improves his ability to screen these submissions.
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A. 6. 19 Safety
Even though each contractor is responsible for the safety of his
own personnel, the CM prepares an overall safety program and enforces
accident prevention requirements on the job site.
4.6.20 Final Inspection/Punch List
Contractors traditionally tend to request final inspections before
numerous contract discrepancies are corrected. Through his inspection
program, the CM seeks to clear up nearly all of the "loose ends" before
the final inspection. After this preparation phase, the CM notifies the
project manager that a particular contract is ready for final inspection.
The inspection is made and a "punch list" of discrepancies is prepared.
The CM uses this list to ensure that the contractor completes his work
before recommending final payment on the contract.
4.6.21 Occupancy Plan
The CM may be asked to prepare the occupancy plan for the
completed facility. The complexity of an occupancy plan is often directly
proportional to the complexity of the construction project. Frequently,
occupancy time can be optimized when closely coordinated with construction,
and thus the occupancy plan is included in the network planning diagram for
the entire project.
4.6.22 The CM and the Classic General Contractor
Many of the specific functions of the CM are the same as the
classic general contractor; however, the CM ' s professional relationship
to the owner makes it possible for him
(1) to carry this construction expertise back into the design of the
project,
(2) to integrate the design and construction phases through a master
time schedule and cost control system, and
(3) to begin construction at an earlier date than would be possible
through a traditional arrangement.
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4.7 The Nature and Organization of CM's
4.7.1 Types of CM Firms
Since the CM system is still a fairly new approach to construction,
the nature and background of the firms that hold themselves out as CM's
are quite varied. CM firms are usually the derivatives of a design or
construction background. The background of these CM's affects the way they
view their roles and the organization created to accomplish their tasks.
4.7.1.1 A-E Oriented CM's
Many firms in the CM arena are the outgrowths or products of
architectural or consulting engineering firms. Since the CM role is a
professional one, the architects and engineers stress that this is a style
with which they are quite familiar. They also stress that they understand
how to work with design professionals. They point to the fact that they
are experienced in conceptual estimating or estimating building systems.
Their services strongly emphasize the design phase of the project, and
indicate that poor management by general contractors has led to CM in the
first place. A-E oriented CM's generally promote CM in its purest form,
where the CM assumes no financial risk whatsoever in the project.
4.7.1.2 General Contractor Oriented CM's
Many other CM's have developed in general contracting firms. The
strongest assets of these CM's are their intimate knowledge of construction
methods and materials, and their ability to manage prime or subcontractors.
These general contractor oriented CM's are much more likely to accept
alternate arrangements to the "purist" concept of CM whereby the CM begins
to share in the financial risk of the project by guaranteeing a maximum
price. They guarantee the project cost because they have the bonding
capacity as a general contractor to establish a maximum dollar amount
on which many owners insist, and which most A-E oriented CM's cannot
or will not provide.
In researching the topic, the general contractor type CM seemed
to have more of a continuing dialogue with the project A-E than the design
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oriented CM. The latter CM seemed to hold the design perogative of the
A-E in much higher esteem and to honor the A-E's traditional dominance
over the design phase. As a result of this traditional approach, this
CM seemed to get involved with the design phase at specified intervals,
and at these times would recommend cost alternatives only when the current
estimate exceeded the budget. This "sat isf icing" relationship reduces
much of the potential of the CM system. The general contractor CM ' s
interviewed seemed to continually interject themselves into the design
phase, providing critical review of design work and supplying cost
alternatives. It should be noted that these general contractor oriented
CM's were the products of very large and successful construction
companies, whose staffs consisted of highly professional engineers and
construction personnel. Thus, the notions concerning contractors'
uncertainty in dealing with the design phase may prove true for the
bulk of the nation's general contractors who run much smaller operations.
4.7.1.3 Field Orientation of the CM
In the construction phase, the general contractor type CM's
assume a more active role. One A-E oriented CM said that they tried
to overcome this lack of field orientation by producing the most
"perfect" set of plans and specifications possible. Therefore, problem-
solving on the site is minimized. This writer feels that this approach
operates under one of the basic misconceptions that the traditional system
operates, and that is a perfect set of design documents can be produced
and also be followed in building a job. However, these A-E oriented
firms do try to solve their lack of construction experience by hiring
veteran construction superintendents to r.ionitor the on-site construction
work, or by engaging a general contractor as one of the multiple
contractors
.
4.7.1.4 The Organization of CM Firms
The organizational strategies of CM firms are developed to deal with
both the design and the construction phases. The CM firm usually assigns
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responsibility for overseeing the project to one of its principal members.
However, the bulk of the responsibility is assigned to the construction
executive, who works on the design and construction phases on a full time
basis. The title of this construction executive becomes quite confusing
at this point. He is referred to as Construction Manager, Project Manager,
Construction Engineer, Contract Manager, Project Superintendent, Construc-
tion Superintendent, and so on. The titles become even more confusing as
one studies hierarchical levels in various CM organizations. These titles
are found in use in different levels in different organizations. Figures 4,6
through 4.12 show some example organizational structures used by CM firms.
Contractor-oriented CM's tend to have more sophisticated field organization
than the A-E oriented CM's. In one case, the writer found an A-E type CM
firm which is liability conscious and weak on field experience. They use
the technique of including field supervision in one of the multiple contracts
being bid on by general contractors. In other cases this firm retains
local general contracting firms to provide field supervision. In this
writer's opinion, this is a subopt'imal approach to delivery of CM services.
The more continuity of personnel participating in both the design and
construction phases, the more benefits are to be dc-rived from the CM
approach. However, as CM becomes more institutionalized, there will be a
real danger of some CM personnel working only in the design phase and
others only in the construction phase. This will dilute some of the
effectiveness of the CM. In summary, the organization a CM firm uses in
accomplishing a project is a function of the owner's requirements, the size
of the project, the resources of the CM, and the nature of the firm.
As the CM system becomes more widely used, laws in various states
will probably be instituted to govern the practice of CM. A-E and con-
tractor oriented firms will be competing in terms of project performance to
gain the support of owners, and in politics to gain the support of
legislators.
A. 8 Manner in VJhich CM Services Are Delivered
The CM delivers his services in three ways:
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Fig. 4.7. CM Organization of Robert E. McKee Construction
Company on Two Project Site for Dallas Junior
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Fig. 4.12. CM Organizational Strategy for an A-E Oriented CM Firm.
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(2) as a manager
(3) as a general contractor
4.8.1 CM As a Consultant
The consultant approach is practiced primarily by A-E oriented
CM's who are strongly liability conscious. These CM's tend to concentrate
their efforts in the design phase, and try to limit their liability by
restricting their participation in the construction phase to such activities
as "observing" and "surveillance" of contractors. Even though the consul-
tant method appears to be a poor method of providing effective CM services,
it may be used to enlist construction consulting services for a specific
task on a traditional project such as a difficult estimating problem or a
design requiring some limited construction technology input.
4.8.2 CM As a Manager
The next approach is the manager technique, in which the CM is
actively involved in all phases of the project. Under this approach the CM
is working as a professional for the owner's project manager, and as such,
acts as his agent in directing, coordinating, inspecting, and controlling
the multiple contractors. The CM does not bear any financial risk under
this system, and all construction contracts are between the owner and con-
tractors. This has been referred to as CM in its purest form. The CM can
act in the owner's best interest without incurring financial losses to his
own firm.
The contractural arrangements between the owner and CM under the
first two delivery techniques are on a fee basis similar to the way archi-
tects and engineers are retained. This underscores the professional nature
of the services provided.
4.8.3 CM As a Modified General Contractor
The third delivery technique is the general contractor approach
(not to be confused with a general contractor type CM, which describes the
CM's background). Under this approach the CM is actually a general con-
tracting firm the owner hires at the beginning of the project along with
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the A-E to work in the design phase and to actually perform the construction
with his own forces and subcontractors. When the design becomes suffi-
ciently defined, this CM will usually negotiate a contract with the owner
with construction not to exceed a guaranteed maximum price. This approach
is less professional, because the CM now stands to lose if the "guaranteed
max" is not met. The CM's financial stake in the project may have a
significant influence on his decision making capability, but some owners
insist on the protection of a maximum construction cost. CM's who operate
under this approach quite frankly admit that the project estimates are
padded to protect the CM's risk exposure, and that the total project cost
is usually higher under this "guaranteed max" approach that purer CM
approaches described earlier.
This presentation on the delivery techniques corresponding to
contractual arrangements has been simplified. Each CM and each owner
who retains a CM employ different degrees and combinations of the
described methods to accomplish a project, but these are the rough
conceptual categories into which CM's are placed.
4.9 Resources Available from CM's
There are five areas of expertise that each CM should be able to







Above all the CM must understand construction: its methods,
materials, processes, practices, customs, structure and the industry
in general. He must have the knowledge of a competent general contractor
to effectively contribute construction technology and alternative solutions
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to the design phase. If a CM does not fully understand the construction
methods, labor and equipment required to place the material as the A-E is
drawing on the plans, then he is not as valuable to the owner/project
manager. The CM who possesses this important construction "knowhow"
resource should be able to apply it by critically reviewing the designer's
work, and in turn, providing the A-E with potential construction efficien-
cies and alternative methods that he could use to revise and refine his
design. These would reduce costs and develop a structure more suited to
the owner's requirements.
4.9.2 Estimating Expertise
The CM must also have a broad range of estimating resources.
These resources should include the ability to estimate construction costs
from a set of conceptual drawings, as well as detailed "quantity take-off"
estimating capability. The skills of a sound cost estimator should be
supplemented with a data base of accurate and current costs for building
subsystems as well as detailed items of work. Many CM's have tools such
as computer assisted retreival capabilities, to quickly apply the data
base to estimating the job. Regardless of methods and tools used,
frequent updates to the estimate are required to closely control potential
costs in the design phase and to eliminate excessive design reworking.
The estimating expertise of the CM must also include common sense in the
application of estimates to designs. Each construction project is unique
in some way, and the estimator must have the flexibility to realize this.
He cannot mechanically apply quantities to unit costs without considering
the peculiarities of the task to be performed and expect to come up
with relevant estimates.
4.9.3 Design Expertise
The CM should also have expertise in architectural and engineering
design. He need not be a designer, but he should thoroughly understand
the process an A-E goes through in designing a structure. He must under-
stand design procedures to be able to interface construction technology
,
market studies, and estimating inputs with the A-E's work in a timely and
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effective manner. The experience of many CM's has been that they are
initially resented by A-E's. Usually the A-E's begin to work well with the
CM's when they realize that the CM has a worthwhile service to offer.
This may take one or two projects in which the designer and CM work together
.
Thus, design expertise by the CM serves to make his construction input
more effective, and hopefully, the CM's professional nonadversary approach
develops into a good working relation with architectural and engineering
firms.
A. 9. 4 Management Expertise
The CM must be adept in the application of management techniques,
such as network planning and scheduling and management information systems.
Techniques such as CPM have not been used as a working scheduling tool by
16
general contractors under traditional operations. However, CM s use
computerized CPM's and management information systems extensively, because
the overlapping of design and construction (fast tracking) and the use of
multiple contractors requires closer project coordination and control.
Also, the owner/project manager plays a more active role in project con-
trol, and he too must have more information than he would under tradi-
tional circumstances.
The CM must also have human resource management skills. Since
the contracts are between the owner/project manager and the multiple
contractors, the CM may not have as much absolute authority as general
contractors have over subcontractors. He must be able to work with all
participants, professional and blue collar alike.
The owner /project manager forsakes the traditional approach with
its lump sum bid price to use a CM, because he feels that in the final
analysis his new facility will be produced at the lowest possible cost and
within the shortest time. The CM then should have enough managerial
capability to effectively use the technical and human resources of the
participants to produce the desired end result.
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A . 9 . 5 Geographical Expertise
A critical resource which the CM must possess and which may easily
be overlooked is the knowledge of the local construction market at the
project site. Ignorance of the availability and cost of labor, material
and equipment, and peculiarities of the construction industry in the
project area can lead to ineffectual or even disasterous decision making.
One of the goals of the CM system is effective employment of all resources
in the execution of the project. As has been stated previously, the con-
struction industry is a heterogeneous , fragmented, locally sens;Ltive industry
.
Thus, the construction economics and peculiarities of the project area
must be known. The CM may find it more economical in a project area to
use casted-in-place concrete, since the nearest prestressed plant is
300 miles away. He may find that the mechanical engineer feels that
pneumatic air conditioning controls are the most efficient, but local
contractors only have experience in installing electrical ones. He may
find that no contractors in the area have tower cranes, one has a 300 ton
crane, and six have cranes in the 100-150 ton range. The only three
masonry contractors in the area are working at full capacity and will be
for the next six to eight months. This kind of information can influence
the basic as well as the detailed design decisions which must be made to
reduce the project's price and time schedule.
4.10 Cost of the CM System
There are a number of compensation arrangements under which CM's
work.
4.10.1 Fixed Fee
Most CM's work for a fixed fee or some variation of the fixed fee
system. This system is similar to that used by design professionals in
the delivery of their services, in that the fee is based on a percentage of
the estimated project cost or the estimated staff and overhead costs of
the CM plus a reasonable profit. The fixed fee is paid to the CM as long
as he carries out his contractual obligations, regardless of the cost
and time performance of the construction. This underlines the professional
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approach to delivery of CM services, since the CM bears no financial
risk in the project.
4.10.2 Fixed Fee and Reimbursables
One common variation of the fixed fee system is to allow certain
expenses of the CM to be reimbursable because of the uncertainty of the
extent of these expenses. A-E's historically have used reimbursable
expenses for such things as required travel and per diem expenses
associated with the project. The CM ' s reimbursable category on the
other hand, seems to be filled with a larger variety of potential expenses.
Not only are travel and per diem included, but also items such as the cost
of temporary and common use facilities, and additional job site staff
above the staffing level included in the fixed fee. Unlike A-E contracts,
the reimbursable portion of the CM ' s fee can be much larger than the
fixed portion of his fee. However, many of these costs were traditionally
paid by general contractors so prime contract work will be reduced. When
the CM negotiates his contract, even before design has begun, there are
many uncertainties about the construction phase. The temporary and
common use facilities which are extensive on a laige project are totally
undefined, and thus it is impossible to include them in a fixed fee. The
job site staff is also an unknown variable, since its size and make-up will
be a function of the design, the number of contractors involved, and the
"tightness" of the project time schedule. Most owners /project managers
feel that to maintain the "risk- free," professional posture of the CM, they
must allow him to cover his uncertain requirements through reimbursable
expenses. Regardless, the owner /pro ject manager must maintain some
controls over these reimbursable categories to ensure that they are
used in a prudent and resourceful manner.
4.10.3 Guaranteed Maximum Price Incentives
Another way that CM's are compensated is through incentive bonuses.
These are usually tied to projects in which the CM has guaranteed a maximum
price in an effort to get the project to come in substantially below the
ceiling figure. Under this type of arrangement, the owner and CM usually
share in the difference between the actual price and the "guaranteed max"

110
when the project is completed in the "black." The theory behind using the
guaranteed maximum price and associated incentives is that the CM has an
interest in minimizing the project cost, and as a result will maximize the
return to the owner as well as to himself. Opponents of the guaranteed
maximum price counter that the project cost will be greater and quality
reduced when not using the "pure" professional approach to CM. They
claim that the CM will sufficiently pad estimates to obtain a high ceiling
price to ensure self-protection against financial loss, and to maximize
the chance of collecting incentive bonuses. If the "guaranteed max" is in
danger of being exceeded, then the CM may make decisions to protect his own
financial interests which can affect the quality of the job.
4.10.4 CM System Project Cost
Most o^imers/project managers are concerned about how the project
cost under CM relates to project cost under the traditional system. The
added cost of the CM must be compensated for in savings elsewhere in the
project. Figure 4.13 shows the cost structure of a traditional project
vs. a CM project. The traditional project costs are made up of the A-E's
contract, the general contractor's contract, the project manager's adminis-
tration cost, and perhaps some miscellaneous engineering services. The
cost of the general contractor is segmented between the cost of the sub-
contractors, the general contractor's fee for managing them, the cost of
labor, material and equipment for the work done by the general's own forces
and his profit, overhead, and contingency allowance. Under the CM system
the construction work is still done primarily by subcontractors, except
they are now called multiple or prime contractors, and there may be more
of them since the general's in-house work must now be done by one or more
additional contractors. However, it is very likely that the multiple con-
tractors may charge the project manager less than a general contractor
because
(1) the contractor knows his price will not be "beaten down" further,
(2) bidding close to when work begins on that portion of the work
reduces economic uncertainties and
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Fig. 4.13. Project Cost Structure.
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(3) since construction technology and market awareness were "cranked"
into the design of the project, the plans should be less ambig-
uous and more construction-efficient.
The cost of the contractors should be the same as it was to the general
unless the system introduced uncertainties the multiple contractors
compensate for by upping their contingencies. The CM ' s cost replaces the
general's profit, overhead, subcontractor management cost, and contingency
18
allowance. On a project these may run 6-8 percent. This was validated
by GSA's experience which is covered in Chapter 6. The CM ' s fee depends
largely on the extent of the services required of him. Since the concept
is so new there are no standards, but CM fees commonly range from 4 percent
to 6 percent. Undoubtedly the CM takes the estimating load and some
inspection responsibilities off the A-E. Therefore, the A-E's fee should
be correspondingly reduced even though this is a highly unpopular notion.
The use of the professional CM approach may also reduce the field adminis-
tration expense of the project manager, since the CM performs the inspec-
tion function. However, there may be corresponding increases in legal,
office, and paperwork expenses, since there will be numerous construc-
tion contracts rather than one under the traditional method. Many quali-
tative judgments must be made in trying to quantitatively analyze the cost
of using a CM system over using the traditional system. At best when
considering project design, construction, and management costs without
regard to project delivery time or project quality, comparisons such as
the Project Cost Structures shown in Fig. 4.13 can serve as a guideline for
analysis.
4.11 CM Sensitivity
There are a number of factors to which the CM system is sensitive
that must be considered for the successful application of this technique.
They are as follows:
(1) Cash Flow . This factor is critical when the overlapping of the
design and construction phases is planned. The owner must have
funds readily available to begin to commit himself to construction
19
contracts very early in the project lifp.
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(2) Decision Making . The CM must have firm, prompt decisions from the
OTimer /project manager on various aspects of the project. As
stated earlier, the CM system requires greater participation from
the owner, so the owner must have the organization to interface
with the CM. To ignore this requirement may render the CM
ineffectual.
(3) Information . Due to the overlapping of design and construction
and the complexity of the contractural relationships with numerous
"prime" contractors on site, the steady and effective flow of
information is essential to project success. Contractors must
know when to be on the job and when to coordinate with other con-
tractors. For example, they need to know when to expect submittal
approvals to be returned. Owners /project managers need to have
cost and financial information. A-E's need to know the design
deadlines for the various contracts and when to expect the esti-
mates from the CM. The CM needs information from all sources to
update the master schedule. It is obvious that under the CM
system, where design and construction are integrated and active
management of the project is increased to improve project perfor-
mance, that information flow becomes much more critical.
A. 12 Project Risk Structure
Under the traditional approach to construction, the risk structure
has been fairly well defined through the contractual documents and the
court system. The general contractor has traditionally borne the risk for;
(1) Misreading and misinterpreting the plans and specifications
(2) Bid calculation errors
(3) Material availability and price stability
(4) Labor availability and price stability






(8) Environmental compliance for construction operations
(9) Scheduling and coordinating subcontractors.
The owner/project manager has usually assumed the risk for:
(1) Design omissions and mistakes
(2) Changes required by the owner
(3) Unforeseen site conditions.
Through his lump-sum bid, the contractor provided owners/project managers
V7ith what they feel is a low risk exposure. For the large amount of risk
the contractor undertakes, he compensates himself with a high mark-up in
his bid. The old business correlation that "the higher potential risk, the
higher the potential return" is well known to the contractor. He knows his
risks are high, but he knows he stands to make a sizeable return if the job
runs smoothly. In a way, the ov;ner-contractor risk relationship also
exists between contractor and subcontractor. Subcontractors whose work is
in the later stages of a project and who must bid before work begins are
subject to high uncertainty and high risk, and their contract mark-up
compensates for this. The contractor then passes these "risk compensations"
on to the o\>mer in his contract price.
The owner's risk obligations seem small as listed, but many poor
quality contractors further increase their project income through the
shrewd "change order" management. Through extremely literal and "nit-
picking" plans and specification interpretations, this type of contractor
seeks to exploit the ovzner's liabilities to generate change orders and
increase his own return. These contractors reduce the risk protection the
owner has against contract cost increases.
In the recent inflationary cycle some contracts have used cost
escalation clauses to reduce the uncertainty for which the contractors
were having to charge phenomenal contingencies. These cost escalation
clauses have had the effect of transferring much of the risk to the owner.
To be specific, labor and material price stability, previously listed as
major risks borne by the contractor, were transferred to the owner.
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Under the "pure" CM system the risk structure changes, even
though the owner /project manager have the same risk relationship with
each multiple contractor as they did with the general contractor. On the
overall project scale, the owner/project manager assumes most of the
traditional general contractor's risk obligations. The main risks which
must concern each o\^mer/proj ect manager in evaluating a shift to the CM
system are labor and material availability and price stability, the
implications of responsibility for overall project safety, and scheduling
and coordinating multiple contractors. As the contractor correlates high
risk with a high possible rate of return, the owner/project manager must
also hope to achieve the likelihood of gains by assuming more risk. The
returns gained by the owner/project manager may not be completely measurable .
These returns may include, but are not limited to a more economical cost of
construction, shorter construction time and a better quality job. These
could result in quicker occupancy benefits from the service of the new
facility, high user satisfaction, a hedge against the facility becoming
obsolete even before completion, and a hedge against numerous user
requirement changes that occur when the project life is drawn out.
If the owner/project manager assumes the greater risks under the
CM system in an effort to achieve the higher returns, he can take actions
which will allow him to hedge on the risk with the high returns still
remaining possible. This may be done by prudent management actions such as
(1) providing in-house management of the project through a well
organized project manager's organization,
(2) selecting a highly qualified CM, and
(3) providing the CM with clearly defined requirements of what he is
to accomplish.
The owner/project manager may also shield himself against the risk of
exceeding his budget by using the guaranteed maximum approach, but he does
so at the cost of losing other benefits mentioned in Section 4.10.2
There are more risks to the owner/project manager in the CM system,
and the value of the gain expected by going to the system should be
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analyzed before adopting the CM approach. However, if major risks such as
cost escalation are transferred from the general contractor to the owner/
project manager when using the traditional approach, the risk structure
becomes more similar to that under the CM concept. Also the owner/
project manager, through shrewd management, can minimize his risks and
still achieve the high expected value of the system.
4.13 Summary
This chapter has sought to describe the CM system from a variety of
angles, and to note some of the implications associated v/ith the CM method.
The reader should leave this chapter v/ith one main point: CM is not a
panacea for all the problems of the construction business. CM is a system
that seeks to use the existing resources of the construction industry to
deliver construction in a more effective manner. The CM does this by
interjecting construction considerations into the design phase, and
assuming a supervisory role in the construction phase while maintaining
a professional relationship with the owner/project manager.
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PERFORMANCE OF TRADITIONAL NAVY SYSTEM
5.1 General
Before considering the use of one alternative approach to Navy
contract construction procurement, the performance of the existing system
should be analyzed. From an analysis of the existing traditional con-
tracting and controlling methods, areas needing improvement can be
identified.
Ideally, the best approach to comparing two design and construction
delivery systems would be to compare a number of similar projects at
similar times under similar conditions in similar localities. Unfortu-
nately, since each construction project is unique to some extent, it is
nearly impossible to find two similar projects - much less two that are
alike in all aspects, not just design alone.
This chapter will seek to give some quantitative performances data
and subjective comments on Navy projects procured by traditional methods.
The next chapter will provide some similar data on projects done by the
General Services Administration (GSA) on some of their projects accom-
plished under the CM approach. The reader should use extreme caution in
making a direct comparison, because of the dissimilarity in the projects
and the circumstances that surround them. Furthermore, the nature of the
two project manager organizations, the Navy's NAVFAC and GSA's Public




However, if one examines the Navy's performance as it compares to
its own goals, this can serve as some basis for measuring the effectiveness




reported in this chapter has been taken from NAVFAC computer reports that
pertain to the status of projects, and from summary reports that accu-
mulate data from projects for comparison against various NAVFAC goals.
The summaries are referred to as goal reports and the status of
projects are in field execution reports. Since it is a generally accepted
fact that the CM approach is more appropriate for large projects in excess
of $5 million, the writer has tried to extract data for Navy projects in
this price range. Since these projects are not separately summarized in
NAVFAC reports, the writer surveyed all the EFD, Field Execution Reports
of 30 June 1975 and identified 143 projects V7ith budgets exceeding
$4.5 million. $4.5 million was chosen due to the large proportion of
projects just under $5 million and since budgets tend to increase as the
project progresses they seemed to be in the CM project range.
Even though all the active projects and projects completed during
FY 75 were included in the report, fev7 large projects (over $4.5 million)
showed as completed. Thirty-two projects were selected that appeared to
have progressed substantially to allow accurate projections to be made
about their completion time and cost. Since some of the computer data
appeared to be erroneous and other information not contained in the
reports was required, each ROICC to which one of the thirty-two jobs was
assigned was sent a letter as shown in Appendix c, requesting information.
The information sought milestone and time data, bid data, change order data,
and cost data. The manual technique of procuring this information limited
the amount of projects which could be surveyed, and this limitation of
small sample size must be considered in examining the results. The data
base was further limited in that ten projects were not reported, reducing
the sample size to twenty-two. On the other hand, the results may be some-
what better for the sample than for large projects on the whole, since only
projects substantially constructed were selected. Problem-laden projects
may have been passed over for this study, since they are not far enough
along to make accurate predictions about completion data. The projects
reported on are shown in Appendix D.
The accumulated data from the large projects are shown in Table 5.1.
Information concerning time data, number of bidders and estimating
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TABLE 5.1. LARGE PROJECT PERFORMANCE
(1) Construction Start . Award of construction contract in year













Projects Awarded 6 14 2 22
Value of
Projects Awarded $34. 3M $104. 3M $20. 9M $159. 5M
Cumulative
Percentage 21% 87% 100%
—
(2) Plans and Specifications (P and S) Complete . Relationship
between FY by which P and S are complete and project program year.
Relationship of By Beyond
FY by Which P&S Within Same 30 Sept. 30 Sept.
TOTAL
Are Complete to FY as PY of Next of next
Project PY FY FY
Number of
Projects Where 12 3 6 21
P&S Are Complete
Value of
Projects VJhere $76. 7M $ 17. 8M $44. 2M $138. 7M
P&S Are Complete
Cumulative
Percentage 55% 68% 100% —
(3) Change Orders . There were projected to be $4.7 million of
change orders on 21 projects valued at $153.7 million. This corresponds
to a project cost increase of 3.1 percent over the initial award amount.




(4) Occupancy. Relationship between beneficial occupancy date and
















Number of Projects 11 4 6 21
Cumulative Percentage 52% 71% 100% —
(5) Estimating . Performance expressed as the percentage that the low
bid exceeds the government estimating (under estimate) or that the low
bid is below the government estimate (over estimate). For 19 projects in
sample, average variance was l!13 percent. Removing two widely deviant





15-20% 10-15% 5-10% 0-5% 0-5% 5-10% 10-15% 15-20%
Over
20%
3 1 4 3 4 2 2
(6) Length of Design Time . Average was 14 months for 20 projects,
DISTRIBUTION
Design Times (months)
7-9 10-12 13-15 16-18 19-21 22-24 25 and up
Number




(7) Length of Bid Time (time between completion of design and
award of construction). Average was 3.5 months for 21 projects.
DISTRIBUTION
Bid Time (months)
1 2 3 A 5 6 7
Number
of Projects










(9) Length of Total Project Time (all phases) . Average was 41 months
for 20 projects
DISTRIBUTION
Total Project Tim.e (months)
21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60
Number










3 A 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 U 20
1
1 V
(11) Average Size of Projects in Sample Was 7.6 Million,
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performance is shown in histogram form, so that the actual distributions
may be seen. With this size sample, extremely high or low figures can
significantly influence averages.
5. 3 Quantitative Results
Table 5.2 shows a comparison of NAVFAC goals to all Navy Military
Construction (MCON) projects and to the large project sample.
5.3.1 Construction Starts
One of the major goals of NAVFAC is to get as many projects as
possible in one program year under contract by the last day, June 30, of
the corresponding fiscal year. The reasons for this "push" to make
June 30 seems to be two-fold.
(1) Once the project is under contract, the implementation phase has
begun and it appears the resources allocated for the project will
be sufficient to accomplish it.
(2) As noted in Chapter 3, the size of the MCON appropriation for
the next program year may be dependent on how fully the funds for
the current year have been used. Even though the construction
appropriations do not expire, congressmen consider the ability to
obligate these funds expediently important in examining new
programs
.
This is a very difficult goal to achieve in that the appropriations are
not usually received until well into the program year, sometimes leaving
only six months in which to award all the contracts. For the FY 75 MCON
Program, NAVFAC awarded 80 percent of the projects and 70 percent of the
2
total program dollar value. The criterion for qualifying the total
authorized project dollar value as a construction start is to award one
or more contracts for at least 50 percent of the authorized amount.
Another NAVFAC goal is to start 100 percent of a MILCON program by
the end of the subsequent FY after the program year. Another motive which
prompts this goal, other than the two given in the preceding paragraph, is
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October 1. Thus, projects awarded by this June 30 target date do not have
to go through the reauthorization process, and do not run the risk of
being cancelled. Any segment of the construction funds, regardless of
size can be awarded to avoid an authorization expiring. By June 30, 1975
NAVFAC had awarded 94 percent in dollar value of the FY75 program.
In the large projects sample only 6 of 22, 27 percent, of the
projects were awarded in their program year, accounting for 21 percent of
the sample's dollar value. Fourteen more were started in the FY following
their program year for a cumulative percentage of 84 percent, leaving two
projects for award beyond the final target date. It is only logical that
large complex projects will take longer to get under a single lump sum
general contract than smaller ones.
5.3.2 Plans and Specifications Comple ted
Naturally, under the traditional approach no construction contract
can be awarded until the plans and specifications are completed. Thus,
NAVFAC seeks to have 95 percent of the plans completed by the end of the
fiscal year which corresponds to the program year. This writer was
advised that unfortunately, a NAVFAC-wide MILCON summary was not available
for this category since the computer reports were inaccurate, due to the
3
presence of much erroneous input. However, the large projects sample
indicates that 12 out of 21 projects, 55 percent, were completed by
June 30 of their corresponding years.
5.3.3 Change Orders
The change order goal of NAVFAC is to hold cost increases to
3 percent of the original award amount. The large project sample was
right at the goal with 3.1 percent, but a Navy-wide MILCON summary for
change orders was not available since the computer output contained
some accounting charges mixed in with the true changes to distort the
4
results. In the large p:
change orders per project




NAVFAC recognizes the need for timely completion of the facility
being constructed. Their goal is to have occupancy within three months of
the original contract completion date at award. The large projects sample
showed 52 percent of the projects projected to meet this goal. The results
are not summarized NAVFAC wide for MCON projects, but a review of EFD/OICC
goal reports showed that of 70 jobs of various sizes completed in FY 75
which had reported contract completion dates, 35 of them or 50 percent
had completed within the goal.
5.3.5 Estimating Performance
NAVFAC sets the tolerance for estimates to be within ±5 percent of
the low bid. This item is not reported on in the goal reports, but in the
writer's large projects sample, the variance averaged ±10 percent for 17
jobs after allowing for two widely deviant estimates. Good estimating
performance has become extremely difficult within the last few years. The
FY 74 program was plagued with highly escalated bids due to the rampant
inflation in construction, the high employment of construction resources,
and the high uncertainty in the future behavior of labor and material,
equipment and fuel prices. The FY 75 program was just the opposite, with
bids coming in significantly under the estimates due to:
(1) the slowdown in construction activity in the private sector which
increased competitive activity in the public sector,
(2) the slackening of inflation and material prices, and stocks,
(3) the stabilization of fuel , and
(4) the NAVFAC estimators' natural tendency to figure on the high
side in reaction to the FY 74 program bids.
One observer also noted that suppliers listed prices artifically high to
protect themselves from price controls, while the actual prices paid by
contractors were drastically discounted. All these factors could also
account for a high estimated project cost.
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5.3.6 Large Projects Time Performance
The design, bid and construction times were calculated, since one of
the main advantages CM offers is project time reduction. The findings
showed that design time averaged 14 months. As noted in Chapter 3, it must
be recognized that design may begin up to a year or more before the funds
are available for construction. The bid time, which is the time from
completion of design to award of the construction contract, averaged 3.5
months. The average construction time was calculated at 24 months. This
accounts for a total project time of 41 months , from beginning of design to
construction completion. This 3-1/2 years, coupled with the project
submission and evaluation time before design is authorized, brings the
project life cycle to approximately five years
.
5.4 Qualitative Evaluation
The quantitative measures of a project are often inaccurate in
describing the performance of a single project or even a group of projects.
Thus, some qualitative judgments must be expressed in order to gain some
notion of the effectiveness of the system. Such items as quality, con-
structability , marketability, and contractor management ability may in
some ways be quantifiable, but figures can only indicate a limited amount
of information. Certain subjective information needs to be gathered and
studied to make a proper evaluation. In this section, the writer attempts
to bring together some opinions on areas of a project which would receive
different treatment under the CM techniques as opposed to the traditional
approach.
5.4.1 Quality
Quality is a difficult area with which to deal. The standards for
quality are defined by the plans, specifications, customs, standard
practices, and even the character of the contractor. The vehicle through
which quality is assured is the inspection program. Large sophisticated
project manager organizations like NAVFAC have maintained sizeable
inspection forces to guarantee that quality is achieved. NAVFAC 's close
inspection strategy for quality control developed implications of govern-
ment supervision which in some cases, made the Navy liable for defective
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performance. As discussed in Chapter 3, NAVFAC adopted the Contractor
Quality Control Program (CQC) whereby the contractor maintained a con-
struction inspector on his staff to fulfill the role previously handled
by the Navy inspector.
The comments of persons who have worked with CQC have been quite
informative. One comment which is heard on a recurring basis is that the
effectiveness of the CQC program depends on the quality of the contractor.
Top notch contractors have effective CQC programs, while low quality con-
tractors have poor CQC programs. The effectiveness of CQC was also said
to depend on the quality and experience of the contractor's CQC represen-
tative. The CQC "rep" is usually from within the contractor's organiza-
tion, even though some contractors have hired testing firms to do
CQC. One respondent noted a situation where a particularly good CQC
representative, who was finding numerous deficiencies in his own con-
tractor's work, was fired and replaced before the contract was finished.
Another person noted that CQC was not supposed to increase the
construction cost because the CQC representative was always on site or at
least under the contractor's control, so the contractor would not be
delayed by waiting for government inspection. Hov;ever, this same person
noted that some contractors are claiming that their CQC costs are running
about 2 percent of the total project cost. He indicated that contractors
are extending this overhead cost to change order claims as well.
One individual noted that CQC was good because it removed the
implications of tacit approval by the Navy, and it might even in some
cases extend the warranty past the traditional one year to include
latent defects in construction which may not appear until much later. He
also noted that the day-to-day record keeping of the CQC representative
seemed to be better in some cases where it has been done properly,
because the Navy inspectors did not have time under the old system.
Of those who commented on CQC, nearly everyone mentioned that
significant levels of effort were required to make the system work. The
education of contractors was the key to making the system work in some
situations while other builders fought CQC all the way. Therefore, one of
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the variables in the success or failure of CQC on individual projects
seems to be the contractor himself,
5.4.2 Constructability
One of the most common complaints on any construction site are the
problems and inefficiencies created by the plans and specifications. Since
contractor input into the design usually helps reduce the inefficiencies,
this writer sought information on the extent of this input to NAVFAC design
.
It was found that participation of construction people in the design phase
was cursory at the most. Though ROICC and EFD Construction Division
personnel were usually invited to attend design review conferences and
were allowed to view the plans before they were advertised, these measures
were not very productive and came too late. The ROICC and Construction
Division personnel claimed that most of their recommended changes were
ignored. When their comments were recognized the personnel were told
that to make the revisions would hold up the award date, so they should
wait and negotiate a change order. Since most field personnel were so busy
with day-to-day administration of construction in progress, and since
little importance was attached to their input, thp designs they received
for comments were given little attention. On the other side of the
organization, one EFD Design Division member criticized the field inputs
as not being real constructability inputs, but more concerned with con-
tractual procedures and technicalities. The NAVFAC system seems to operate
under the assumption that constructability optimization is included in the
responsibility of the A-E who is retained to design the project.
5.4.3 Marketability
Input of construction market information into the design is also
left mostly to the A-E, under the NAVFAC concept. The cost behavior and
availability of construction labor and material are assumed to be included
in the designs and estimates produced by the A-E. One questionnaire
respondent noted that the A-E on his project had produced a good design,
but the talent for the type of construction did not exist in the locality
of the site. The estimating variance of -10 percent also could indicate a
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lack of market information. Even though each project needs to have
construction market input to the design, the thoroughness of a market
study as needed under a CM project may have less value for a traditional
project. This is due to the fact that the design is done in advance under
the traditional method, and market conditions are more likely to change
over this longer lapse of time. Another market variable is the competi-
tiveness of the project, which is many times a function of the timing of
the bid opening.* The EFD Contracts Division has the responsibility for
setting the opening date and time. One person involved in this area
noted that for big projects the local AGC near the potential project site
is notified to ensure the opening date does not conflict with other
openings or contractor events in the area. The large projects sample noted
earlier the average was six bidders per bid opening, so there seemed to
be reasonable competitiveness.
5.5 Conclusion
NAVFAC has been able to produce one of the more effective
traditional approaches to construction among governmental agencies.
Even though there seems to be room for improvement in estimating, getting
construction started, minimizing change orders, controling quality,
finishing on time and producing more construction efficient designs, the
total design, bid and construction average time of 41 months compares
favorably to the 59 months required by the General Services Administration
prior to their switch to the CM approach. Even GSA's original prediction
for the new approach was 48 months, from the selection of A-E and CM to
the completion of construction. The next chapter will look at the actual
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ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENTAL CM SYSTEMS
6. 1 General
This chapter explores the performance of CM systems as used by
Federal governmental agencies. Unfortunately, quantitative data have not
been easy to obtain. The two biggest users of CM, the General Services
Administration (GSA) and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), have not been collecting data to monitor their overall CM programs,
As a result, HEW was not able to provide any quantitative data, and GSA
had to gather information specifically at the request of the writer. It
was also limited to information available from their Central Office in
Washington, D.C. In the writer's opinion, the material on CM performance
in this chapter is not comprehensive, but it appears to be more than what
has been gathered before this study. Therefore, the data collected can
serve the purpose of drawing some basic conclusions about the CM
approach. In the future, data should be easier to obtain as CM projects
begin to multiply and owner/project manager organizations need to quanti-
tatively determine the benefits of CM jobs.
6 .
2
CM Approaches Used in Governmental Agencies
6.2.1 GSA's Public Building Service (PBS)
The GSA-PBS uses the approach nearly identical to the "pure" CM
method described in Chapter 4. The CM participates in the design phase,
manages the contractors in the construction phase, and maintains schedule
and cost control over the entire process. He does this as an agent of





6.2 .2 Department of Health, Education and Welfare '(HEW)
The Office of Facilities Engineering and Property Management of HEW
administers the procedures under which certain federally assisted projects
are constructed, as well as some in-house HEW jobs. Their approach to
phased construction requires the CM to guarantee a maximum price so that
the CM does assume the financial risk for the budget success of the project,
6.2.3 Other Systems
There are variations to the systems cited above, such as the
University of California approach. Under this system, firms bid for CM
services during the design phase. The selected CM is also permitted to bid
against other contractors for the various contract packages, to ensure a
high degree of competition. However, since GSA and HEW are the two most
prominent users of CM within the federal government, these two systems
will be analyzed in detail. Due to the availability of information, the
GSA system will receive a more thorough treatment than the HEW approach.
6.3 GSA's CM Approach
6.3.1 GSA's Self-Examination
In March 1970 GSA issued a study of the construction contracting
systems used by the PBS and other organizations. The study indicated that
the PBS was not very effective in procuring contract construction. The
following facts were revealed:
(1) Design and construction time for a traditionally built $10 million
Federal Office Building was taking 59 months. When considering
preliminary planning time before the design begins, the comple-
tion of construction could be expected at eight years after
project submission.
(2) Design was taking 24 months to accomplish, while the PBS standard
called for only 12.5 months. The actual design time was taking 16
months, but an additional 8 months was being expended by the
various PBS reviews. This long, fragmented process prevented the
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A-E from continuing the same personnel on the design. Other
factors contributing to design slippage were:
(a) Rigid guide specifications;
(b) Inadequate project program description;
(c) Client and PBS changes which increased in proportion to length
of design time;
(d) Client agencies' failure to conduct timely reviews;
(e) The desire by PBS to redesign the A-E's work;
(f) The expenditure of excessive review time to achieve dispropor-
tionately small savings;
(g) Prolonged consideration of changes;
(h) Double review on many projects by the PBS regional office and
2
the Central Office in Washington, D.C,
(3) Many of the designs as finally developed in contract documents
exceeded the project budget. Architects often viewed the Federal
government as a client with sufficient resources to cover the
project cost, even if the budget was exceeded. Other
architects appeared to have only a limited ability to forecast
the cost of their design decisions. Additional causes for "over-
design" were attributed to the fact that the project was being
estimated for a considerable time into the future, and the fact
that the PBS failed to stop the architect when a budget-exceeding
over design was detected. In some cases, the PBS personnel led
the A-E's to believe more funds would be provided to increase the
3budget.
(4) There was a two to three year lag between the time funds were
appropriated by Congress to purchase the site and design the
project, and the time when the money was provided by the lawmakers
4
for construction.
(5) The advertisement, bid and award consumed four to five months,
compared to the PBS target of two months.
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(6) The standard allowable time for construction was 24 months, but
the actual building process was consuming an average of 30 months.
Liquidated damages were highly ineffective in motivating time
performance. Of the 320 projects examined, the study indicated
only 25 percent were performed on schedule, while only 12 percent
were assessed any liquidated damages. In fact, some contractors
indicated enforcement could be avoided to a large degree through
processing delay claims.
(7) Change orders were running at 6.74 percent of the project cost,
which was up 14 percent from a study done eight years earlier.
Tenant changes accounted for 62.7 percent of the value of these
changes. Design errors and omissions were only 16.9 percent of the
dollar value, but accounted for one-half of the total number of
change orders. Processing of change orders was extremely slow,
since field personnel only had authority for changes up to $1,000,
and since a detailed estimate was required on changes over $500.
(8) The project responsibility within PBS was fragmented and unco-
ordinated. The Office of Space Management acquired the site and
prepared the space directives for the A-E. The Office of Design
and Construction handled the design and construction phases and
the Office of Building Management furnished information relating
to the operation of the building. Among these three divisions,
there was no single overall point of responsibility. At the time
of the study, a decentralization plan was to have been implemented
to transfer more responsibilities to the regional offices. Various
responsibilities had been transferred, others had not, and in most
cases the resources, guidance and technical support had not been
provided with the increased workload. Furthermore, the PBS
regional personnel reported to the Regional Commissioner of GSA,
who in turn reported to the Administrator of GSA, rather than to
the Commissioner of PBS. This organizational and authority





6,3.2 GSA's Examination Of The Private Sector
GSA also surveyed the practices of owners in the private sector
such as industrial firms and commercial developers, to obtain new
facilities. The industrial firms examined were Ford, General Electric,
General Motors, IBM, and New York Telephone Company which have an annual
construction volume from $160 to $400 million. GSA's finding among
industrial firms were as follows:
(1) The industrial firms procured construction in a traditional manner
of designing, bidding, constructing, but the time for a $10 million
office building was only 24 months from start of design to comple-
9
tion of construction.
(2) The design review is conducted concurrently as the des ign progresses
,
with a company project manager spending much time in the A-E's
office. The design reviews tend to be more conceptual and less
detailed.
(3) Most of the industrial firms maintained automated and sophisticated
cost accumulation systems. The costs of current projects were
being processed and used as a basis for estimating the cost of new
construction and changes.
(4) Change orders for these companies averaged less than 4 percent of
the contract price. The firms placed a high emphasis on expedi-
. , .
12
cious processing of claims.
(5) Most companies did not use liquidated damages or performance
bonds, and they used less inspection than GSA; however, the
contractors were prequalified and rated on performance for the
13
future opportunity to bid.
GSA interviewed a number of general contractors who had experience
in developing and constructing office buildings. They included Turner,
Fuller, Tishman, Bateson, Hyman and Volpe. The findings were as follows:
(1) Time is of the essence to a developer so tight schedules are
imposed and phased construction, overlapping design and construc-
tion, is used to the maximum extent possible. When using phased
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construction, developers found the apparent risk of a high
incidence of changes during the building phase was not a
significant problem.
(2) The specifications used by developers are more performance-
oriented and less detailed, thus leaving greater options open
during construction time. Bid solicitations frequently use
specified alternatives, and contractors were allowed to make
proposals on materials or systems to reduce the cost of construc-
tion. A number of the general contractors who were interviewed
stated that detailed expertise in the electrical and mechanical
areas came from the subcontractors.
(3) The cost of the building was kept at a minimum through the CM
technique by maintaining the benefits of competition by bidding
at the subcontract level, while constantly striving through con-
1
(i
struction inputs to achieve the most cost effective design.
(4) The contractors noted that the decision making capability of the
developer was the key to success. The most effective developers
were those who utilized a single, well-qualified project manager
who possessed substantial authority.
6.3.3 Study Recommendations
The recommendations resulting from this GSA study were:
(1) Preliminary planning funds should be used to develop the project,
1 Q
acquire the site and hire the A-E.
(2) The construction should be funded by one lump sum appropriation or
19
a revolving building fund for all PBS projects.
(3) Cost estimates should be improved by reducing the lag time in
getting into the construction phase, and using a CM on major
20projects to perform the estimating.
(4) A-E quality should be improved by rating past performance and
selecting on that basis. Also, the A-E should specify what persons
will work on the design and PBS should insist that these people
u . ^ 21do the job.
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(5) Reduce the design time to standards prevalent in industry which
can be partially achieved by concurrently reviewing design as it
22
is produced.
(6) Revise the guide specifications to provide more flexibility for
23
the architect.
(7) Continually validate the estimated construction costs during the
design phase, and take forthright action to revise designs or
increase budgets when problems are indicated. CM ' s should be
24
used on major projects to serve these functions.
(8) Expedite change order processing by delegating up to $5,000
authority to field personnel, and by devoting more management
• J 1 25attention to contractors priced proposals.
(9) Adopt procedures to speed up the delivery of decisions to con-
tractors, and take other actions to reduce construction time to
match that of private industry. Contractors who have worked on
both private and PBS construction noted that PBS projects were
characterized by a feeling of a lack of urgency and a general
failure to make decisions in a timely fashion.
(10) The sequential design, bid, construct system should still be used
for other than major projects, but the system should be modified
27
to make it more responsive.
(11) Use CM system for multistory office buildings, complex design
28
projects and other projects over $5 million.
(12) Create a project management organization for all new construction
projects .
30
(13) Install an overall CPM for each major project.
(14) Increase delegation of authority and provide more clerical,
administrative and data processing support for professional
31
employees to increase their productivity.
(15) Decentralization of PBS should be accomplished by providing
adequate personnel to handle a reasonable volume of moderately
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sized construction projects. Major projects should be assigned
to regions where there is clear evidence that staff capability
32
exists to handle these jobs.
6,3.4 Implementation of Study Recommendations
The recommendations cited in the previous section were the point of
departure from which PBS launched into the use of the CM approach. How-
ever, for projects in excess of $5 million CM could not be used effectively
until certain changes in PBS and the governmental environment were adopted.
There included (1) the method of funding; (2) PBS in-house organizational
changes; and (3) site selection and building program development.
6.3.4.1 Funding of GSA Projects
If CM and phased construction are to b e used, the funds must be
readily available to commence construction while the design process is
still in an early stage. It can be seen why CM was not adaptable to the
existing PBS project budget cycle, since historically there was a two to
three year lag between the appropriation of design money and the funding
of construction. However, PBS then took advantage of the Federal Building
Fund (FBF) , which had been formed to charge "rent" to the federal agencies
using GSA buildings. These agencies then had to budget for and transfer
funds to the FBF based upon the amount of space they occupied. The purpose
of the FBF was to provide a proper accounting of costs incurred by agencies
of the government; however, PBS was able to win support for the idea that
33
the fund could be used to finance new construction. The Public Buildings
Amendment of 1972 made the use of these funds for new construction a




6.3.4.2 PBS Organizational Realignment
As noted in the 1970 GSA self-study, a key variable in using CM and
phased design-construct approach was the use of a project manager (PM) to
serve as the single point of responsibility on major projects. Large, high
interest projects such as the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum in Washington,

lAl
D,C. and the Regional Social Security Program Centers are handled by PM's
located in the PBS Central Office in Washington, D.C. The PM is involved
in every phase of the project, from the initial project development and
site acquisition to the final occupancy and close-out of all contracts.
The total project responsibility and involvement of the PM distinguishes
him from the CM, who works for the PM and whose functions are to provide
construction technology and management expertise. The PM's general duties
are outlined in Appendix E. PBS officials refer to these PM's as mini-
commissioners because they have nearly all the authority of the PBS
Commissioner, but are limited to the PM's designated project. GSA's first
standard CM contract used the term Project Manager in the place of such
traditional terms as the Government and the Contracting Officer.
Projects of less interest to the Central Office, but which are
still large enough to qualify for use of CM are assigned Project Directors
(PD) from the appropriate regional office. These Project Directors
35
perform the same functions as the PM's do.
A PM's staff is actually very small, consisting only of the PM, his
assistant and a few support personnel. Despite the lean staffing of the
PM office, the involvement of a large number of PBS personnel on large CM
projects still remains a fact. The bulk of these in-house PBS employees
come from the regional offices. These personnel perform much the same
functions that they did under the traditional systems: reviewing designs,
advertising and awarding contracts, performing some field inspection,
plus administering nontechnical government programs such as Equal Employ-
ment Oppoutunity, Small Business Adminstration contracting, Davis-Bacon
wage rate adminstration, etc.
These regional PBS personnel report to their superiors in the
regional office, but when CM jobs are working in their region these employees
are made aware of the PM's or PD's authority and instructed to cooperate
fully with him to ensure PBS does its part to meet the project schedule,
and performs its work on these projects expeditiously.
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There are a number of reasons why the human resources of PBS cannot
be divided among the PM's/PD's to form exclusive task-oriented organiza-
tions :
(1) The majority of PBS ' s work on repair and construction jobs is less
than $5 million, so qualified personnel must be available to
handle these projects in the traditional manner.
(2) The meshing of work from CM jobs and smaller projects allows PBS
to even out its employee work load. Even when using phased
construction on a large project, the work load of design, contract
and construction personnel assigned exclusively to the job will
vary.
(3) The assignment of technical personnel to a project on an exclusive
basis would dilute the in-house technical expertise of PBS, and
prevent the meaningful communication and feedback between numbers
of a technical speciality that occurs when they are located in
the same office.
Thus, the organizational strategy of GSA in accomplishing CM
projects resembles what is commonly referred to as a matrix organization,
as shown in Fig. 6.1, The formal organization remains structured along
functional lines, while project or product-oriented managers perform an
integrating function in using resources from each of these functional areas
to achieve the desired results of the project or product.
The regional PBS organizations did not go untouched from some
reorganization, however, even the CM and PM techniques could not completely
solve the less than satisfactory project performance noted in the study,
without some organizational modifications in the regions. For example,
Fig. 6.2 shows the former organizational arrangement of PBS in Region III,
GSA's largest region in terms of workload. Figure 6.3 shows the modified
version of Region III. The main feature of the change was to retain the
contracts and highly specialized technical fields in a centralized function.
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Fig. 6.3. Now PBS Organization in GSA Region III.
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branch and further decentralized by districts. Each district approached
projects or groups of projects through multi-disciplined design teams,
37
project officers and, when necessary, major project field offices.
The PM primarily uses the personnel of the Operations Department
for design review and the on-site resident engineer function. The
procurement department handles the award and negotiation of all contracts,
while the technical service department provides special functions such
as specialized inspections, etc. Figure 6.4 shows the relationship
between the two formal organizations, the Central Office PM and the
regional Construction Management Division, with the dotted lines indicating
TO
the relationships.
6.3.4.3 Site Selection and Building Program
A key ingredient that is prerequisite to the hiring of a CM and A-E
is the selection of the site, since many federal buildings are to be built
where no U.S. government land exists. One GSA official insisted that the
potential job site be procured or at least be under option to the federal
39government before hiring outside professionals. The building program
must also be completed to give the A-E and CM an accurate scope of what is
40
to be performed. These functions are typical responsibilities of the
PM with his total project accountability.
6.3.5 Quantitative Performance Data On CM Projects
The most illusive ingredient in the evaluation of existing CM
systems is the collection of quantitative data. To date, GSA had only
completed six CM projects and further, little information is available
from the PBS Central Office. However, the writer was able to obtain
evaluative information on these six projects as contained in Table 6.1.
Summary data are listed in Table 6.2, and the following sections discuss
the findings.
6.3.5.1 Project Time
Total project time averaged 38 months
, even though design took 18
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TABLE 6.2. GSA CM Project Performance.
(1) Length of Design Time . Average was 18 months.
DISTRIBUTION
Projects
y( ^ X X XX
I I I I I I I I I
I
I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I
Months 10 15 20 25 30
(2) Length of Construction Time. Average was 28.5 months.
DISTRIBUTION
Projects X
)( y X X K
I I I > I t
i I M > I ) I I I I I I M )
Months 20 25 30 35 40
(3) Length of Total Project Time . Average was 38 months.
DISTRIBUTION
Projects
XX X ^ X X
I ' I I I I I I I I I I I ( I I I < I ) I I I
Months 25 30 35 40 45
(4) Average Cost of CM (not including reimbursible general conditions work
work) was 2.5 percent of estimated construction cost.
(5) Average Cost of All CM Services (including all reimbursible work)
was 7.2 percent.
(6) Change Orders Averaged 6.8 percent of initial award amount.














of Planned After Planned Planned
Compl. Date Compl. Date Compl. Date
Number
of Projects 1 2 3 6
(9) Average Project Size was $19.1 million.
(10) Average Number of Contracts per Project was 22
(11) Average Contract Amount was $811,000.
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work did not stretch out over a longer period of time because of the
phasing of design and construction, the fast tracking procedure appears
to have saved nine months. If two months are allowed for bid time, then
the saving would be eleven months or nearly one year. Compared to the
1970 GSA study findings of 59 months for design and construction of a
typical $10 million office building, the CM projects, averaging $17.5
million, v^;er•e done in 35 percent less time, or a little less than two
years. Figure 6.5 compares the findings of this study to those of the
1970 study. The differences in construction time are not significant;
however, the CM projects are larger and this factor usually affects the
length of the building period. The main savings come from reducing the
design time by six months, and elimination of the five month dead time
between the finish of design and the commencement of construction.
6.3.5.2 CM Fees and Costs
On the six projects the CM's fees ranged from 1.5 percent to
7.5 percent of the estimated construction cost. This does not consider
the construction work done by the CM's own forces in providing the tem-
porary and common-use facilities or other general condition items. On
one of the six projects. Phase I of the Washington Technical Institute,
the CM performed some extra services normally provided by the government,
thus, the fee was 7.5 percent. Without including this project, the
remaining five projects averaged 2.5 percent of the estimated construction
cost.
The general conditions work by CM forces ranged from $200,000 on
a $5.6 million project to $2 million on a $31 million job. The average
cost of the CM's for all services provided was 7.7 percent and 7.2 percent
when the Washington Technical Institute job is not considered in the
sample. However, since the general condition items would normally be
a direct labor and material item for the general contractor, the real cost
of the CM's design consultation and management services are the ones cited




















































































































The estimating performance of the CM ' s was +13 percent with all
of the projects bid below the estimate. Even though, +13 percent is a
high variance, the estimates made on a conceptual basis have a higher
level of uncertainty, and thus, it is naturally more difficult to
determine accurate costs.
6.3.5.4 Contract Data
Construction contract awards on GSA CM projects ranged from 17 to
29 per project, with the average being 22. The range of contract amounts
was not available, but the average contract award was just over $800,000.
This is a good indication that bidding was open to many more bidders
than on a large conventional project with a large general contractor
securing subcontractors.
6.3.6 Qualitative Information on CM Projects
6.3.6.1 Problem Areas
The most recurring problem GSA has faced with the CM approach has
been the attainment of desired performance from the CM. The reasons
appear to be two fold:
(1) The quality of the CM firm itself
(2) The proper definition by GSA of what services the CM is expected
to deliver.
Regarding the quality of the CM, one GSA official noted that a
number of firms had been terminated for poor performance. One of the
six completed projects listed in Table 6.1 was handled by two different
CM's since the original one was terminated. Even though GSA officials
and their publications are quick to note terminations have been and will
be issued for poor performance, specific reasons for these actions were
not made available. However, one can infer from changes and additions
to GSA's "second generation" CM handbook the functional weakness of
some CM's. Under the subheading of "Problem Areas" from the manual are lis ted
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(1) A-E's who are interested in providing CM services should have the
capability to manage, direct, and coordinate the day-to-day field
operations of many separate construction contractors.
(2) Meaningful involvement of CM's in design development has been
difficult to achieve. CM's must develop the necessary experience
and expertise.
(3) CM estimates need to acquire more reliability, and CM's need to
develop more expertise in conceptual estimating for the compara-
tive evaluation of different design approaches.
(4) More meaningful and accurate feedback is required from the
computerized management information system.
Furthermore, one GSA official noted that CM's have not been
exercising enough leadership during the design phase. He also stated that
CM's who are general contractors who have worked on a competitive bid
basis have done a better overall job than CM's v;ith other types of back-
grounds
.
The other aspect of the problem is that the requirements of the
CM have not been adequately defined. One PBS official noted that the
first GSA CM contract was vague in delineating specific requirements of
43
the CM. Another PBS official stated that the revised GSA CM Manual and
Contract are much more specific, and the CM is required to deliver
44particular items before any payment for services could be made.
GSA's experience indicates that even with their professional relationship
to PBS, CM's cannot be expected to operate from a loosely defined document
such as the typical owner- A-E contract. Perhaps this is because CM is new
and without any industry-wide standards or self-regulation. That is, even
CM's themselves seem to have different perceptions of what their role
should be.
6.3.6,2 Solutions to CM System Problems
The two basic solutions to the problem areas cited in the previous




6.3.6.2.1 CM Selection Changes
Previously, the CM selection process evaluated candidate firms for
a project on the basis of qualifications without price considerations.
45
Then the five top firms were evaluated on the basis of price. The
CM's qualifications submission was highly oriented to the firm's construc-
tion experience, and only minor attention was given to the firm's strategy
for accomplishing the proposed project. That is, the only information
required of the firm was in regard to the proposed CM project staff and
organization chart.
The revised method of CM selection first considers the qualifica-
tions of interested CM's then it asks the five most highly qualified firms
46
to submit a management plan for the project with a price proposal. Thus,
qualifications, management plan, and price become the three factors con-
sidered for selection of a CM by GSA.
As in the original GSA CM selection scheme, the qualification
requirements include:
(1) CM experience or high CM potential
(2) Financial ability to provide the necessary services
(3) Competence in civil, mechanical, electrical and structural engi-
neering; construction estimating, cost accounting and control;
tenant coordination; project management; contract negotiation and
administration; contract superintendence and inspection, and other
related fields
(4) Experience in constructing buildings in "the general geographic
area of the project or recent knowledge of local conditions.
(5) Professional and business reputation with an on-time and within-
budget performance record.
However, the new system also adds the following traits of a CM concerning
management information and control systems and minimum experience level.
(6) Proven competence in the implementation and maintenance of network
based construction management systems, and in the application of
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systematic cost control throughout the design and construction
process
.
(7) Ability to provide professionally qualified key personnel with a
minimuin of twelve years satisfactory experience in the design and
construction industry that is directly related to the position
47
they will hold on the GSA project.
The qualification questionnaire for CM ' s shown in Appendix E , is
distinctly different from the original questionnaire with its general
questions. Qualification submissions must now be more specific in more
areas than before. A prospective CM must now provide information never
provided before on such things as:
(1) Organization of the firm
(2) Scheduling, management information and control system experience
(3) Present workload and capacity
(4) Familiarity with GSA procedures
In addition the applicant CM firm must now provide more specific
information on:
(1) Personnel resources of the firm
(2) The firm's CM strategies and operations
(3) Past CM projects of the firm, including time, cost and
change order data
Further, even the requirements concerning the CM ' s areas of
48
financial condition and his references have been significantly expanded.
It is evident that GSA is seeking to overcome the problem of CM quality
by concentrating on the specific items that could indicate probable
success on one of their CM projects.
The management plan the five top rated firms must submit is perhaps
the most unique change GSA has devised to ensure CM quality. The management
plan goes beyond the overall qualifications and resources of the firm to
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give PBS officials an idea of how the CM firm proposes to bring its
capabilities to bear on the subject project. GSA has also specified
certain functions the CM must perform, and it calls them "deliverables."
The standard deliverable items of work are shown in Appendix F. The term
and concept of deliverables is woven into the GSA's required management
plan. It is used to serve as a comparison in evaluating CM's for
selection, to reduce the uncertainty of what is expected of the CM, and
49
to serve as a basis for payment of the CM.
The CM's management plan and price proposal then consists of:
(1) A narrative of the strategy for completing the project during
all phases - design, design-construction overlap, and construction.
(2) A network diagram (CPM) depicting the CM's deliverable items of
work as activities and how they logically interrelate with each
other and with other activities which represent major milestones
in each of the three phases of the project.
(3) A lump sum contract price breakdown by deliverable items and
project phases, as shown in Appendix F.
(4) An organization chart for the CM's project organization, showing
the names and positions of all the nonreimburs ible staff and the
positions of all the tentative reimbursible job site staff to be
utilized
.
(5) Detailed description of the duties of all staff personnel shown on
the organization charts.
(6) A nonreimbursable staff listing by position of name, work location,
estimated manhours , and hourly wage rate. This would include the
Construction Executive, Construction Superintendent and management
information system supervisor, who are the mandatory staff, plus
various engineers, draftsmen, estimators, accounting personnel,




(7) A tentative reimbursable job-site staff listing by position
giving number of employees to be hired in that category, extent
of employment (full time, part time) estimated manhours, and
estimated hourly wage rate.
After PBS officials evaluate the management plans and price
proposals, discussions may take place between the various firms and PBS to
clarify points of the plan, and the OI's may make modifications. The final
plans are evaluated, along with the price and the qualifications. The
evaluation is a numerical technique where each CM is graded on each of the
three areas by a panel of PBS personnel. The system gives a 30 percent
weight factor to qualifications and price and a 40 percent weight to the
management plan. The panel compares their results and discusses differences
before making the final selection.
GSA appears to have gone to great lengths to ensure that CM quality
is improved, and that CM's fully understand their requirements. The manage-
ment plan eventually becomes a part of the contractual documents, and the
deliverables serve as a basis for payment.
6.3.6.2,2 CM Contract Changes
The changes in GSA's CM selection process should help improve the
delivery of CM services, but also the standard PBS CM contract has under-
gone significant revisions to more explicitly define the CM's role.
The major changes to the basic CM contract are as follows:
(1) The contract which was originally a two part document, one part
for services during the design phase and one part for the construc-
tion portion, but this was changed to a one piece document.
Since the deliverables are well defined for all phases and the FBF
provides a stable source of funds, the two part concept is not
required
.
(2) The scope of the project, its completion date, and maximum
permissible cost were added to define the project the CM is to
build, and set the cost and time limits the CM must maintain.
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(3) The GSA Resident Engineer is given the added responsibility of
observing the performances of the CM and the construction contrac-
54
tors .
(4) The CM's Construction Superintendent must now be on site full time
30 days prior to the first construction contract award. The
superintendent must have at least four years supervisory
experience in the field.
(5) The term "deliverables" is defined by the new contract as those
services performed by the CM which will serve as a basis for making
installment payments of the lump sum contract amount. Under the
old contract, the payment time and amount were to be made at
fixed milestones in the project life cycle, regardless of the
level of effort exerted by the CM. The old system could not use
progress payments very effectively to motivate performance. Now
if a deliverable item is not performed satisfactorily, the CM
does not get paid for it.
(6) The CM is assigned the objectives of ensuring that
(a) the project will be well designed by the A-E
(b) the construction will be completed as soon as possible, but
not later than the completion date established by the contract
(c) the construction work will be performed in accordance with the
applicable requirements
(d) the project will be completed at a project cost not to exceed
the maximum amount specified by the contract.
(7) Even though the preceding objectives of the CM are defined, the
same clause states the CM will not be held responsible for cost
overrun, time overrun, design deficiencies, and defective construc-
tion when the CM has diligently performed all that was reasonably
required to prevent these problems. GSA's CM manual states,
"GSA wants an uninhibited CM." It is GSA's belief that freeing him
of the major construction cost risks, serves the Government's best
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interest by optimizing the value of his input, since he can now
afford to give frank and objective advice, independent of any
CO
personal considerations of financial gain or loss in the outcome.
(8) The Construction Management Control System (CMCS ) , GSA's own
computerized network scheduling and management information and
control program, is now required for use by all CM's. In the
previous contract, acceptable substitute systems were allowed.






The system is designed to provide pertinent reports to the various
participants in the project. The logic for GSA to specify use of
their own systems seems to be that since PBS plays such an active
role in the course of the project under the CM approach, management
information is much more critical and it requires uniformity among
various projects.
(9) Even though the CM's management plan becomes part of his contract,
GSA requires the plan be updated and expanded for each of the
three phases of the work: design, design and construction overlap,
and construction.
(10) The design development and review clause has been revised to be
more specific about the CM's role in this area. Also, it intro-
duces the comment that "the CM should familiarize himself with the
'evolving' plans and specifications and shall continuously follow
the development of the design through concepts, tentatives, and
6
1
working drawings." Thus, there is a need for the CM's continual




(11) The CM is given specific procedures to follow in the procurement
of long lead items, where before he was to recommend early
purchase and expedite procurement in very general terms.
(12) The CM is now required to consider more factors in determing
the optimum way to divide the project into contract packages.
A "satis f icing" CM (one whose goal is just to meet the minimum
standard) who routinely divides up the packages along some
predetermined norm such as the Construction Specifications
Institute (CSI) divisions could pass up tremendous economies,
and perhaps even create many jurisdictional or other problems.
The CM is also directed to give attention to awards which could
be made to the Small Business Administration (SBA) for perfor-
mance by disadvantaged contracting firms.
(13) The CM ' s responsibility for interfacing separate construction
contracts has become more specific my ensuring that all construc-
tion requirements will be covered, and that each bid package
64
clearly identifies what work is included in that separate contract.
(14) Under the solicitation of bids, certain functions have been made
more specific. First, the CM prepares for government issuance of
the invitation for bids. Second, a prebid conference is now a GSA
requirement, where before it was only recommended.
(15) The Market Analysis and Stimulation of Bidder interest is an
entirely new item, and the CM is required to submit a written
report on this area, indicating his findings and recommendations.
The CM must update and submit the report every 30 days until
1 /- . 1 . . , 1 66the rxnal construction contract is awarded.
(16) Differences between the contractor and the CM shall be resolved
6 7
by the Project Manager.
(17) Regarding the safety program for the project, the CM in addition
to his responsibility for program preparation under the new
contract, shall m.onitor compliance to the program and to OSHA




(18) In regard to construction changes, the CM ' s specific
responsibilities are more explicit on how the CM is to handle
changes eminating from various sources. The CM is now required
to observe and collect data on costs incurred by contractors
performing work on change orders where the price has not been
negotiated
6.3.6.2.3 Monitoring CM Performance
GSA, with its new CM contract, has sought to clairfy what is required
of the CM on its PBS projects. This excerpt directed at potential CM's
from the GSA CM manual sums up how it expects CM's to perform when working
for them:
In the conventional building process, contractors are normally
oriented to performing only what is specifically required by the
construction contract. When a Construction Manager joins the
Owner's side of the table, there is an extremely important
psychological adjustment necessary -- TO COOPERATE, THINK, AND
ACT IN TERMS OF THE ODER'S BEST INTERESTS.
Another critical aspect is the LEVEL OF EFFORT put forth by a
Construction Manager. To ensure that CM offerors clearly under-
stand the extent of performance required under the CM contract
and that they fully intend to carry out the obligations, GSA has
incorporated a Management Plan requirement in its selection
procedures. The network diagram of the management plan specifically
shows the required CM deliverables, by activities and dollar
amounts, both as tangible indicators of future CM performance and
as a mechanism to provide payment only for CM work actually
accomplished. The management plan is integrated subsequently
into the PBS-CMCS shortly after award of the CM contract and CM
performance is then monitored throughout the life of the CM contract
.
GSA expects the Construction Manager with his sophisticated array
of expertise and electronic data controls to be self-actuated, to
anticipate the project needs and problems, to arrive at practical
solutions, and to take effective and timely action, so that
construction conflicts, cost overruns, and delay in completion
are avoided or minimized. Ineffective CMs can and will be
terminated
.
However, PBS has indicated that no formal evaluation of CM's exists
within PBS. This seems somewhat contradictory, since the main motivation
of the "pure" CM to perform is to build a good reputation and hope for
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repeat business. Currently, PBS does not rate a CM's performance, but
rating may become inevitable as the number of CM projects increases.
Since the CM approach has no dominant group to self -regulate its
practices and to set its performance standards, GSA appears to be filling
the role of defining the CM's job. Thus, GSA's program may eventually
become a standard for CM services.
The GSA's program has had its share of problems, as might be
expected with the introduction of a new and complex contracting system.
The uncertainty caused by the new system was not solely confined to CM's.
A-E's and contractors who participated in the initial CM projects were
also uncertain as to what their roles included. However, GSA has been
fortunate in that CM projects to date have performed well in terms of
cost and time, vs/hich has allowed GSA to make adjustments to the system
without great disruption.
In any case, the performance of CM projects has far exceeded the
typical record exhibited by traditionally built PBS projects of equal size
and complexity. The reader should note that changes in the PBS organiza-
tion which provide a single point of responsibility, the PM, and the
revised funding arrangement of the FBF to permit greater availability of
funds when needed, largely contributed to the success PBS has had with
CM. The total system of procuring facilities must be considered when
contemplating major shifts in strategy that a conversion to CM represents.
6.4 CM - HEW Style
Even though HEW claims more than 200 projects have been accomplished
under their auspices using CM, they too keep no centralized records on CM
project performance. Thus, no quantitative evaluation of CM can be
presented, but the qualitative aspects of the system will be presented.
This information is different from GSA's CM approach because HEW operates




6.4.1 Nature Of HEW Construction Requirements
HEW encourages the use of GMP-CM on projects which are primarily
funded by Federal assistance funds. HEW is very concerned that owners
whose construction is partially supported by Federal funds do not exceed
the resources made available to them. In contrast to GSA, HEW exercises
little control over the actual design and construction of the project.
This level of control is primarily handled by the owners of the projects
on which these Federal funds are to be used. This could be a hospital
for which HEW has given grants to help expand their medical facility, or
the board of a junior college district which has also received federal
money to build a new laboratory or classroom building.
The GMP-CM then serves as a control in itself to assure HEW
officials that federal grants will not prove inadequate to complete the
facility. In a system where HEW exercises little direct project control
and v;here the resources available are fixed, the CMP allows the
owner to start constructing early with the assurance that sufficient funds
71
are available to complete the project.
In addition, funding for grants for construction are approved
by Congress, and no project cost escalations are allowed. Therefore,
72
HEW is highly sensitive to prevention of cost overruns.
6.4.2 HEW CM Contract Features
HEW has recently issued a new manual for use on CM projects. Some
of the changes and features of that new guideline follows:
(1) Defining the participants' roles has apparently become a necessity
for HEW, since detailed explanations are given as to the respon-
sibilities of the A-E and owner as well as the CM. Since CM is
particularly sensitive to owner involvement and participation on
HEW assisted projects, and since some owners are diverse and may
have little or no engineering expertise, the need to define the
owners' role becomes critical. HEW points out that the owner's
representative must have the authority to make decisions, and that





The A-E interrelationship with the system is also discussed with
items that are not clearly in the CM or A-E's area, such as
estimating responsibilities and bid reviews, assigned to specific
participants
,
(2) An important addition to the revised manual is that inspection
services are assigned to the owner. The owner may use one of his
own personnel or a member of the A-E's staff. Since the GMP
creates a financial interest in the project which may sway the
objectivity of the CM, he is not allowed to inspect the work.
(3) Once the GMP has been established and the construction phase of
the CM contract begins, the CM must post performance and payment
bonds for 100 percent of the GMP.
(4) The HEW CM Contract is a two part contract. Part A is the CM's
consultation services during the design phase, and Part B
establishes the G14P and includes services during the construction
7 fi
phase. The GMP must be established before construction begins.
The two part contract allows the owner some degree of flexibility
in discharging the CM if his performance during Part A was unsatis-
factory or if the GMP is unacceptable.
(5) The new manual stresses that owners may terminate CM's during the
design phase. HEW strongly recommends the inclusion of termina-
tion clauses in all CM agreements. That is, CM quality appears
to be a problem on HEW projects as well as GSA projects. One
HEW official complained that may CM's treat the GMP like many
general contractors treat their lump sum award - they frequently
request change orders to increase the GMP to protect their
^. . , . 78financial interests.
(6) The CM selection process is a two step procedure, with interested
firms submitting qualifications in a format similar to GSA's CM
questionnaire. The top rated firms are asked to submit price
proposals. These proposals contain no management plan such as




Part B. Thus, the CM is selected by the owner on the basis of
qualifications and price.
(7) The HEW manual states that the CM fees include the profit and
overhead of the CM for the entire job, and they also include the
cost of the CM ' s risk factor in providing the GMP. The fixed fee
can be modified only when there is a change in project scope or
80
time of completion as directed by the owner. Reimbursible costs
are those that may be authorized by the owner to provide the
general condition items, salaries for job-site personnel below the
superintendent level, and related travel and per diem costs. Part
B of the CM agreement sets a ceiling of the level of reimbursible
81
costs that will be allowed. On many GMP-CM contracts in the
private sector, the owner shares the savings with the CM when the
job comes in below the GMP; however, HEW considers the CM to have
a professional relationship with the owner, so he is obligated
82
to minimize the project cost without a financial incentive.
(8) Under the new manual, CM projects must have a GMP where previously
non-GMP contracts were possible. The GMP includes all construc-
tion contracts, and all the GMP fees and reimbursements paid to
the CM are required to be broken down into two formats. The first
format is subdivided into the elements of contruction such as
concrete, masonry, steel, electrical, etc. The second GMP
breakdown is by estimate for each bid package. The first provides
cost information related to the usual cost of construction elements,
while the second helps the owner determine how the bids for each
portion of the work are going to affect the GMP. HEW recommends
that the CM be required to recertify the GMP monthly, based upon
8 "^
the latest set of plans and specifications. Since the CM must
wait until the project is sufficiently defined to negotiate a GMP,
the total project time may be longer than under a "pure" CM
approach.
(9) The CM is heavily involved in the advertisement, bid and award of
the construction contracts; however, each award must be approved by
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the owner. The new HEW manual offers the CM significant latitude
in dealing with bid packages that exceed the budget for that
portion of the job. Those options are:
(a) The CM may negotiate with the low bidder to reduce the price
of the bid package to a cost not to exceed the budget line
item price.
(b) The CM may reject all bids and issue a revised invitation for
bids to be prepared by the A-E and approved by the owner.
(c) The CM may agree to perform the work with his own forces for
the price of the budget line item.
(d) The CM may award to the low bidder for a price above the
84budget line item.
6,4.3 HEW Summary
The HEW CM approach tries to enlist the services of a highly
qualified constructor to make inputs into the design and to manage the
construction. The fact that the CM works for a fee establishes a profes-
sional relationship between himself and the owner. However, the CM '
s
financial interest in the project because of the GMP prevents him from
becoming what GSA calls the "uninhibited" CM. If one were to view a
horizontal scale depicting the owner-builder relationship as a function of
professionalism, the GSA system would be on one end of the spectrum while
at the other end there would be the traditional lump sum general contractor,
The HEW CM would have to fall somewhere between the two, perhaps closer to
GSA's CM.
Even though it appears that a philosophical battle rages between
the two predominant CM using agencies of the federal government there is
an indication that both have selected the optimum system for their own
environments and organizations. GSA is concerned with building facilities
which it will eventually manage and maintain. It has a large in-house
engineering organization, PBS, to closely monitor the CM and to be intimately
involved in project decision making. On the other hand, HEW is concerned
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with the allocation and prudent use of federal funds by many diverse
owners. These owners may or may not have in-house engineering staffs
and they certainly will have different perceptions of a CM's responsibil-
ities and functions. Therefore, HEW feels it can protect its investment,
which is being utilized by an owner outside the HEW organization at a site
remote to HEW personnel, by using the GMP as a financial guarantee. Since
it would be economically prohibitive to maintain HEW project management
organizations at each site where federal money is being used, the price
paid for the risk assumed by the CM is justifiable.
6.5 Use of CM in the Military
Even though full scale CM's services have not been used on any
military projects, the use of CM firms for construction input for design
has been employed with some success.
U. S. Army Hospital, West Point . The design of this $13 million
hospital proved to be too costly when the bids were opened and read. The
Corps of Engineers then retained a CM for construction input to suggest
revisions to the plans and specifications. The CM was credited with saving
$2,138,000 of the previous low bid amount by the Corps of Engineers
officer on site. The CM was hired for design consultation only, but his
valuable input allowed the project to get on track and into the construc-
tion phase.
2,600 Units of Family Housing, Hawaii . The Army Corps of Engineers
is also building an extremely large housing project in Hawaii that is
valued at approximately $100 million. Since no single housing contractor
in Hawaii had the capacity to bid the job and allowable housing costs are
highly restrictive, the Corps hired a CM as a construction consultant to:
(a) estimate the project
(b) present cost alternatives
(c) make packaging recommendations
QfL
(d) review the design for constructabil ity
.
U. S. Naval Hospital, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina . On this
project, which is currently being designed, a CM has been retained for
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design consultation. The CM has participated in many of the earlier
conceptual design decisions. He made a number of significant contri-
butions to design to make the project more constructable , such as changing
the configuration of a twin tower concept to a single tower to eliminate
the requirement for one tower crane and the separation of a low clinic
building from the tower area to allow simultaneous work on both sections.
These inputs have reduced the need for specialized construction equipment
and enabled a shorter job duration.
CM's involvement in military projects has been limited to date to
participation in the design phase. However, CM advocates feel that CM
involvement in the design phase is more effective when it is utilized in
the construction phase as well. That is, the CM exercises the utmost care
and prudence in suggesting construction economies when he knows he will
soon be constructing the facilities.
6. 6 Conclusion
Hopefully, the following ideas were gained from this analysis
and evaluation of CM as used by GSA and HEW:
(1) Where measurable data were obtainable, CM appears to have performed
up to its objective of reducing the time for project performance
and producing a job which is completed within the budget.
(2) The use of the CM in the design phase is imperative if the concept
is to be successfully applied.
(3) The quality of the CM firm and the level of effort devoted to a
project is critical to the success of the job.
(4) The requirements the owner/project manager places on the CM must
be explicit and definitive to ensure that both parties completely
understand their responsibilities.
(5) The CM concept has not diminished, but actually increased the
importance and responsibility of the owner/project manager's role
in the procurement of new facilities by giving him more control
throughout all phases of the project. Therefore, the owner/
project manager must structure his organization so that it is
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adaptable to the type of decision making required in an integrated
design-construction environment.
(6) The success of CM projects is highly dependent on the availability
of funds for design and construction at an early point in the
process. Implementation of a CM system without providing a
sufficiently adaptable financing structure could negate many of
the positive aspects of using a CM.
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CHAPTER 7




The Navy's system for procurement of contract construction and the
CM method of contracting have been discussed, as well as the performance
record and problems of each system. This chapter w ill attempt to apply the
various CM alternatives to the Navy's construction procurement system and
to indicate possible results.
The material covered in Chapters 2 and 3 becomes critical at this
point, because each alternative must be presented in light of how it will
affect the ability of the Navy to accomplish its goals and objectives.
NAVFAC ' s military construction program supports the goals and objectives
of the Navy and other defense agencies. Any alternative which does not
improve some aspect of this supporting function is not acceptable.
For "real world" application, the resources and constraints of
the environment must be imposed on these alternative systems. The four
areas of the environment discussed in Chapter 2 (military, public, NAVFAC '
s
organization, and construction industry) should be kept in mind when





Configuration Of The Procurement Systems
7.2.1 System Dimensions and Components
There are three dimensions critical to the design of an alternative
procurement system for the Navy. Those three dimensions are:
(1) The CM Concept
(2) The Project Manager Organization




7.2.1.1 Types of CM Concepts
CM concepts, which mean the form in which CM services are provided,
will be segmented as follows for the purposes of presentation:
(1) "Pure" CM (often called Professional CM) . Under this approach the
CM provides a full range of services throughout design and construc-
tion, and no financial risk is assumed by the CM.
(2) Guaranteed Maximum Price CM . With this approach the CM provides a
full range of services throughout design and construction, and also
guarantees a ceiling price which the project cost will not exceed,
(3) Construction Consultant . This firm, provides construction input
to the design phase only as a consultant.
(4) In-House CM . CM services provided by a project team of NAVFAC
personnel.
(5) Existing System . No provision is made for CM services.
7.2.1.2 Types of PM Organizations
"Project manager organization" refers to how NAVFAC v>;ould organize
for the use of CM services. It has been noted in previous chapters that
the provision of an owner's representative or project manager with con-
siderable decision-making authority is a necessary ingredient for the
success of the system. This presentation will only be concerned with
the characteristics of the project manager's position itself, and not
broad organizational modification of NAVFAC and its EFD's. All project
manager systems will be considered to use the other element of NAVFAC '
s
functional organization (i . e ., Design, Contracts and Construction Divisions)
to support individual projects in a manner similar to the matrix organiza-
tion discussed in Chapter 6. The various methods of organizing the
project manager functions are as follows:
(1) Existing PM . The PM organization as explained in Section 3.3.3.7
where the PM is responsible primarily for ensuring financial
resources are provided as needed for various phases of the project.
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(2) Task-Oriented PM . The PM organization used by GSA where one PM is
assigned to one large project, and given the responsibility and
authority for the accomplishment from conception to completion.
(3) Centralized PM . This is expansion of the structure used by the
Existing PM above where the PM is located in the EFD and is
responsible for a number of projects of various sizes, except
that now the PM has more responsibility and authority for
project decision-making.
(4) ROICC PM . This PM is the ROICC or one of his assistants located
at the project site. This PM may also have other projects of
various sizes in progress. This PM is given the overall authority
over project decision-making. He must now be concerned with
the design phases, as well as with the construction. The
contractual authority remains with the OICC which is normally
the Commander of the Engineering Field Division.
(5) On-Site - OICC . This PM arrangement is an extension of (4)
above. The PM is the existing ROICC or one of his assistants,
but now the PM is given the contractual authority to award all
contracts in connection with the project, even though he may
utilize the personnel in the EFD contracts division for
administrative purposes.
7.2.1.3 Types Of Cyclical Strategies
The cyclical strategy determines how to synchronize the design and
construction with the planning and programming cycle discussed in Chapter 3,
Since construction contracts cannot be awarded until after the authoriza-
tion of the project and the appropriation of funds by the Congress, the
options are rather limited. Knowledge of this planning and programming
cycle is necessary to understand how CM models will interact with the Navy
system. However, the detailed analysis and recommended modifications to
the Shore Installations Facilities Planning and Programming System, and
the executive and legislative budget reviews are not within the scope of
this thesis. Therefore, the planning and programming cycle shall be
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considered to be fixed, and the design and construction cycle variations
shall be imposed on it. This approach seems to be logical, since the
method of the thesis is to make an exploratory study on the suitability
of CM for the Navy or graphically stated, the first pass through the
systems analysis model presented in Section 1.10. Follow up studies rep-
resented by subsequent passes through the systems model would have to
address modifications to the system of planning and programming and the
process of budget review and approval in addition to just considering a
new approach to design and construction.
The following cyclical strategies were conceived for application
of CM to existing planning and programming process:
(1) Early Design . This is actually the commencement of design as it
is presently accomplished, with the bulk of the MILCON program
projects being released for design after the results of the
Navy Military Construction Review Board (NMCRB) are received.
Presently, this occurs nearly two years before construction funds
are appropriated.
(2) Delayed Design . This is the commencement of design approximately
6 to 12 months prior to the anticipated appropriation of funds,
but not until the budget has gone to the President. This was
actually the point in time that NAVFAC commenced design on MILCON
projects a few years ago.
(3) Late Design . This is the commencement of design after the projects
have all been authorized and funds appropriated by Congress.
Using these three configurations, the timing of construction
becomes dependent on when the funds are received and what type of CM
arrangement is used.
7.2.2 Combinations Of The System Components
Given these three dimensions, with each containing a variety of
alternative approaches, it becomes evident that a large number of com-
binations exist. This type of situation could be appropriately treated
through the use of a morphological analysis. This method singles out
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the most important dimensions of a problem, and then examines all the
relationships among them. In the previous subsection, three dimensions
were singled out and alternative means of satisfying each were listed.
The combination of these is graphically shown in Fig. 7.1, so the resulting
combinations number 75 (5x5x3). One combination will be recognized
as the existing system, for in any systems analysis the existing system
is nearly always one alternative. Other combinations appear unworkable
after a quick examination of the three components. Some examples are:
(1) When using a CM firm such as in the Pure CM and GMP-CM approaches,
it would be unvs^orkable to go with the Existing PM arrangement
since the design-construction integration performed by the CM
needs to be matched by a PM set-up which provides more coordina-
tion between phases as well;
(2) When using In-House CM where NAVFAC personnel would perform the
CM function describedin Chapter 4, it would be unnecessary to
have Task and Site-Oriented PM organizations since the In-House
CM people could handle many of the PM responsibilities as well as
the CM function;
(3) When procuring construction in the traditional manner, it would
be unnecessary to have more elaborate PM organizations than
presently exist since design and construction are separate and
distinct functions, and less process integration is required.
Thus, the value of a more sophisticated PM organization would
probably provide little return for the resources invested in it;
(4) When using the traditional method to procure construction, it
would be unwise to use the Late Design Cycle, where design does
not commence until the construction funds are available;
(5) When using a Construction Consultant in the design phase of a
project, more emphasis on the PM function may be appropriate;
however, not to the extent that the On-Site-OICC concept would
be required. In this case only one contract would still be
awarded in a traditional manner to the lowest bidding general
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Fig. 7.1, Morphological Analysis Model,
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contractor. Therefore, the On-Site-OICC PM, which is designed to
allow award and total administration of contracts at the local
level, would serve no purpose.
When comparing various CM concepts with PM organizations, the
"Task," "ROICC," and "On-Site-OICC" PM's appeared to be acceptable with
the "Pure" and GMP - CM systems regardless of cyclical strategy. On
the other hand, the Construction Consultant and In-House CM approaches
are more compatible with the Existing PM and the Centralized PM organiza-
tions regardless of the cyclical strategy used.
The problem of which of the three PM strategies to use with the
Pure and GMP-CM approaches then becomes one of practicality. Task PM
systems call for a full time PM and perhaps a small staff dedicated to
one project and that one alone. Even though GSA uses this task type-PM,
it becomes readily apparent to this writer as a CEC officer himself that
NAVFAC certainly does not have the officer assets and probably not the
civilian assets to devote a full time PM to all large (over $5 million)
projects. On certain occasions this may be possible, but not if a
derision rule is applied to use CM on all projects over $5 million.
The ROICC and On-Site-OICC PM's are basically adaptations of the
existing ROICC office. It is proposed that this adaptation strategy is
the best approach for use with full service CM provided by private firms
for the following three reasons :
(1) It recognizes the fact that at the same location numerous projects,
which are below the economical size for CM treatment, are being
performed in the traditional manner, and as such they must be
administered in the established way.
(2) It is personnel efficient by not requiring the full time
commitment of people exclusively to one project.
(3) It is site-oriented. Throughout the text of this entire paper,
the site-orientation of the CM has been stressed. From the market
study to the supervision and inspection of the miltiple contractor's
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work, the success of the CM is closely related to the v^?ork he
does at the project site. In many cases the A-E's office is
even in the community near the site. Thus, what better place to
work with and observe the performance of the CM than at the
site itself? Under the On-Site-OICC PM arrangement, even the
bid openings can be held in the local area.
When considering the more plausible of the 75 different models,
the comparisons and tradeoffs and the advantages and disadvantages of
various combinations could take a tremendous effort to develop as well as
to comprehend. It is also a comparative effort which is subject to little
quantification. As a result. Table 7.1 was developed to make a comparison
of the 14 most logical combinations of CM concepts, PM organizations and
cyclical strategies; and to compare them on their predicted performance
on each aspect of a project and on the possible impact they would make on
the NAVFAC military construction program as a whole. Figure 7.2 is
provided to complement Table 7.1 by showing how each of the models reacts
with the military construction program cycle in terms of when designs
begin and finish, and when construction starts and completes.
The first six models, A through F, are systems which use private
firms to perform the CM function. The PM organization used in Models
A-F is the On-Site-OICC project manager, which the writer considers
superior to all others for use on projects with a private CM. However,
it should be pointed out that use of the ROICC PM in Models A-F will
produce almost the same results on the aspects of the project and the
military construction program as the On-Site-OICC PM does. Thus, the
reader should be aware that in the first six project strategy models,
two PM models are quite appropriate. The On-Site-OICC PM was considered
slightly more desirable than the ROICC-PM because it appears to be a
little more responsive in decision-making concerning contracts. Taking
bids, awarding contracts, and reviewing and approving change orders
locally would seem to be more effective when done near the site, since
there will be a number of small and moderate contracts rather than one
big one. However, even on GSA's large CM projects with their task-
oriented PM's, the regional PBS contracts division takes bids, awards and
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handles the paperwork on all the construction contracts. Therefore, the
ROICC-PM organization should not be discarded as impractical just
because it does not appear in Table 7.1.
In reference to Models K through N, the in-house CM systems, the
effects that these models have on the various aspects of the projects and
the overall MILCON program are very similar to the ones caused by the
Pure CM systems in Models A-C. However, NAVFAC may encounter difficulty
in trying to make widespread application of this system on all large
projects. First, use of the in-house system would require much more
manpower, since NAVFAC would be assuming an additional responsibility
not generally considered in its workload. The task of construction
superintendence - the scheduling, coordinating, directing multiple
contractors - alone would require a significant increase in human resources
dedicated to the project. Since NAVFAC has been seeking ways to stretch
its own inspection manpower through techniques like Contractor Quality
Control, it seems that widespread application of Models K-N would be
impractical. Secondly, since NAVFAC lets contracts for nearly all major
construction within the States, the expertise of construction superin-
tendence for large, complex contract jobs has been developed in the private
sector rather than in the Navy. NAVFAC has significant capabilities in
project management and construction inspection to draw from; however, the
existence of experienced construction superintendents within the
Facilities Engineering Command is likely to be sparse. Thus, NAVFAC can
perform its own CM on a few projects and the comments in Table 7.1 are
applicable for those cases; however, the limitation of human resources
prevents its widespread use.
7 . 3 Selecting Among Alternative Procurement Systems
Each of the models listed in Table 7.1 has its own set of positive
and negative characteristics. However, a few models are worthy of special




The best of the CM alternatives as listed in Table 7.1 is the one
designated as Model "B," Pure CM with On-Site-OICC PM in a Delayed Design
cycle. This is the model where the CM has no financial risk in the project,
the project management function is handled by NAVFAC from the job site,
and design is commenced about 7-8 months prior to the receipt of the
construction funds. The advantages this system offers are:
(1) It allows NAVFAC to have the discretion to pick the head construc-
tor on the basis of his reputation and his proposed plan of
accomplishment for the project, with consideration given to the
cost of his services. People involved in federal government
construction have long moaned about selecting the low bidder,
regardless of his character and reputation. CM provides NAVFAC
the opportunity to select the construction leadership while still
remaining within the rules requiring competitive bids for all the
construction work itself.
(2) The CM will have to live with his constructability inputs made in
the design phase when he has to direct their installation in the
construction phase. This should eliminate the making of
suggestions which are untried or impractical, which were made
just to impress the PM with the great inputs the CM is making to
the project.
(3) It allows market inputs which are effective because the initial
market study is made only 7 to 8 months prior to the start of
construction.
(4) With the design commenced only 7 months prior to start of construc-
tion, the design still has a good chance of being relevant to the
users' needs, which can change quickly in the Navy's environment.
The design can also reflect the latest technological considerations.
(5) By using multiple contractors and bidding each work package a short
time before its respective portion of the job is required, the
uncertainty subcontractors have to account for in their bids is
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considerably reduced. This will have the effect of reducing the
cost as well.
(6) A design-construction cycle time of 31 months for projects over
$5 million improves the prospects of personnel continuity through
the entire process. This includes CM, PM, and A-E personnel.
(7) It allows for a good answer to the quality control dilemma. Since
quality control is provided by the CM, this reduces the workload on
Navy inspectors. Also, since the CM has no financial interest in
the project, the CM's inspectors can be expected to act in the
interests of NAVFAC rather than a contractor.
(8) It allows NAVFAC to select a CM who is skilled in using computer-
ized design-construction management information and control
systems, and network scheduling to provide information concerning
such things as projections for: (a) milestone points in the
design or construction; (b) dates when government furnished equip-
ment is required; and (c) the usable completion date. This type
of data has alv^;ays been important to NAVFAC, and under this model
the provision of information systems is a primary duty of the CM.
Under the existing system, even the limited information the gen-
eral contractor has to provide, such as an initial CPM schedule,
is in reality a secondary requirement of his contract. As a result,
it gets secondary treatment.
(9) It should produce the lowest total project cost, especially if
the CM's fee less any reimbursable work done by its construction
forces remains in the range of 2 to 3 percent. In referring to
Fig. 4.13, it can be seen that a general contractor charges 3 to
5 percent of subcontract costs for management, 15 percent of his
own forces' portion of the work for profit, contingency, and
overhead. CM fees in the range experienced by OS A should produce
projects at a cost less than if the jobs were accomplished under
the existing traditional approach. 'vVhen one adds the cost savings
generated by the CM's construction and market inputs to the design,
the cost of the project should be below the traditional
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approach. Most users of CM services claim the major cost savings
are created by inputs to the design.
(10) Starting the design only 7-8 months before the appropriation of
construction funds minimizes "design breakage," since projects
have survived all but the Congressional review.
(11) One of the most important advantages is that starting the design
only 7-8 months before the appropriation of construction funds would
allow some possible reductions in the planning and programming,
cycle, with construction still completing at the earliest possible
date. Referring to Fig. 7.2, it can be seen that a user activity's
wait for a needed facility is determined to a greater extent by
the planning and programming time, rather than by the length of
the design and construction period. As noted previously, analysis
of the planning and programming cycle is not within the scope of
this thesis, since it could be the topic of a lengthy study as
well; however, use of this model with its later design start
date would remove one requirement for an early start to the process
of turning facility needs into completed construction. The net
effect of a reduced planning and programming cycle on the "front
end" of the overall project cycle would be a facilities production
system that is more responsive to the Navy's current requirements.
The disadvantages that Model "B" Vi70uld present are:
(1) Since the design development could not begin until a later date
this system would not provide the extensive supporting documenta-
tion now provided by a design which reaches the 30 percent stage
well before the Congressional hearings. This writer understands
that NAVFAC is currently attempting to restructure the format of
the documentation which is presented to Congress, to eliminate a
number of details about the technical aspects of the project. If
information such as the construction material to be used and
quantities and cost breakdo\-;ns for details of the project could
be eliminated, the need for extensive supporting documentation
would diminish. In that case, EFD design divisions could then
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provide program cost estimates which would probably be reliable as
fairly detailed estimates made by A-E's at least eight months
before construction bids can be taken. Congress then could
concentrate on the real issues, like the validity of the
facility requirement and reasonableness of the project price,
instead of why the Navy is using one material over another, and
so forth.
(2) The overall project risk is borne by NAVFAC. It could be argued
that in reality NAVFAC bears the large majority of the project
risk under the traditional approach anyway. Unforeseen site
conditions, changed requirements, and design errors are the
responsibility of NAVFAC on its existing projects, and NAVFAC is
still the ultimate loser when a contractor falls way behind in
his schedule or goes bankrupt, because the Navy is deprived of a
facility's use for an additional period of time. NAVFAC has the
potential to withstand project risk better than a general contrac-
tor. Even tliough a project may be large, NAVFAC with its large
number of authorized jobs, $600 million appropriated annually, and
centrally managed contingency funds, can withstand a cost over-
run without destroying its program. On the other hand, to the
general contractor the project represents a large segment of his
volume and a cost overrun on that one project could destroy his
company. The general contractor compensates for the high degree
of risk he assumes by adding sufficient contingency to his bid
to help him withstand adverse events. Statistically then, NAVFAC
has a better chance of withstanding project cost overruns since
over a large number of projects all over the world the over-
runs will be counter balanced by underruns . However, NAVFAC does
face one big obstacle to truly flexible contingency fund manage-
ment and that is the limit on cost escalation at any one Navy or
Marine Corps installation of 5 percent. The individual project
escalation limitation of 25 percent seems quite adequate and even
the procedures for exceeding that, only involve sending a written
notification to Congress where if not ansv^ered within 30 days,
the request for exceeding that limit is considered approved.
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Therefore, a real contributor to the risk burden of NAVFAC
under this model is an arbitrary escalation limit of 5 percent set
by Congress for the sum of all projects at any single installation.
Recision of this constraint would greatly reduce the disadvantage
that risk assumption presents to NAVFAC.
(3) Since there would be approximately 20 contracts on a project
instead of one, there will be an increase in contract administra-
tion processing and paperwork. However, since this model (the
commonly accepted break even point over which CM services are
considered cost effective) would only be used for large projects
over $5 million and since projects this size are a small minority
of the total number of projects NAVFAC performs by contract, the
impact on overall contract administration should be small.
(4) Even though this model provides for completion of construction as
early as any system, including the existing one, the project may
not qualify as a bona fide "construction start" vs/ithin its program
year which is defined as having 50 percent of the estimated
construction cost under contract. This is because contract
awards for this model are made at various times throughout the
construction phase, whereas, the traditional approach with the
lump sum award at the beginning easily qualifies as a "construction
start." Since the level of within program year "construction
starts" are used to justify funding levels for next year's
program in Congressional hearings, this goal is quite important.
The significance of this disadvantage may be reduced, however,
if the criterion for a construction start was changed to perhaps
the award of the first construction contract, the same Congres-
sional requirement for preventing the expiration of the two year
project authorization.
Even though the Model "B" alternative is the writer's first choice,
it must be recognized that required changes, emitted as feedback in the
thesis model presented in Section 1.10, must be made to the constraint
"sieves" of the system. Inability to make these changes may dictate the




If, for example, (1) supporting documentation cannot be reduced
thus requiring the continued use of an Early Design Cycle, and (2)
the continuance of the 5 percent cost escalation limit on "same year"
MILCON projects at individual military installations discourages NAVFAC
from wanting to formally accept overall project risk, an alternative model
may provide a better solution. Model D, the Guaranteed Maximum Price-CM,
On-Site-OICC Pm, using an Early Design Cycle, may be more appropriate for
this given set of circumstances. This is the model where the CM now
accepts the financial responsibility should the project cost exceed an
established ceiling price, NAVFAC ' s project management is performed on
the job site, and the design is commenced two years prior to the time
when construction funds are made available.
Many of the advantages of Model B given in the preceding subsection
would be retained. Those remaining advantages would include:
(1) NAVFAC 's ability to choose the head constructor
(2) The CM having to implement ideas he implanted into the design
(3) The reduction of uncertainty among contractors bidding on separate
packages
(4) NAVFAC ' s ability to retain a CM with scheduling and management
information and control expertise.
Model B's purported disadvantages of not providing supporting
documentation and assuming the project risk would be eliminated. However,
the following tradeoffs are required:
(1) The reduced effectiveness of initial market inputs since they are
required two years before construction can start
(2) A reduction in design relevancy to facility user's needs and to
the latest technology
(3) Reduced chances for personnel continuity
(4) Quality control (Q.C.) reverts to NAVFAC or it is performed by
the CM in a similar manner to the existing CQC system. The CM's
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financial interest in the project could now influence the
effectiveness of his quality control program.
(5) The overall project cost should still be less than the existing
general contractor system, however, NAVFAC must pay the CM for
the cost of risk assumption,
(6) Since the project is committed to design at an early date, the
chances are somewhat reduced that the project will survive all
the levels of review and approval.
(7) The potential for reduction in the planning and programming cycle
time is lost.
The disadvantages of increased contract administration workload
due to multiple contracts for each large project and the inability to
achieve the arbitrary "construction start" goal (50 percent of estimated
construction cost in contract awards) still remain with Model D.
7.3.3 Third Choice
If the last two disadvantages cited in the preceding paragraph
cannot be coped with or if the overriding preference remains strong for
the concept of the single lump sum contract with the low bidding general
contractor, there is still an alternative to provide some integration of
design and construction. Model H offers a Construction Consultant to
work in the design phase, with a Centralized Project Management organiza-
tion, and an Early Design Cycle. Under this model a general contractor
performs the construction in a traditional manner, NAVFAC 's overall
project management function is handled from their Engineering Field
Division, and design cominences two years before construction funds are
received. This model eradicates all the disadvantages of Models B and C,
however, it also contains none of the advantages listed for Model B. The
overall project cost should still be less than a traditional project with
no construction input to design since most of the savings generated on
CM projects are purported to be made by way of these inputs. The fact
that these inputs are made so far in advance of the construction phase
and by a firm other than the general contractor who will have to direct
their implementation, reduces the effectiveness of the inputs. However,
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they will still produce a significant cost saving over the alternative
of making no construction inputs whatsoever into the design.
7.4 Importance of Feedback Considerations
It becomes evident from Figs. 7.1 and 7.2, Table 7.1 and the
discussion of this chapter that the selection of a contract construction
procurement strategy is a complex decision. Even though three options
were discussed in this chapter, the reader should note that these model
systems are not ready for immediate implementation. It must be recog-
nized that each of these models generates feedback to the environment in
which Navy contract construction is performed and which is graphically
illustrated by the thesis model presented in Section 1.10 These feedback
considerations include such items as:
(1) Will the model make NAVFAC more responsive in meeting the
construction requirement of the Navy in terms of the time that
a facility requirement emerges to the day the user occupies the
new structure?
(2) Will it be cost effective?
(3) What will be the effect on quality?
(4) Can constraints such as the 5 percent escalation limit and the
criterion for a "construction start," be met or even changed?
(5) What would be the behaviorial reaction of the participants and
particularly NAVFAC personnel? If negative, do the potential
benefits of the model merit efforts to deal with and change their
opinion?
(6) What internal organizational shifts and procedural changes must
be made to maximize the benefits of the model?
The list 'of feedback considerations could go on and on. Any attempt to
adopt one of the proposed models without determining the feedback effects
could be disastrous. After the feedback effects are included in the
earlier sections of the systems model, another pass through the model





In this chapter a synthesis of the alternative CM concepts, PM
organizations and cyclical strategies into model construction procure-
ment systems has been made. The writer has ventured predicted results
and effects of using these models based upon knowledge gained in
researching this topic. However, the main contribution this chapter
makes to the selection of a construction procurement system is not totally
in the predicted results of using the selected models in Table 7.1 since
the entire table is restricted by the biases and limitations of this
writer. The main contribution is the framework Table 7.1 and Fig. 7.2
provide for an expanded analysis of a problem which is largely unquanti-
fiable. Inputs from additional people who have a good working knowledge
of a variety of procurement techniques can provide additional project and
program aspects and/or new models which need to be considered . They can also
provide their own predicted effects for existing and newly defined
factors. In this way the views of numerous individuals concerning
varieties of construction procurement systems can be brought out of the
realm of generalization and into a model by model and item by item com-
parison from which the most adaptive system can be identified.
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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8. 1 Summary
This chapter is the output or the last component of the thesis
systems m.odel introduced in Section 1.10. A quick review of the key points
of the preceding chapters may provide a clearer understanding of these
conclusions and recommendations.
In Chapter 2, it is evident that the goals of the Department of
Defense and the Department of the Navy are of paramount importance and the
benefits derived from actions in support of these goals is often non- «
quantifiable. However, the readiness environment of the military is often
cast in conflict with the Congressional environment which supports a
responsive armed force, but primarily stresses cost consciousness and
equal treatment for contractors who do work for the services. Another
element of the environment is the construction industry which is fragmented
into small functional and specialized units and is sometimes characterized
by inefficient management practices. A final element of the Navy construc-
tion environment is the organizational structure of the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command which is designed to accomplish many other facility
related functions in addition to design and construction.
In Chapter 3 it was learned that the planning and programming
process for new facilities is very comprehensive, sophisticated and some-
what lengthy. The implementation process - the design and construction -
is performed by the sequential technique of design, bid and construct.
The portion of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command's organization
concerned with the design and delivery of construction is organized in
a manner which suits this traditional procurement approach.
On these traditionally performed projects, Chapter 5 indicated




design and construction. However, the design and construction time does
not tell the entire story, because a project construction start date and
eventual completion date are now a function of when the funds are
appropriated by Congress. The large projects sampled showed some need
for improvement in getting construction underway and completing at an
earlier date. NAVFAC has responded to the need for getting construction
underway sooner by trying to have as many designs as possible completed by
the time construction funds are appropriated. In many cases, NAVFAC is
starting designs two years in advance of the appropriation to achieve
these earlier construction start goals. Also, NAVFAC projects showed
some need for construction consideration in the design phase and for
improvement in the quality control system.
In Chapter 4 the CM method was discussed from a number of angles
to provide more specific information about CM and hopefully, remove
some misconceptions about the system. It was pointed out that the CM
replaces the general contractor, but CM is a much different contracting
technique in that the constructor participates in the design phase and
works on a professional basis with the owner/project manager. The CM
system is well adaptable to owners with large facilities engineering
and management staffs, because the method requires increased involve-
ment on the part of the owner's organization.
Chapter 6 described how CM was instituted in two federal construc-
tion agencies to reverse the dreadful time and cost performance of their
projects. Each agency, the General Services Administration and the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, uses conceptually different
CM systems because of their different in-house project management organiza-
tions and methods of funding. The GSA's large, estiblished facilities
engineering organization, the Public Building Service, allows it to
dedicate a government project manager to each CM job and its Federal
Building Fund provides it with flexibility of financial resources, so
the "pure" CM approach is very applicable to this situation. GSA has the
resources to assume the overall project risk and apparently has reaped
the benefits of using this CM approach since the six CM projects completed
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to date have all performed within the budget and averaged just over
three years from start of design to completion of construction, which is
down from the five years experienced under the traditional approach.
HEW ' s limitations on project overruns and dispersion of funds to diverse
owners in widely scattered locations requires them to exercise project
control through the use of Guaranteed Maximum Price CM. Under this
approach the CM has the financial risk and thus, an incentive other than
his professional reputation to stay within the project budget. The key
problem areas in the use of these nev; approaches have been
(1) CM ' s not performing up to the expectations of the ovmer/project
managers , and
(2) lack of specific delineation of the CM's requirements by the
owner/project manager.
In Chapter 7 a framework for analysis was presented which
emphasized that analyzing the use of the CM alternatives must be done
in a systems context. In this case, the system whose purpose is the
procurement of contract construction for the Navy includes three
dimensions
:
(1) the CM concept
(2) the Navy's Project Management organization, and
(3) the cyclical strategy (or when the Navy should start design)
From these parameters fourteen model systems were presented and analyzed
for their effect on project and program performance. All the models had
positive and negative aspects, but three conceptually different systems
were recommended in the order of their desirability. The first choice
system. Model "B" from Table 7.1 used a Pure CM concept where CM's
relationship to the Navy is purely professional. The second and third
choices. Models D and H, used a Guaranteed Maximum Price-CM and a
Construction Consultant (design phase participation only) respectively
where the financial risk is borne by the CM or general contractor. The
two other dimensions of each model, the Project Management organization
and Cyclical Strategy, were combined with the corresponding CM concept
to form a procurement system. None of the three selected were exactly
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suited to the constraints of the existing system and each required
different types of tradeoffs to achieve the benefits the model system
offered. The constraints which had to be overcome for the most
desirable system v;ere more "fixed" than the ones of the less desirable
systems. "Fixed" here, and as defined by the thesis model of Section 1.10,
means the constraints are imposed at a higher level where it is harder to
make a change. In the case of the first choice CM model, some Congres-
sional constraints would have to be changed to realize the benefits of
the model. The fact that Congressional requirements which constrain the
first choice may seem somewhat arbitrary does not make them any less real.
8 .2 Conclusions
Since Chapters 1 through 6 have presented elements of the systems
and Chapter 7 introduced an extensive number of alternative model system.s,
the following conclusions will concentrate on the total effect of using
CM and its related approaches.
Conclusion 1 . Integration of design and construction can benefit
the procurement of contract construction by the Navy. First, it is one
of the major ways in which the Naval Facilities Engineering Command can
become more responsive to the needs of the operating forces. If the design
can be started later in the project life cycle, but still allow construc-
tion to start as soon as construction funds are available, which is
possible through CM, some pressure will be taken off the planning and
programming cycle. If improvements can be made to the planning and
programming cycle, then the time from when a requirement goes into the
"hopper" until the requirement is satisfied by a completed project can be
reduced. This will have the side effect of reducing NAVFAC ' s risk to
changed requirements of the proposed user and eliminate the need for
frequent revalidation of the requirement. Further integration would not
only increase responsiveness, but it would also maximize the utilization
of available resources. Secondly, integrating methods like CM would
satisfy the primary goals of Congress in that it would tend to produce
lower cost projects, stimulate high levels of small business participation
and comply with the required use of competitive bids. Thirdly, NAVFAC 's
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in-house organization would benefit from exposure to constructability
inputs to design on large projects in that the idea and knowledge
exchange may have some effect on smaller projects for which no formal
construction inputs are provided. Finally, CM and other integration
techniques are growing and many of the better engineering and construc-
tion firms which have produced high quality projects now offer this
service
.
Conclusion 2 . The use of CM concepts would not create
significant disruptions to the existing system. First, the CM uses the
existing elements of the structurally fragmented construction industry
such as small specialty contractors, and architects and engineers to
optimize their collective performance. In fact, the CM approach may
even help achieve some order when the economy is booming again and
construction labor and material prices begin to rise so as to create
uncertainty in the minds of bidders. Secondly, NAVFAC ' s basic organiza-
tion will not change as a result of using CM except relatively minor
adjustments are required to accommodate the appropriate PM alternative.
This is important because the bulk of NAVFAC ' s construction work is on
projects less than $5 million that will be accomplished through the
traditional contracting method. Also, the chaos generated by substantial
organizational change is avoided. Finally, the constraint changes which
must be made by the Congress to accommodate the most desirable CM model
do not appear significant. Changes to the 5 percent installation
escalation limit and supporting documentation requirements which require
technical aspects of each project be presented, would not alter the
manner in which Congress reviews and approves the annual Military
Construction program.
Conclusion 3 . The disadvantages of using CM are outweighed by
the advantages. The primary disadvantage is the overall project risk
assumed by NAVFAC. However, when taking a "macro-view" of the Military
Construction program and momentarily assuming the 5 percent installation
escalation limit is not required, NAVFAC may more effectively assume the
risk than a CM or general contractor. For example, a $10 million project
to a contractor could represent 20 percent of his current volume. Thus,
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he must charge NAVFAC a sufficient amount for contingency whereas this
particular NAVFAC project may represent less than 2 percent of its entire
annual Military Construction program. Statistically, NAVFAC with a larger
resource base and a larger number of projects can withstand the risk better
than a general contractor or CM and therefore, reap the resulting cost
savings and if the disadvantages created by the Congress, such as the
5 percent installation escalation limit and the technical construction
data required in the supporting documentation that are basically suited
to the traditional procurement method could be changed, the major obstacles
to CM would be dissolved. Without these constraints the potential
advantages or time reduction, cost savings, improved quality control,
and increased project control by NAVFAC could be realized by the implemen-
tation of a CM system.
Conclusion 4 . The existing procurement system of NAVFAC is not
presently suitable for the immediate use of CM in spite of all the potential
benefits to be gained from using the system. Adjustments must first be
made to:
(1) provide for the appropriate PM organization
(2) provide the appropriate cyclical strategy for design and construc-
tion
(3) remove the Congressional constraints which appear to be minor,
but which would have significant influence on the success of the
CM approach
(4) reduce the planning and programming time to fully realize time
savings in the project life cycle
One exception is that a CM could be utilized by NAVFAC for emergency
projects which are funded through reprogramming, or projects for which
funds are immediately provided and for which no preliminary engineering
work has been done. In these cases, construction usually needs to be
completed at the earliest possible date so a CM phased constructed




Six basic recommendations are presented as a result of the
research findings, and evaluation of the CM approach and its application
to the Navy's system for construction procurement. The first four are in
logical order of the steps to be taken for further research and study of
the subject. Recommendations 5 and 6 are of a more general nature.
Recommendation 1 . Since this thesis is only an exploratory study,
a more in-depth and comprehensive study needs to be made into the cost
and schedule performance of large Navy projects and CM projects for the
General Services Administration and the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare. The study of Navy projects could address the effectiveness
of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command in meeting its user's require-
ments, needs and expectations plus evaluating the performance of more
specific items such as
(1) Project Cost
(2) Project Life Cycle Time




The expanded study of HEW and GSA could gather more specific data on the
projects presented in Chapter 6 plus additional projects in both agencies.
Hopefully, these studies would divulge more subjective information about
governmental CM projects that was unavailable for this study. More
specific information needs to be gathered about the impacts of CM on the
owner/project manager's organization, the behavioral and attitudinal
reactions of the project participants to CM, the quality of the job and
the enforcement of warranty provisions. More in general information is
required to determine the trend of the construction industry toward
design-construction integration and the project value cut-off point below
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which it becomes uneconomical to use CM. Implementation of this
recommendation would actually represent the second pass through the
thesis systems model of Section 1.10.
Recommendation 2 . If CM still appears to be an attractive
alternative, a study of the Navy planning and programming system should
be undertaken with a goal of reducing the time between the point at
which a routine project must go into the system and the point at which it
must be presented to the Congress in order to be considered within a
specific program year. The automation of the Shore Installations and
Facilities Planning and Programming System which has taken place in
NAVFAC in the last few years may help in reducing the slack time in some
areas. If a significant reduction in planning and programming time is
possible, then the use of CM becomes a highly attractive alternative.
Recommendation 3 . If the CM alternative still has a potential
attraction for Navy projects, the next step would be a test program. The
test should include the use of one or more CM concepts with the corre-
sponding PM organizations and cyclical strategies on a number of "routine"
Military Construction projects. By using routine projects, procedures for
the use of CM can be developed in a noncrisis environment. This is
important since at this stage the Navy would still be at the beginning of
the learning curve for CM utilization. CM procedures, contracts, control
systems and other technology developed by GSA and HEW should be used to
the maximum extent possible to minimize development costs to the Navy.
GSA and HEVJ have learned a great deal about CM in the last few years and
as a result they have made adjustments to their systems which could prevent
owner/project managers new to the CM system from avoiding some of the
same pitfalls. The test project must be staffed by a highly qualified CM
and the requirements of the CM must be explicitly stated since these were
the two main problems experienced in governmental CM systems and identified
in Chapter 6.
It is important to emphasize that the results of the Navy CM
projects should be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively. NAVFAC
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should not take the precarious step of GSA and HEW who totally coramitted
themselves to the use of CM on large projects without establishing any
feedback mechanism to help measure program effectiveness. The results of
these test projects should be evaluated in order to determine the true
benefits and disadvantages of using a CM approach.
Recommendation A . If the use of CM appears to be effective on the
test projects performed by NAVFAC, then CM systems should be used for
emergency and other high-priority projects since they are usually needed
in a hurry and since it is likely that the construction funds have already
been allocated before design even begins. The overlapping of design and
construction on these types of projects can result in significant project
time reduction. Enough NAVFAC expertise would have been developed by
this point on the routine test projects to effectively cope with problems
on the crisis jobs. Even if NAVFAC elected to continue the use of the
traditional approach on normal Military Construction projects, CM could
still be used on these emergency projects to cut project delivery time,
plus it would give NAVFAC the flexibility to be able to adapt to a CM
procurement approach should it become the dominant contracting technique.
Recommendation 5 . Construction inputs to design can help NAVFAC
projects now. Even the use of a construction consultant could provide
cost saving inputs into the design at the present time. If a CM
approach is later chosen for use by NAVFAC, the prior use of a construc-
tion consultant in the design phase of NAVFAC projects may serve to ease
the adaptation period when CM systems are implemented.
Recommendation 6 . If further consideration of CM is to be
undertaken as recommended, then steps should be taken at an early date to
continue studying the topic. To convert from the traditional approach to
a CM approach may take a number of years considering the in-depth studies
and test projects that should be undertaken to truly evaluate the system.
The General Services Administration fully committed themselves to CM in
1970 and to date they have only completed six projects. Therefore, it




QUESTIONS POSED TO SENATOR JOHN TOWER CONCERNING
THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
1. In examining a proposed Military Construction Budget, what are the
key items you look for?
2. Do you measure the effectiveness of the services in implementing
their respective military construction programs in terms of the
amount of financial obligations made by each service against last
year's authorized and appropriated funding level?
3. Does the Congress concern itself with following authorized and
appropriated projects through to completion? Is effectiveness in
this area examined?
4. Does Congress concern itself with the responsiveness of construction
to fill a requirement? In other words, is the time lag between
emergence of a requirement and completion of construction examined?
5. Are the supporting documents for proposed projects provided for you
by the services satisfactory? Are they lacking in any areas? Are
they providing more information than is necessary in any areas?
6. What do you consider are the main functions of the committees that
examine military construction programs (programs' contribution to













This is in response to your letter of August 13, 1975, requesting my views
on various aspects of the military construction budget. For your convenience
I shall answer your questions in their original order below.
1
.
The key items to look for in examining a proposed Military Construction
Budget are the requirement by the Services for it, and its cost.
2. I am generally not concerned v;ith measuring the effectiveness of the services
in implementing the respective military construction programs, only with
authorizations and appropriations.
3. The Congress does not generally concern itself with following authorized
and appropriated projects through to completion unless there are problems
requiring additional funding.
4. Again, the Congress does not concern itself with the responsiveness of
construction to fill a require.ment unless there are exhorbitant delays in
construction as a result of poor conceptual design.
5. Yes, the services are satisfactory in their provision of supporting documents
for proposed projects. No, they are not lacking in any areas. No, they are
not providing m.ore information than is necessary in any area.
6. The main function of the committees that examine military construction
programs is protection of taxpayer's monies by austere, prudent funding of
military construction essential to the defense of the country.
I hope this information is responsive to your needs. Lf you should need







LETTER USED IN REQUESTING INFORMATION ON LARGE NAVY PROJECTS
3 September 1975
Dear
(1) The purpose of this letter is to request project data to be used in
support of a Master's thesis in my postgraduate program at the University
of Texas at Austin. My thesis will explore the suitability of using
alternate forms of procuring construction to our traditional sequential
technique of design, bid, construct for large projects. In order to
effectively evaluate the impacts of any alternate system I need data and
information on large MCON projects done under the "traditional" system.
Your help in this effort would be greatly appreciated.
(2) The project(s) below was (were) selected from the EFD Field Execution
Report (NAVFAC Report H7140R40) . The project data in this report were
inadequate and/or substantially confusing to prevent an adequate evalua-
tion based on the report alone. These projects v/ere selected because
(1) the budget for the projects was in excess of $4,500,000, (2) they
seemed to be executed in a traditional manner (design, bid, construct in
sequence), and (3) they appeared to be either completed or substantially
unden^/ay. The selected project(s) is (are):
MCON PROJECT # FY DESCRIPTION
(3) The following data are needed on each of the above projects:

















RANGE OF BIDS $_





AMOUNT OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT AWARD
CONSTRUCTION DATA
# OF CHANGE ORDERS (Actual or projected) change orders











SUBJECTI VE COMMENTS (i.e., on quality; problems with the construction
market (bidder interest, competition); "constructability" of design
(practicality, cost effectiveness); contractor management/scheduling
problems; material problems; etc.)
(4) If any of the above data are not available at your office, just leave
it blank and I will chase it do\m. If you are aware of any projects that
meet the criteria in Paragraph 2, I would appreciate data on those, too.
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(Project name, location, and number)
FIRM DATA
PRESENT ORGANIZATION





Name, address, telephone, person to contact?
(2) Name of parent company (if any)?
b. Types of Services .
(1) Construction management?
(2) Project management?
(3) General construction contracting, with building types?





c. Legal Form .
(1 Individual , partnership, corporation, joint venture, or other?
(2) Date and location of establishment or incorporation under
present name?
(3) Former names, locations, and dates (if any)?
(4) Names, titles, and addresses of firm owner, partners, or
officers?
(5) States and categories in which firm is legally Qualified
to do business?
d. Branch offices.
For each branch give:
(1) City, state, and telephone number?
(2) Number and type of personnel?
(3) Person in charge?
(4) Capability of performing independently of main office?




e. Operational Areas .
List geographic areas of the United States in which firm conduct
business and value of construction work put-in-place during the




Present number and type of employees in home office, and in
field offices (construction sites)?
(2) Number and type of employees during each of the past five
years?
(3) Average annual receipts for the preceding three fiscal years
g. Facil ities .
(1 Office space, equipment, and computers?





(2) Recruitment, orientation, training, and development?
(3) Employee benefits and privileges?
(4) Employee relations?
(5) Employee average length of service?
Employee Qualifications .
Describe design oriented and construction oriented capabilities
of personnel of your firm or joint venture, or consultants in
the following areas:






















In what technical disciplines do you consider your staff to be
exceptionally strong? Why? What are the names and specialties
of the particular experts.
d. Design Contact .
Have your key employees been in personal contact with the designers
or your construction projects during the design development?




What is your capability to sustain loss of key personnel
without adverse effect on a project or the firm?
(2) How do you minimize personnel shifts in projects?
(3) Recent history of key personnel turnover with dates,
names of personnel and projects, and causes for changes.
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT
a. Organization.
(1) Team, departmental, combination, permanent, temporary?
(2) Leadership and decision making?
(3) Top management involvement?
(4) Personnel recruitment, within firm or from outside?
(5) Number of personnel normally assigned to project during









(3) Working procedures, coordination, followup, and cooperation
with Contractors, A-E, and Owner?
(4) Inputting construction know-how?
(5) Market analysis?
(6) Interfacing construction contracts?
(7) Bid packaging and solicitation?
(8) Long range procurement?
Construction Related Operations .
(1) Extent?
(2) Personnel involvement, full, part time?
(3) Working procedures, coordination, followup, checking, and







(6) Technical support and consultants?
(7) Administration?
(8) Handling change orders, shop drawings, materials approvals,
samples, as built drawings, and claims?
(9) Labor relations?
(10) Construction facilities, equipment, materials, and manpower?
e. Overlap of Design and Construction .
Describe your experience in managing phased construction activities,
with particular emphasis on its special problems and their resolution.
f
.
Responsibility and Liability .
Discuss your review of the extent of your responsibility and
liability as a Construction Manager under the proposed GSA contract.
g. Associations .
With respect to joint ventures or associations with other firms,
please describe in detail previous associations on construction
projects in sufficient detail to demonstrate your ability to
effectively work with and manage a combination of firms. Indicate
who the firms were if they are different from the ones proposed
for this project.
h. Improvements .
What changes have been instituted in the last 5 years to improve
your operations? Why were they needed? Have they been successful?
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
Describe your firm's competence in the implementation and maintenance of
network-based construction management control systems and in the aopli-
cation of systematic cost control methods. Give answers to the following:
a. Do you use computer generated schedules for construction management?
b. Do you require separate contractors to prepare their own schedules?
Explain.
c. What is your experience in scheduling A-E activities?
d. What is your method of estimating construction requirements in
pre-construction planning?
e. To what level-of-detail should a construction schedule be defined?
f. Which method of diagramming schedules do you normally employ,
activity-on-arrow or precedence diagramming method? Explain.
g. Do you use cost-on-activities as a basis for control and/or
payment?
h. To what extent do you rely upon the capabilities of your sub-
contractors to provide estimating know how?
i. Do you employ computer accounting systems in your work?
j. How do you use your computer systems to forecast work-in-place,




k. What relationships do your narrative reporting systems have to
your automated systems?
1. Have you ever employed GSA's construction management control
system? Where? How? Results?
5. INNOVATION
Discuss your familiarity, involvement, and application of any of the
following techniques or systems:
a. Project Management,
b. Conceptual Estimating,
c. Life Cycle Costing,
d. Specifications System,
e. Building Systems and
f. Value Management.
6. WORKLOAD
a. Present Projects . List (giving names of projects, locations, owners,
estimated construction costs) work your firm resDonsible for, per-
cent of design completion and construction completion, and firms
associated with (if any).
b. Capacity . Describe in today's construction dollar the volume of
work which your firm can handle at this time with a) your present
force and b) with readily available augmentation (i.e. give number
and types of additional oersonnel required).
c. Long Term Record . List in today's construction dollars, the volume
of work your firm has handled for each of the past 5 years. Discuss
reasons for any major fluctuations.
7. LOCAL KNOWLEDGE
Show recent knowledge and experience with local construction conditions
in the proposed GSA project area.
8. PROCEDURES, CRITERIA, AND REGULATIONS
Discuss your familiarity with GSA's requirements based on your past
experience.
9. SOCIO-ECONOMIC
Describe your experience with:
a. Energy Conservation,
b. Environmental Control,
c. Equal Employment Opportunity,
d. Small Business Utilization,
e. Utilization of Minority Businesses,







Attach statement of financial condition including regular dated
statement or balance sheet.
n. REPUTATION
Give name, address, telephone number, and person to contact for any
of the following references you wish the Government to contact con-







g. Major Subcontractors, and
h. Major Suppl iers.
PROJECT DATA
General Note . Base your written answers to the following searching
questions on the actual experience of your firm or joint venture during
the last five years. The replies should be detailed and informative, and
cover all the facets of the questions.
12. PROJECT EXPERIENCE - GENERAL.
Describe your experience on completed construction projects giving
the following information on each project reported:
a. Project name and location;
b. Project description;
c. Construction cost;
d. Design start and completion dates;
e. Construction start and completion dates;
f. Actual work you oerformed;
g. Owner's name, address, telephone number, and oerson to contact; and
h. Architect-Engineer's name, address, telephone number, and oerson
to contact.
13. PROJECT EXPERIENCE - SPECIFIC.
For one or more of the above comoleted construction projects (maximum
of three) which you consider similar to or eauivalent to the croposed
GSA project, provide the following additional information:
a. Discuss any original or unique thinking or judgement exercised
by your staff during the design development or construction;
b. Number and subject of addendum issued during bidding; why they
were needed;
c. Number and subject of change orders issued during construction;





d. The total construction award amount compared to the final prebid
estimate;
e. Completed construction cost compared to the initial construction
award amount and to the construction estimate when design was
initiated;
f. The initial schedule in months for design and for construction
compared to the actual time spent;
g. Extent of your involvement in project problems during both design
and construction including any design or construction omissions,
errors, other deficiencies, or changed conditions;
h. Discuss your relationships with the owner; the architect-engineer
and the construction contractors (prime or sub);
i. Describe any post-construction problems in start-up, operation,
or maintenance;
j. If you were doing the project again, would you do anything
different? Why?
14. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
In what way were your duties and services on the foregoing projects
similar or equivalent to the services required in GSA's construction
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